Односи Индија-Пакистан

Misirkov

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Пакистан поставува илјадници војници на границта со Индија. Одамна се крчка работава, посебно по терорисичките напади во Мумбаи, но сега изгледа има кризна ситуација:

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20081226/ap_on_re_as/as_pakistan


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TpH_Bo_OkO

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Тешко дека ќе избие војна меѓу нив...имаат соработка на неколку клучни полиња. Башка што во Пакистан има многу индијци...
 

Justice for All

Tempus fugit
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Далеку е од војна, ама Пакистан е дефинитнивно loose cannon.
 
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New Delhi has told Islamabad that time is running out for Pakistan with the deadline of Dec 26th given by for a crackdown on so called terror groups which are charities for Hindu & Christians.
A leading publisher of geopolitical intelligence, Stratfor, has said that after the Nov 26th Mumbai attacks, India relayed a message to Pakistan via the US that they would be given thirty days to carry out significant actions in cracking down on Islamist militant proxies operating on Pakistani soil.

Islamabad has continued to deny that the terrorists who attacked Mumbai were from Pakistan.

The Stratfor report said: 'Pakistan's deadline, as far as we know, is Dec 26th, making Indian military action against Pakistan a very real and near possibility. The Indians have had a month to prepare their military operations against Pakistan, and Indian defence sources have revealed that these plans are ready to go into effect.'

Over the past month, the US has come down hard on Pakistan behind the scenes, making it clear that Islamabad will have to deliver on India's demands or else Washington will not be able to stand in New Delhi's way if and when India decides to act.

However, the report said that it is still unclear how far India will take this military campaign and to what extent the US operations in Afghanistan will be affected.

Discussions are taking place inside Indian defence circles over an escalatory military campaign, beginning with largely symbolic strikes in Pakistan's Kashmir against local offices.

Depending on Pakistan's ability to respond, Indian pressure could then be ratcheted up with precision air strikes in Pakistan's urban areas, including intelligence facilities and militant leadership hideouts.
http://www.daily.pk/local/other-local/8706-india-threatens-pakistan-with-deadline-for-war.html

Дефинитивно ке се изнервира некој.Сега место да се пресметува со талибанците Пакистан ке мора да префрлува трупи на границата со Индија.А и да влезат во војна прилично се изедначени.Ке биде долга и блесава војна.Се што ке се постигне е зацврстуванје на позициите на АК.Што знам ја би ја изиграл нерешена....ке остане на брбљање само...ама којзнае...
 

theMac3donian

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Пак ќе гинат Македонци.:smir:

Инаку ако Индија и Пакистан стапат во војна, Западните сили ќе мора да го евакуираат Авганистан. Горе беше наведено дека неможе пакистан и со талибанците и со Индија, па така талибанците или ќе се вратат да прават зулум во Авганистан или ќе им помагаат на Индија, што значи Западниот свет ќе го подржи Пакистан! Ако запад го подржи Пакистан, реална е шансата Русија и Кина (Шангајска Група) да го исфрли Пакистан како надгледувач и да стои позади Индија.

Краен резултат: Депопулација. (не верував во такви конспираси, ама светот на тоа оди изгледа).

Ама ај можеби нема да дојде до тоа. Можеби ова е исто како и последните 34256263 пати.
 

аце_шваба

ГОРД ВУЈКО
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Пак ќе гинат Македонци.:smir:

Инаку ако Индија и Пакистан стапат во војна, Западните сили ќе мора да го евакуираат Авганистан. Горе беше наведено дека неможе пакистан и со талибанците и со Индија, па така талибанците или ќе се вратат да прават зулум во Авганистан или ќе им помагаат на Индија, што значи Западниот свет ќе го подржи Пакистан! Ако запад го подржи Пакистан, реална е шансата Русија и Кина (Шангајска Група) да го исфрли Пакистан како надгледувач и да стои позади Индија.

Краен резултат: Депопулација. (не верував во такви конспираси, ама светот на тоа оди изгледа).

Ама ај можеби нема да дојде до тоа. Можеби ова е исто како и последните 34256263 пати.
брат ништо не те разбрав
де преведи на нашки малце:kesa:
 

theMac3donian

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Пак ќе гинат Македонци.:smir:

Инаку ако Индија и Пакистан стапат во војна, Западните сили ќе мора да го евакуираат Авганистан. Горе беше наведено дека неможе пакистан и со талибанците и со Индија, па така талибанците или ќе се вратат да прават зулум во Авганистан или ќе им помагаат на Индија, што значи Западниот свет ќе го подржи Пакистан! Ако запад го подржи Пакистан, реална е шансата Русија и Кина (Шангајска Група) да го исфрли Пакистан како надгледувач и да стои позади Индија.

Краен резултат: Депопулација. (не верував во такви конспираси, ама светот на тоа оди изгледа).

Ама ај можеби нема да дојде до тоа. Можеби ова е исто како и последните 34256263 пати.
брат ништо не те разбрав
де преведи на нашки малце:kesa:
1. Пакистан и Индија во војна.
- Пакистан се тепа на Индиската граница
- Талибанците на северната не се замараат нема кој да им пречи
- нон-стоп напади на мировните сили во Авганистан
- поради тоа што обама е на власт и народот не сака војна, сите таму ќе се повлечат.
- резултат: талибанците пак на власт
- ако не ова, ќе има крвопролевање во авганистан што значи цер регион ќе е зафатен.

2. Пакистан и Индија во војна
- Поради тоа што се прилично еднакви (макар мислам дека Индија има предност) двете страни ќе си бараат нови начини.
- Индија може да ги искористи талибанците (истите тие што се борат во Авганистан) за да го дестабилизира пакистан од внатре.
- Ако тоа се случи тогаш значи Индија-Талибанци а Пакистан-Запад (поради тоа што западот не ги сака талибанците)
- Ако пак тоа се случи ГОЛЕМА Е ШАНСАТА да Русија и Кина (Шангајска Група) ја подржат Индија.
- Ова не значи дека ќе има глобална пресметка, но значи дека некој пак ќе гине во интерес на САД и РУСИЈА (ЕУ и Кина), исто како што гинеа луѓе во Кореа и Виетнам.

3. Конспираси
- Па има гласини дека светските сили сакаат да ја намалат популацијата во светот, како демек полесно да се одржува планетата и тие да имаат поголема власт (помала толпа луѓе се контролира полесно).
- Тоа е конспираси и реално не верувам во тие гласини, но ако се препукат Индија и Пакистан тоа е неизбежно, што значи дека сакаш неќеш овие лудациве што зборувале барем делумно е точно.

4. Македонците ќе гинат
- Војниците во Авганистан
- Хунзите и Калашите во Пакистан.
 
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Тешко дека освен ситни погранични пушкарања ќе има нешто поголемо, зошто при евентуален поголем судир тешко дека страната што ќе почне да губи нема да посегне по својот нуклеарен арсенал, тоа им е јасно и на двете страни.
 
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Да го проанализираме индиско-пакистанскиот проблем:

Introduction

Ever since the partition of the sub-continent in 1947, when Britain dismantled its Indian empire, India and Pakistan have been arch rivals.
The animosity has its roots in religion and history, and is epitomised by the long-running conflict over the state of Jammu and Kashmir. This has recently escalated into a dangerous nuclear arms race.

The name Pakistan was derived from an idea first suggested in 1933 when a student, Chaudhuri Rahmat Ali, proposed that there should be a separate homeland which would be comprised of the Muslim-majority provinces in the north-west as well as the geographically contiguous princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. The name was formulated from: P for Punjab, A for the Afghanis of the north-west frontier, K for Kashmir, S for Sind and Tan denoting Baluchistan. The word also means land of the pure in Urdu.
The partition of the Subcontinent, however, led to severe rioting and population movement as Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus found themselves on the wrong side of the partitioned provinces of Punjab and Bengal. The latter of these became East Pakistan. An estimated half a million people died in communal violence, millions more became homeless.
Jammu and Kashmir, a collection of culturally distinct regions, were nominally brought under the rule of Sikhs in the early 19th Century. After the British fought the Sikhs in 1846, instead of assuming direct control over the area, Britain installed a Hindu ruler as Maharaja.
The Maharaja's territorial possessions included the Buddhist area of Ladakh, the predominantly Hindu region of Jammu, the majority Muslim valley of Kashmir, as well as smaller Muslim kingdoms in the west.
In the days of the British Empire, the state of Jammu and Kashmir was one of more than 560 autonomous princely states owing allegiance to Britain. At independence, the rulers were advised to join, by means of an instrument of accession, either of the two new dominions, India or Pakistan, bearing in mind their state's geographical position and the religion of their inhabitants.
By August 1947, the date of partition, the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir had not decided which dominion to join.
Over 50 years later, Pakistanis still believe that Jammu and Kashmir should have become part of Pakistan because the majority of the state's population, concentrated in the valley of Kashmir, is Muslim.
India, says the state of Jammu and Kashmir belongs to India because by the October 1947 instrument of accession, the Maharaja finally agreed to join India.
The first Indo-Pakistani war started after armed tribesmen from Pakistan's north-west frontier province invaded Kashmir in October 1947. Besieged both by a revolt in his state and by the invasion, the Maharaja requested armed assistance from the government of India. In return he acceded to India, handing over powers of defence, communication and foreign affairs. Both India and Pakistan agreed that the accession would be confirmed by a referendum once hostilities had ceased.
Historians continue to debate the precise timing when the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir signed the instrument of accession and the Indian army moved into the state, arguing that the Maharaja acceded to India under duress.
In May 1948, the regular Pakistani army was called upon to protect Pakistan's borders. Fighting continued throughout the year between Pakistani irregular troops and the Indian army.
The war ended on 1 January 1949 when a ceasefire was arranged by the United Nations, which recommended that both India and Pakistan should adhere to their commitment to hold a referendum in the state. A ceasefire line was established where the two sides stopped fighting and a UN peacekeeping force established. The referendum, however, has never been held.
In 1954 Jammu and Kashmir's accession to India was ratified by the state's constituent assembly. In 1957, it approved its own constitution, modelled along the Indian constitution. Since that time India has regarded that part of the state which it controls as an integral part of the Indian union.
To the west of the ceasefire line, Pakistan controls roughly one third of the state. A small region, which the Pakistanis call Azad (Free) Jammu and Kashmir, and the Indians call Pakistani-occupied Kashmir, is semi-autonomous. The larger area, which includes the former kingdoms of Hunza and Nagar, called the northern areas, is directly administered by Pakistan.
In 1962-3, following the 1962 Sino-Indian war, India and Pakistan held talks under the auspices of Britain and the US in an attempt to resolve their differences over Kashmir, but without success.
In April 1965, a clash between border patrols erupted into fighting in the Rann of Kutch, a sparsely inhabited region along the south-western Indo-Pakistani border. When the Indians withdrew, Pakistan claimed victory. Later, in August, hostilities broke out again in the 2nd Indo-Pakistani war, when the government of Pakistan launched a covert offensive across the ceasefire line into the Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. In early September, India retaliated by crossing the international border at Lahore. After three weeks, both India and Pakistan agreed to a UN-sponsored ceasefire.
In January 1966, the governments of India and Pakistan met at Tashkent and signed a declaration affirming their commitment to solve their disputes through peace
Indo-Pakistani relations deteriorated again when civil war erupted in Pakistan, pitting the West Pakistan army against East Pakistanis demanding autonomy and later independence. The fighting forced an estimated 10 million East Pakistani civilians to flee to India.
In December India invaded East Pakistan in support of the East Pakistani people. The Pakistani army surrendered at Dhaka and its army of more than 90,000 became Indian prisoners of war.
East Pakistan became the independent country of Bangladesh on 6 December 1971.
Regional tensions were reduced by the Simla accord of 1972 and by Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh in 1974. The Simla accord committed both sides to working through outstanding issues bilaterally and through the mechanism of working groups.
In relation to Jammu and Kashmir, the two countries agreed that the ceasefire line, which was renamed the Line of Control, would be respected by both sides "without prejudice to the recognised positions of either side".
In 1974 the Kashmir state government reached an accord with the Indian Government, which affirmed its status as "a constituent unit of the union of India". Pakistan rejected the accord.
In 1989 armed resistance to Indian rule began in the Kashmir valley. Muslim political parties complained that the 1987 elections to the state's legislative assembly were rigged against them, and they formed militant wings. Some groups demanded independence for the state of Jammu and Kashmir and others union with Pakistan.
Pakistan gave its "moral and diplomatic" support to the movement, calling for the issue to be resolved via a UN-sponsored referendum.
But the government of India maintained that Pakistan's support of the insurgency consisted of training and supplying weapons to militant separatists and repeatedly called for Pakistan to cease "cross-border terrorism".
During the 1990s, several new militant groups emerged, most of which held radical Islamic views.
The ideological emphasis of the movement shifted from a nationalistic and secularist one to an Islamic one.
This was in part driven by the arrival in the valley of Kashmir of large numbers of Islamic "Jihadi" fighters who had fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union in the 1980s.
 
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In 1996, Pakistani and Indian military officers met on the Line of Control dividing the state of Jammu and Kashmir to ease tension after clashes. The celebrations of 50 years of independence in 1997 in both countries coincided with a surge in diplomatic activity. During 1997, Indian and Pakistani foreign ministers met in Delhi.
After a second round of talks in Islamabad, they announced an eight-point agenda for peace talks, including discussion of the Kashmir issue. Although the talks ended in stalemate, both sides promised to meet again.
In a speech at the UN, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif offered to open talks on a non-aggression pact with India, proposing that both nations strike a deal to restrain their nuclear and missile capabilities.
In 1988 India and Pakistan had signed an agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities.
India has consistently rejected any third party mediation to help end Kashmir border clashes, saying differences should be solved in bilateral talks, according to the 1972 Simla agreement.
The 1980s had seen some diplomatic discussions aimed at resolving outstanding differences, between India and Pakistan. In 1982, the two rivals began unsuccessful talks on a non-aggression treaty. However, in 1984 Indian troops were airlifted to the Siachen glacier in northern Kashmir which increased tension in the area.
Pakistan retaliated by fortifying the glacier from its side of what has become known as the world's highest war zone.
The arms race between the rivals escalated dramatically in the 1990s. In May 1998, India conducted underground nuclear tests in the western desert state of Rajasthan near the border with Pakistan. In response, Pakistan conducted six tests in Baluchistan.
In the same year, Pakistan tested its longest range missile, the 1,500 km (932 mile) Ghauri missile, named after a 12th Century Muslim warrior who conquered part of india.
Both sides were heavily criticised by the international community for the tests as fears of a nuclear confrontation grew.
The United States ordered sanctions against both countries, freezing more than $20bn of aid, loans and trade. Japan ordered a block on about $1bn of aid loans.
Several European countries followed suit, and the G-8 governments imposed a ban on non-humanitarian loans to India and Pakistan.
The UN Security Council condemned India and Pakistan for carrying out nuclear tests and urged the two nations to stop all nuclear weapons programmes.
Relations between India and Pakistan improved again in February 1999 when Indian Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee travelled to Pakistan to meet Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.
They signed the Lahore accord pledging again to "intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir".
India had detonated its first nuclear device in1974. In 1989, Pakistan announced the successful test firing of its first long-range surface-to-surface missile, the Hatf-1 and Hatf-2.
In 1992 Pakistan said it had acquired the scientific know-how to make a nuclear bomb.
For the first time in nearly 30 years, in May 1999, India launched air strikes against Pakistani-backed forces that had infiltrated into the mountains in Indian-administered Kashmir, north of Kargil. Pakistan responded by putting its troops on high alert as the fighting built up towards a direct conflict between the two states.
India repeatedly claimed that Pakistani forces belonging to the northern light infantry, based in the Pakistani-administered Northern Areas, were engaged in the operations - a claim Pakistan consistently denied.
Pakistan insisted instead that the forces were "freedom fighters" fighting for the liberation of Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir.
At the height of the conflict, thousands of shells were fired daily, and India launched hundreds of airstrikes. The Red Cross reported that at least 30,000 people had been forced to flee their homes on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control.
Correspondents reported that about 20,000 people became refugees on the Indian side.
Both sides claimed victory in the conflict, which ended when, under pressure from the United States, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif called upon the infiltrating forces to withdraw.
In October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf led a military coup in Pakistan, deposing elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. General Musharraf's assumption of power was later validated by the supreme court of Pakistan for a period of three years.
The coup was, however, was condemned by the international community which called for elections and an immediate return to civilian government. Pakistan was also suspended from the Commonwealth.
The 11 September 2001 suicide attacks in the United States brought a rapprochement between Pakistan and the West. Pakistan agreed to co-operate with the US's campaign against Osama Bin Laden's al-Qaeda network and the Taleban rulers of Afghanistan. Tension along the line of control continued. The worst fighting for more than a year broke out in October as India, which continued to condemn Pakistan for cross-border terrorism, started shelling Pakistani military positions.
October saw a devastating attack on the Kashmiri assembly in Srinagar in which 38 people were killed. After the attack, the chief minister of Indian-administered Kashmir, Farooq Abdullah, called on the Indian government to launch a war against militant training camps across the border in Pakistan.
On 13 December, an armed attack on the Indian parliament in Delhi left 14 people dead. India again blamed Pakistani-backed Kashmiri militants. The attack led to a dramatic build-up of troops along the Indo-Pakistan border, military exchanges and raised fears of a wider conflict.
In January 2002 President Musharraf gave a keynote speech pledging that Pakistan would not allow terrorists to operate from Pakistani soil. He again called on the government of India to resolve the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir through dialogue.
India said it would wait for action to back up his words.
Значи главниот проблем како и обично, по глобална традиција, е за територија.
Кашмир и Џаму (или Жаму на француски) се спорни земји веќе 60 години.

Kashmir: The origins of the dispute


Current tensions go back decades

By Victoria Schofield, author of Kashmir in Conflict
In August 1947 when the Indian subcontinent became independent from Britain, all the rulers of the 565 princely states, whose lands comprised two-fifths of India and a population 99 million, had to decide which of the two new dominions to join, India or Pakistan.
The ruler of Jammu and Kashmir, whose state was situated between the two new countries, could not decide which country to join.
He was Hindu, his population was predominantly Muslim. He therefore did nothing.


Instead he signed a "standstill" agreement with Pakistan in order that services such as trade, travel and communication would be uninterrupted.
India did not sign a similar agreement.
Law and order
In October 1947, Pashtun tribesmen from Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province invaded Kashmir.
There had been persistent reports of communal violence against Muslims in the state and, supported by the Pakistani Government, they were eager to precipitate its accession to Pakistan.
Mountbatten favoured Kashmir's temporary accession to India


Troubled by the increasing deterioration in law and order and by earlier raids, culminating in the invasion of the tribesmen, the ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, requested armed assistance from India.
The then Governor-General, Lord Mountbatten, believed the developing situation would be less explosive if the state were to accede to India, on the understanding that this would only be temporary prior to "a referendum, plebiscite, election".
According to the terms of the Instrument of Accession, India's jurisdiction was to extend to external affairs, defence and communications.
Troops airlifted
Exactly when Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession has been hotly debated for over 50 years.

Nehru's representative met the ruler of Kashmir


Official Indian accounts state that in the early hours of the morning of 26 October, Hari Singh fled from Srinagar, arriving in Jammu later in the day, where he was met by V P Menon, representative of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and signed the Instrument of Accession.
On the morning of 27 October, Indian troops were airlifted into Srinagar.
Recent research, from British sources, has indicated that Hari Singh did not reach Jammu until the evening of 26 October and that, due to poor flying conditions, V P Menon was unable to get to Jammu until the morning of 27 October , by which time Indian troops were already arriving in Srinagar.
In order to support the thesis that the Maharaja acceded before Indian troops landed, Indian sources have now suggested that Hari Singh signed an Instrument of Accession before he left Srinagar but that it was not made public until later.
This was because Hari Singh had not yet agreed to include the Kashmiri leader, Sheikh Abdullah, in his future government. To date no authentic original document has been made available.
Pakistan immediately contested the accession, suggesting that it was fraudulent, that the Maharaja acted under duress and that he had no right to sign an agreement with India when the standstill agreement with Pakistan was still in force.
Pakistanis also argued that because Hari Singh fled from the valley of Kashmir , he was not in control of his state and therefore not in a position to take a decision on behalf of his people.
'Bad faith'
In the context of Pakistan's claim that there is a dispute over the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the accession issue forms a significant aspect of their argument.
By stating that the Instrument of Accession was signed on 26 October, when it clearly was not, Pakistan believes that India has not shown good faith and consequently that this invalidates the Instrument of Accession.
Indians argue, however, that regardless of the discrepancies over timing, the Maharaja did choose to accede to India and he was not under duress.
On the basis of his accession, India claims ownership of the entire state which includes the approximately one-third of the territory currently administered by Pakistan.
In 1949 Maharaja Hari Singh was obliged by the Government of India to leave the state and hand over the government to Sheikh Abdullah.
He died in Bombay in 1962.
 

Misirkov

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Грдиот Пртко: добра анализа само дај извор инаку бришеме без извор.

ИРА го уби лорд Луи Маунтбатен, инаку многумина веруваат дека неговите односно Британските ставови и колонијална пракса се во основата на проблемот.


Mountbatten favoured Kashmir's temporary accession to India
 
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Изворот:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/default.stm

Изворот:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/default.stm

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1762146.stm



How is the Kashmir situation affected by the current war in Afghanistan?
The Kashmir area is adjacent to Afghanistan and the agitation for Kashmir independence is sponsored primarily by fundamentalist Muslims in Pakistan and in Kashmir itself. Much of Al-Queda's terrorist activity has occurred in Kashmir. Because Pakistan claims all of Kashmir territory, it has covertly supported this activity. Moreover, the U.S. war against the Taliban has been regarded as a "Jihad" or holy war by Muslim fundamentalists and thus has exacerbated this already tense border dispute. The existence of a terrorist network in the region has provided a possible escape path for Al Queda activists in Afghanistan including Bin Laden.

What have been the recent developments in the dispute between India and Pakistan regarding Kashmir?
After reaching the brink of nuclear war regarding the Kashmir boundary dispute, there has been a promising momentum toward reaching a peaceful resolution. In January 2004, Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf agreed to embark on a process of normalizing relations between the two countries and resolving the Kashmir problem. But diplomats and analysts on both sides know that there quick-fix solutions to a dispute which has been the cause of two wars between India and Pakistan in the last 50 years.
In fact there has been very little progress and there is a fear that hostilities might resurface, particularly since there has been a change in leadership in India. This is true even for issues which have been agreed upon in principle; like the reopening of consulates in Karachi and Bombay. The Indian government wants peace talks to include all issues, not just the boundary dispute. They propose friendly exchanges, increased people to people contact and suggestions to promote trade and commercial links. But President Musharraf has remarked on more than one occasion that it is not possible to discuss trade and other subjects unless they coincide with substantive progress on the core issue of Kashmir.
http://www.newsbatch.com/kashmir.htm


Треба да бидеме практични и прагматични и да искористиме максимум од оваа ситуација.Ова ќе влијае на нашето евроинтегрирање дефинитивно.
Само нели,треба да пукне војна,а тоа никој од нас не може да го предвиди.
 
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Pakistan's present and future war
Saturday, January 03, 2009
Samson Simon Sharaf

India has carried out a revaluation of its strategic options with Pakistan, and the coming years could witness an all-out strategy of coercion by it, a strategy so effectively applied by Israel in the Middle East. India's biggest advantage in conceptual and technical military cooperation with Israel lies in the fact that its technology is largely indigenous and facilitates material transfer with no end-user problems. Pakistan is already engaged in a war of attrition and the future will be a serious test of its strategy of defiance and ability to ride out the crises as a cohesive nation state.

India's quest for security and response to perceived external threats is shaped and complicated by its past. India desires to exist as a great power with a capability of bullying its neighbours and turning them into vassal states. Pakistan has been the major impediment towards this India's quest for great-power status. Wary of the freedom struggle in Kashmir, an exaggerated threat of Islamic militants and fear of another Two Nation Theory from within, Indian strategists have been toying with the idea of using a small but lethal rapid-reaction force for a limited duration inside Pakistan. However, India cannot accomplish what it has failed to do in the past six decades, unless the breeze blows in its favour.

In the post-9/11 scenario, India sees an opportunity and is acting as a neo-realist to minimise the importance of Pakistan through high-profile coercion in line with international perceptions. In this India is even ready to forego its traditional mantra of keeping the great powers out of the region and to align with them for short-term gains. In the final analysis, India wishes to frame a politically discredited, ethnically fragmented, economically fragile and morally weak Pakistan. This can only happen if the role of the armed forces in Pakistan's policymaking is reduced, Punjab divided and the rallying call of Kashmir taken care of for good.

The Indian military structure is geared towards such a capability with active assistance from Russia and Israel, and now the USA and UK. Having allied itself closely with Israel, India will now seek a continuous harassment through heightened military coercion, control of river waters, diplomatic isolation and covert interference. Mumbai and any such incidents in future will continue to provide reason for such intimidation, all in concert with the US and western strategic objectives in the region.

Interestingly, much of the blame for having landed in the box and then pushed into a vulnerable position must also be shared by the Pakistani establishments of the past decade. Pakistan's declared nuclear capability was meant to deter all types of conflicts and pave the way for sustained economic growth, international stature, and a political solution of the Kashmir dispute, Through Kargil, Pakistan led India and the world to believe that notwithstanding a nuclear shadow, a limited military conflict in an existing conflict zone was still possible. Kargil, and later 9/11, changed international perceptions on an armed freedom struggle in Kashmir as well as Pakistan's relevance to the new form of threat: non-state actors. Seen in the backdrop of 9/11, it was the second effect that finally resulted in disownership of the freedom fighters in Kashmir by Pakistan while also resigning the Kashmir question to the impossibility of backdoor diplomacy.

The nuclear capability of Pakistan provides a very small window of opportunity to India to carry out a physical offensive action across the LoC or the international border. This action could be a raid in the form of hot pursuit through ground or helicopter-borne troops, precision air strikes with or without stand-off; remote-controlled targeting through a guided-missile attack, and in the worst case, an attempt to seize objectives close to the international border with little military but considerable political significance. India had a fully developed chemical weapons programme even before it signed the chemical weapons convention as a country not possessing chemical weapons. But it declared its arsenal soon after signing the convention and is not averse to using quickly diffusing chemical weapons. After 9/11, India has held war games and fine-tuned these concepts and implemented some in a very limited manner during the escalation on the LoC.

Hot pursuit, as the name suggests, is only possible in an already hot theatre like the LoC. These are launched through ground troops or heliborne forces. Such an option has little probability because of the bilateral ceasefire. But such an option, however remote, cannot be ruled out.

With the active assistance of Israel, some Indian aircrafts have acquired a beyond-visual-range, precision stand-off capability, something witnessed during the Kargil conflict. India may use its air force remaining inside its own territory and launch laser-guided munitions diagonally inside Pakistan. However, the selected targets should be within 20 kilometres of the LoC or the international border.

Precision strikes imply that Indian aircrafts will physically violate Pakistan's airspace and launch precision surgical strikes against selected targets from a very high altitude, or conventional bombing runs, or use heliborne troops. In such a situation, these aircrafts will be vulnerable to Pakistani air defence and the PAF.

In the cold start strategy, India positions forces with offensive capabilities in military garrisons close to the international border, equipped, trained and tasked to capture some nodal points along the international border, before the Pakistani forces can react. India may not succeed in such an operation without a massive air cover. In Indian strategic calculus, the timing and lightening speed of such operations will solicit immense international pressure on Pakistan so as to curtail Pakistan's conventional and nuclear response.

Notwithstanding such options hinging on military and diplomatic brinkmanship, India will benefit from the use of Israeli armed and surveillance drones operated by Israeli crews from inside India. Historical precedents for such cooperation already exist.

The whole body of war fighting reasoning in such limited conflicts warrants a level of rationality and comprehension of a common strategic language between the belligerents. This is technically impossible. Different actors would draw varying conclusions from an animated Graduated Escalation Ladder (GEL) always vulnerable to a Fire Break Point that could result in uncontrolled conventional and nuclear escalation. It is, therefore, most important that the decision to graduate a conflict rest solely with the political leaders of the country, wherein a common strategic parlance could be evolved with more ease.

Taking a leaf from the Israeli opaqueness in its nuclear doctrine, India over time has applied a conceptual innovation in her nuclear strategy. The Indian revision in the nuclear doctrine implies the ambiguity in the "no first use clause" through a declared no first use and pre-emptive retaliation to create a perception that it is making a coercive transaction from doctrine of limited conventional war to an opaque level of conflict in which the nuclear weapons remain in a very high state of alert. The implication is that India may flirt with the concept of a limited strategic coercion in the shadow of a very high non-degradable nuclear alert beyond Pakistan's capability to neutralise. It is also my opinion that, as of now, after having signed the Nuclear Deal with USA, India benefits from an extended US nuclear umbrella, and strategic and diplomatic support.

There are reliable reports from Afghanistan that Indian contractors are busy building billets and accommodation in Kabul and Bagram to station two Indian divisions in the area. At the same time, bids have been invited by the US Corps of Engineers to construct a divisional size cantonment in Kandahar. Hypothetically, troops in the garb of protection for Indian investments will actually seal off Afghanistan's Pakhtun regions from the North. Then the US, NATO and Indian troops will go for an all-out counter insurgency operation in the cordoned off Pakhtun areas. The effects of spill-over into Pakistan would be pronounced and the Durand Line would become a figment of imagination. Premised on the romantic notion of Pakhtun nationalism, the doors to Pakhtunkhwa would be opened. The USA would then select the shortest route to Afghanistan through the Arabian Sea and Balochistan.

Whatever the concept, scope and objective of such limited escalations, India, with its newfound allies, has decided to maintain a constant vigil and coercion of Pakistan over a prolonged period of time but well below a Fire Break Point. The obvious targets, in tandem, with its allies, will be addressed through diverse instruments like control of rivers, economics, diplomacy, international pressure, internal law and order, military intimidation and even insurgency. A trillion-dollar question is: will the USA be ready to occupy Balochistan for a secure supply corridor?
http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=155247
Interesno Indija ponudila 20000 vojnici za vo Afganistan a eve se spekulira deka vekje nagolemo se gradad kampovi.Isto taka vcera procitav deka se preseceni rutite za snabduvanje na SAD vo Pakistan .E sega ke bide interesno ako stvarno Indijcive se rasporedad na severnite granici na Pakistan i toa vo Avganistan.So tie 20000 vojnici i ako donesat zasiluvanja ostanatite NATO clenki(a planirano e ,Makedonija vklucitelno) ke sleduva goolema operacija a isto kako i avtorot na ovoj tekst i jas se prasuvam dali ke se osmeli SAD da okupira delovi od Pakistan,bidejki toa ostanuva izgleda edinstvena opcija za da gi neutraliziraat talibancite,ili pak pakistan ke reagira?

PS znaci ako ova scenario se ostvari najgolem dobitnik od nastanite vo Mumbai ke bide SAD.Ovie 20000 vojnici i te kako ke im bidat od polza.Eh kako nekavo prestcustvo imam deka zdravje zivot koga ke ostaram ke citam kniga nekoja "Al-Kaeda cedoto na CIA"......:) :) paranoicki zvuci znam obicno begam od vakvi scenarija,ama koga pa ke presmeta covek koj gubi koj dobiva "Al KAeda" najmalku im odi vo prilog na Muslimanite a najmnogu na SAD......
 
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