http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/03spring/malik.pdfFor New Delhi, Beijing’s military alliance with Islamabad remains a
sore point because the Sino-Pakistani nuclear nexus has introduced a new element of uncertainty and complexity in sub-continental strategic equations.
While the attention of world leaders and the media has been focused on the night marish scenario of a nuclear Armageddon in South Asia and large-scale mutual assured destruction leading to the deaths of 12 to 30million people, strategic circles in Islamabad and New Delhi have been discussing the pros and cons of a short, limited nuclear war in Kashmir.Media reports based on intelligence leaks have revealed the forward deployment by the Pakistani military of low-yield
(five kilotons or less) tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs).
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Such small battlefield nuclear weapons have a one-mile destruction radius and could be used effectively against large troop concentrations and advancing tank formations along the LoC in Kashmir.The Pakistanis seemto have taken a page out ofChina’s book on tactical
nuclear warfighting capability. Just as persistent Sino-Soviet disputes and the Soviet Union’s conventional military superiority during the 1970s and 1980s
gave China strong incentives to develop and deploy TNWs, the decade-long
India-Pakistan border tensions and India’s conventional superiority may have added momentum to Islamabad’s efforts to deploy TNWs. Most of Pakistan’s missiles acquired from China, such as theM-9, are short-range, solid-fueled,mobile, nuclear-capable missiles and can be used in a tactical mode.
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Asked to comment on reports that Pakistan has acquired TNWs, the Deputy Chief of the Indian Army, Lieutenant General Raj Kadyan, was quoted as saying that the “IndianArmy has trained itself to cope with a tactical nuclear strike in the battlefield.”26
Tactical nukes can be launched over an unpopulated area fromfield artillery guns or aircraft to halt an enemy advance or in an effort to intimidate a numerically stronger enemy. Since the damage is localized or confined to a certain area, the danger of affecting the civilian population is greatly reduced as compared to a strategic nuclear weapon of the Hiroshima kind and therefore need not evoke massive retaliation by enemy forces. The mountainous terrain in Kashmir provides the perfect setting for their use.
In addition to the United States and Russia, only China is believed to
have a large stockpile of about 120 TNWs or “baby nukes.” Some of these were apparently delivered to Pakistan following the visit of PLA Deputy Chief and
Spring 2003 41
“China does not want to see India increasing its power, stature, and profile regionally or internationally.”military intelligence boss General Xiong Guangkai (arguably China’s most important military figure and the man who calls Pakistan “China’s Israel”) to Islamabad in early March 2002.
If the reports of China’s transfer of TNWs to Pakistan are indeed true, the question then is:Would India, which does not possess TNWs but has strategic nuclear weapons in abundance, keep a nuclear conflict limited or escalate it to the strategic level and respond with massive
retaliation? Though New Delhi has long maintained that even a tactical nuclear strike on its forces would be treated as a nuclear first strike, and would invite massive retaliation, some Pakistani generals believe that a tactical strike would circumvent retaliation fromIndia, since such an attack on an advancing tank regiment or infantry battalion (in contrast to a strategic strike killing millions of
civilians),would not be provocation enough for all-out retaliation. They contend that the many layers of bureaucracy surrounding India’s nuclear capability, the strength of world public opinion, and the fact that strategic command remains in civilian hands places severe doubts on India’s willingness and ability to retaliate with amassive nuclear strike against an opponent, particularly in the face of only a limited tactical strike from Pakistan.Some analysts attribute the recent lessening of tensions to the belated recognition in India’s strategic circles that New Delhi cannot afford to dismiss Pakistan’s repeated threats of using nuclear weapons as “mere posturing” or “bluffing” on Islamabad’s part. They point to the Pakistani military’s strong aversion to fighting a 1965- or 1971-type conventional war with India and offer this as the rationale behind Islamabad’s decision to pull back from the brink on several occasions in recent history (in 1987, 1990, 1999, and 2002). Others believe that the tendency of Indian strategic planners to discount the threat of nuclear escalation
may well be based on some fundamentally erroneous assumptions:
That the United States cannot allow Pakistan to be the first Islamic
country to use nuclear weapons to settle a territorial dispute, as it
would mean the end of the global nonproliferation regime and en-
courage other countries to go nuclear to settle their territorial dis-
putes as well.
That the presence of US forces in Pakistan will be a constraining
factor.
That the international community (the United States, United King-
dom, China, or the United Nations) will intervene in time to prevent
such a catastrophe.
And that India can count on American and Israeli military support to
seize or take out Pakistan’s nuclear and missile infrastructure.
These assumptions do not seem to be based on cold, clear-headed calculations of the strategic interests and influence of major powers (especially the United States and China) and may well be a sign of wishful thinking on India’s part.
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It is worth noting that new strategic and geopolitical realities emerging in Asia since 9/11 have put a question mark over Beijing’s older certainties, assumptions, and beliefs.
I sega ovoj del.Stanuva komplicirano.
