by John Helmer, Moscow @bears_with There have been many revolutions in the technology and the geography of global cargo transpor
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Destroying Russian logistics by cutting off export-import flows is not a new form of US warfare. Sanctions, followed by armed interception or sinking of cargo ships; bombing ports, rail lines and roads; and mining seaways were American weapons against Japan, Korea and Vietnam; as they had been weapons against Germany in the two world wars of the 20th century, and British weapons against France during the Napoleonic wars of the 19th century.
Russia’s capacities to resist, fight back, and defeat the current western war are greater than any adversary which the Americans, British, Germans or French have ever attempted to subdue. The conventional; macro-economic statistics tell the story of the war so far, as do the data on each of the transportation sectors.
Russian Customs reports show that in 2023 exports fell by 28.3% compared to 2022, from $592.5 billion to $425.1 billion. The reason for the drop was the collapse in the volume of the export trade to the European countries. In 2022 this had been $265.6 billion; in 2023 it dwindled to $84.9 billion, a fall of 68%).
Russia’s exports increased to Asian countries as Moscow began its reorientation to alternative markets but not by large enough margins to offset the declines in the western direction. The Asian export trade rose by almost 6% from $290.4 billion to $306.6 billion. Such a modest increase is also explained by the fall of the oil price between 2022 and 2023. China’s customs data show that in volume Russian oil supplies to China in 2023 increased by 24% (to 107 million tonnes), while Beijing paid only 3.5% more than the year before ($60.7 billion).
In physical movement of trade, the balance between west and east is now transformed — the share of Asian countries in the total volume of Russian exports by the end of 2023 amounted to 72%, compared to just 20% for Europe. The remaining 8% of Russia’s exports went to Africa ($21.2 billion, an increase of 43%). The flow of Russian exports to the Americas has fallen by 40% to $12.2 billion.
In battlefield terms, the losses of Russia’s export value are not victories for the western allies. Their attempts to cut Russian trade flows are failing, as can be seen from the rise in the volume and value of imports. According to the Federal Customs Service, in 2023 the import value increased by 11.7% to $285.1 billion. This was due to the ncrease in the volume of imports of goods from Asia by 29.2%, to $ 187.5 billion, of which $111 billion (59%) was accounted for by imports from China. Shipments from Europe decreased by 12.3% to $78.5 billion; from the US by 11% to $15 billion. Imports from Africa increased by 8.6% to $3.4 billion.
Counting the combination of export and import flows, Russia had become the third largest surplus trader in the world in 2022. The size of this surplus has now fallen.
Source:
https://www.statista.com/
A report by the semi-official security analysis medium
Vzglyad explains the
dynamics. “The main reason is the price of oil as Russia’s main export commodity. In 2023, oil prices were very high…in the range of $75-$80 per barrel for the exporting countries. At the same time, due to the restrictions of the West and the policy of import substitution, Russia began to import less than in previous years.
Sanctions limit both export revenues and import opportunities in differing degrees, but imports in 2022-2023 turned out to be more sensitive to the restrictions. Russia’s record foreign trade surplus was $315 billion in 2022, which was facilitated by high commodity prices and a reduction in imports, and in 2023 the surplus decreased to
$121 billion.”
“However, there is a fly in the ointment in this,”
Vzglyad comments. “In Russia, up to 2022, the economic model assumed growth mainly due to income from the export of raw materials, which were either immediately spent on imports or postponed for a rainy day in a piggybank – first in the
Stabilization Fund, and then in the
National Wealth Fund. This model
hindered Russia’s development of its own manufacturing industry. Just as the United States developed the oil-for–food model for poor oil-exporting countries in Africa and Asia at the end of the 20th century, Russia, unfortunately, has lived on the basis of its own model for a long time — oil and gas to the West in exchange for engineering products and consumer goods.”
Unstated in
Vzglyad is the
fundamental power shift which the “change of model”, forced by the war, is causing for the oligarchs who for twenty-five years have controlled resource exports, disinvested in the domestic economy, bought political and other havens in the US, UK and other hostile states, and in Russia fought both their domestic commercial competitors and the state. This power shift is revolutionary – just as the capture of the Russian state by the oligarchs from 1995 was revolutionary.
Geography before politics — the impact of the geographic shift of trade on each of the transportation segments can be summarized briefly. In examining the detail of each segment, however, what can be seen is the fight between the oligarch interests, their Russian rivals, and the state, including the President. This is not the civil war or coup which the US and NATO have been trying to stimulate since the Yeltsin takeover of 1991; it continues today with
Donald Trump.
How the oligarchs tried to capture Sovcomflot, the state shipping conglomerate; were backed in their plan by the Kremlin; but then failed is the story of this
book. The maritime sector – ships, ports, and cargo terminals – remains the largest feature of Russian logistics by far. Rail, road, and air transportation follow.
Source:
https://www.vedomosti.ru/
The west-to-east revolution is impacting each of these transportation modes differently.
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THE NORTH-SOUTH ROUTE, RUSSIA TO INDIA VIA IRAN
Source:
https://sber.pro/
Source:
https://www.fruitnet.com/
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MAP OF MOSCOW CARGO TERMINALS
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THE EASTERN POLYGON
Source:
https://thecoalhub.com/
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