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RAYTHEON23
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With the current attention being given to potential Iranian nuclear weapons development, it is prudent to examine the defense posture of the Persian state in light of potential military action. This article will focus on Iran's fixed SAM network. Three different SAM types provide a sporadic, yet still potentially effective, SAM network throughout the nation. Unusual deployment strategies hint at what may be part of a serious deception campaign, possibly providing insight into the apparent lack of serious, integrated ground-based air defense coverage throughout most of the nation.
SAM SYSTEMS
The Iranian air defense network relies on a mixture of Soviet and Western SAM systems. This relatively unusual mix stems from both pre- and post-1979 acquisitions from the West and the Soviet Union, respectively. The following SAM systems are currently in service as part of the fixed air defense network: HQ-2 GUIDELINE (a Chinese-produced SA-2 derivative, employing the TIGER SONG engagement radar), HAWK, and SA-5 GAMMON.
Currently, there are 19 active SAM sites inside of Iran. The following image depicts the locations of these sites. HQ-2 sites are red, HAWK sites are orange, and SA-5 sites are purple. Empty sites are denoted by white icons.
The following image depicts the overall SAM coverage provided by Iranian air defense sites. Using the same color scheme applied in the previous image, HQ-2 sites are red, HAWK sites are orange, and SA-5 sites are purple.
HQ-2 GUIDELINE
There are currently 3 active HQ-2 sites at the following locations:
35 42' 21.53" N 51 04' 42.97" E
33 53' 10.86" N 51 35' 15.42" E
27 10' 17.75" N 56 10' 23.09" E
The following image depicts the coverage provided by Iran's HQ-2 sites:
HAWK
There are currently 10 active HAWK sites at the following locations:
36 13' 19.77" N 59 39' 46.71" E
35 41' 22.10" N 51 16' 08.29" E
35 35' 56.19" N 51 14' 12.97" E
35 30' 54.72" N 51 22' 29.90" E
33 47' 13.71" N 51 42' 02.42" E
32 45' 52.38" N 51 49' 14.90" E
32 25' 15.76" N 48 28' 13.56" E
29 15' 12.54" N 50 18' 19.51" E
28 56' 29.45" N 50 48' 42.66" E
28 54' 10.12" N 50 49' 56.48" E
The following image depicts the coverage provided by Iran's HAWK sites:
SA-5 GAMMON
There are currently 6 active SA-5 sites at the following locations:
35 12' 03.67" N 48 39' 16.69" E
35 18' 20.10" N 51 08' 28.91" E
35 23' 06.05" N 53 44' 22.29" E
32 47' 13.06" N 51 49' 23.00" E
28 57' 03.27" N 50 49' 13.63" E
27 15' 03.44" N 56 23' 27.27" E
The following image depicts the coverage provided by Iran's SA-5 sites:
EMPTY SITES
There are currently 19 unoccupied, prepared SAM sites inside of Iran. These sites have been identified as either HQ-2 or HAWK sites, based on their configurations.
Iran's empty SAM sites are located at the following coordinates:
HQ-2 37 58' 04.83" N 46 10' 40.42" E
HQ-2 37 56' 36.66" N 46 11' 47.59" E
HQ-2 35 30' 24.55" N 51 05' 47.20" E
HQ-2 35 26' 34.93" N 51 23' 00.52" E
HQ-2 31 21' 56.98" N 48 35' 24.41" E
HQ-2 29 35' 11.25" N 52 18' 47.83" E
HQ-2 29 33' 03.87" N 52 25' 07.64" E
HQ-2 28 52' 12.20" N 50 51' 37.87" E
HQ-2 28 52' 04.26" N 50 51' 25.16" E
HAWK 38 02' 45.30" N 46 12' 31.55" E
HAWK 35 34' 07.59" N 51 32' 41.90" E
HAWK 34 58' 12.30" N 50 48' 03.10" E
HAWK 32 44' 34.85" N 51 36' 51.47" E
HAWK 31 17' 07.87" N 47 56' 09.14" E
HAWK 28 50' 05.88" N 50 55' 41.81" E
HAWK 26 48' 20.11" N 53 16' 37.84" E
HAWK 25 52' 21.47" N 55 02' 33.59" E
HAWK 27 13' 36.39" N 56 19' 53.54" E
HAWK 25 27' 15.68" N 60 27' 28.66" E
These empty SAM sites can perform multiple tasks within the overall air defense network. They can be employed as dispersal sites for existing air defense assets, complicating enemy targeting. They can also be used to deploy additional SAM systems currently held in storage if more air defense assets are deemed necessary in a given sector.
An overview of empty Iranian SAM sites is provided in the following image:
THE AIR DEFENSE NETWORK
National SA-5 Coverage
The primary means of air defense in Iran, insofar as SAM systems are concerned, is the deployment of six SA-5 GAMMON firing batteries throughout the nation. The three northernmost sites are positioned to defend the northern border and the region surrounding the capital of Tehran. A fourth site is situated to defend facilities in and around Esfahan in central Iran, including the Natanz nuclear facility. The last two sites are situated at Bandar Abbas and Bushehr and provide coverage over the Straits of Hormuz and the northern half of the Persian Gulf, respectively.
The northern three SA-5 sites, as well as the southern two sites, are well positioned to provide air defense outside Iran's borders to deter any inbound aggressor from approaching the ADIZ. The central site near Esfahan is a curiosity, however. The southern and western portions of the coverage area are limited due to the presence of a good deal of mountainous terrain, in some cases 10,000 feet or more higher than the terrain where Esfahan is located. This also affects the remaining five sites, but they are affected to a lesser degree due to the fact that they are positioned to defend outwards towards the border and beyond, not likely intended to defend against targets operating deep within Iranian airspace. The Esfahan site, in direct contrast, is apparently situated to defend a central portion of the nation, and as such is limited in its effectiveness by the aforementioned terrain considerations. The curiosity lies in positioning a long-range SAM system in such a fashion to apparently purposely limit its effectiveness. This can be overlooked to a small degree as the SA-5 is not necessarily a choice system when it comes to engaging low-altitude targets, but the terrain in the area would seem to greatly reduce the effectiveness of the Esfahan site. The radar horizon is the key issue here, as each piece of terrain situated higher than the engagement radar will carve a significant portion out of the system's field of view and limit its ability to provide widespread coverage.
Iranian SA-5 sites are also purposely limited in their composition. Each site consists, unusually, of one 5N62 (SQUARE PAIR) engagement radar and two launch rails. For more information on this unusual practice, reference the following article on this site analyzing S-200 site layouts worldwide: LINK
Point Defense
The remainder of Iran's SAM sites are positioned in a point defense strategy to provide coverage of key areas in the nation. There are four key areas defended by shorter-range systems: Tehran, Esfahan, Bushehr, and Bandar Abbas. All of these areas are also covered by SA-5 sites, which are co-located in some instances, providing a degree of overlapping coverage in these locations.
The capital city of Tehran is defended by three HAWK sites and a solitary HQ-2 battery. There are three empty sites in the area. The outer two sites are prepared HQ-2 sites, while the inner site to the east is a prepared HAWK site. Were the empty sites to be occupied, they would form an inner HAWK barrier and an outer HQ-2 barrier oriented to defend against threats from the west and south. This layout may be a legacy leftover from the Iran-Iraq War. An SA-5 site is also in the vicinity, and the other two SA-5 sites to the east and west also provide limited coverage of the capital.
The following image depicts SAM coverage of Tehran:
There are two HAWK sites and one HQ-2 site in the vicinity of Esfahan. One of the HAWK sites, as well as the SA-5 site in the area, are located on the grounds of Esfahan AB, with the HAWK site likely situated to provide point defense of the airbase. The HQ-2 site and the remaining HAWK site are located near Kashan approximately 120 kilometers to the north. These sites provide point defense for the nuclear facility at Natanz. An empty HAWK site is also located in Esfahan proper, likely representing a dispersal site for the battery at Esfahan AB.
The following image depicts SAM coverage in the vicinity of Esfahan:
The Bushehr region, which contains a key nuclear facility, is defended by three HAWK sites. Two HAWK sites are located on the grounds of the Bushehr military comples, with a third site being located offshore on Khark Island. Bushehr AB is also home to an SA-5 battery. There are two unoccupied HQ-2 sites and a single unoccupied HAWK site in the area as well. The unoccupied sites are situated around the nuclear complex, perhaps suggesting that any weapons-related work has been moved from the facility to one of the various inland nuclear research and development locations such as Natanz. This would appear to be a sensible course of action given the serious vulnerability of the coastal Bushehr nuclear facility to enemy activity approaching from the Persian Gulf region.
SAM SYSTEMS
The Iranian air defense network relies on a mixture of Soviet and Western SAM systems. This relatively unusual mix stems from both pre- and post-1979 acquisitions from the West and the Soviet Union, respectively. The following SAM systems are currently in service as part of the fixed air defense network: HQ-2 GUIDELINE (a Chinese-produced SA-2 derivative, employing the TIGER SONG engagement radar), HAWK, and SA-5 GAMMON.
Currently, there are 19 active SAM sites inside of Iran. The following image depicts the locations of these sites. HQ-2 sites are red, HAWK sites are orange, and SA-5 sites are purple. Empty sites are denoted by white icons.
The following image depicts the overall SAM coverage provided by Iranian air defense sites. Using the same color scheme applied in the previous image, HQ-2 sites are red, HAWK sites are orange, and SA-5 sites are purple.
HQ-2 GUIDELINE
There are currently 3 active HQ-2 sites at the following locations:
35 42' 21.53" N 51 04' 42.97" E
33 53' 10.86" N 51 35' 15.42" E
27 10' 17.75" N 56 10' 23.09" E
The following image depicts the coverage provided by Iran's HQ-2 sites:
HAWK
There are currently 10 active HAWK sites at the following locations:
36 13' 19.77" N 59 39' 46.71" E
35 41' 22.10" N 51 16' 08.29" E
35 35' 56.19" N 51 14' 12.97" E
35 30' 54.72" N 51 22' 29.90" E
33 47' 13.71" N 51 42' 02.42" E
32 45' 52.38" N 51 49' 14.90" E
32 25' 15.76" N 48 28' 13.56" E
29 15' 12.54" N 50 18' 19.51" E
28 56' 29.45" N 50 48' 42.66" E
28 54' 10.12" N 50 49' 56.48" E
The following image depicts the coverage provided by Iran's HAWK sites:
SA-5 GAMMON
There are currently 6 active SA-5 sites at the following locations:
35 12' 03.67" N 48 39' 16.69" E
35 18' 20.10" N 51 08' 28.91" E
35 23' 06.05" N 53 44' 22.29" E
32 47' 13.06" N 51 49' 23.00" E
28 57' 03.27" N 50 49' 13.63" E
27 15' 03.44" N 56 23' 27.27" E
The following image depicts the coverage provided by Iran's SA-5 sites:
EMPTY SITES
There are currently 19 unoccupied, prepared SAM sites inside of Iran. These sites have been identified as either HQ-2 or HAWK sites, based on their configurations.
Iran's empty SAM sites are located at the following coordinates:
HQ-2 37 58' 04.83" N 46 10' 40.42" E
HQ-2 37 56' 36.66" N 46 11' 47.59" E
HQ-2 35 30' 24.55" N 51 05' 47.20" E
HQ-2 35 26' 34.93" N 51 23' 00.52" E
HQ-2 31 21' 56.98" N 48 35' 24.41" E
HQ-2 29 35' 11.25" N 52 18' 47.83" E
HQ-2 29 33' 03.87" N 52 25' 07.64" E
HQ-2 28 52' 12.20" N 50 51' 37.87" E
HQ-2 28 52' 04.26" N 50 51' 25.16" E
HAWK 38 02' 45.30" N 46 12' 31.55" E
HAWK 35 34' 07.59" N 51 32' 41.90" E
HAWK 34 58' 12.30" N 50 48' 03.10" E
HAWK 32 44' 34.85" N 51 36' 51.47" E
HAWK 31 17' 07.87" N 47 56' 09.14" E
HAWK 28 50' 05.88" N 50 55' 41.81" E
HAWK 26 48' 20.11" N 53 16' 37.84" E
HAWK 25 52' 21.47" N 55 02' 33.59" E
HAWK 27 13' 36.39" N 56 19' 53.54" E
HAWK 25 27' 15.68" N 60 27' 28.66" E
These empty SAM sites can perform multiple tasks within the overall air defense network. They can be employed as dispersal sites for existing air defense assets, complicating enemy targeting. They can also be used to deploy additional SAM systems currently held in storage if more air defense assets are deemed necessary in a given sector.
An overview of empty Iranian SAM sites is provided in the following image:
THE AIR DEFENSE NETWORK
National SA-5 Coverage
The primary means of air defense in Iran, insofar as SAM systems are concerned, is the deployment of six SA-5 GAMMON firing batteries throughout the nation. The three northernmost sites are positioned to defend the northern border and the region surrounding the capital of Tehran. A fourth site is situated to defend facilities in and around Esfahan in central Iran, including the Natanz nuclear facility. The last two sites are situated at Bandar Abbas and Bushehr and provide coverage over the Straits of Hormuz and the northern half of the Persian Gulf, respectively.
The northern three SA-5 sites, as well as the southern two sites, are well positioned to provide air defense outside Iran's borders to deter any inbound aggressor from approaching the ADIZ. The central site near Esfahan is a curiosity, however. The southern and western portions of the coverage area are limited due to the presence of a good deal of mountainous terrain, in some cases 10,000 feet or more higher than the terrain where Esfahan is located. This also affects the remaining five sites, but they are affected to a lesser degree due to the fact that they are positioned to defend outwards towards the border and beyond, not likely intended to defend against targets operating deep within Iranian airspace. The Esfahan site, in direct contrast, is apparently situated to defend a central portion of the nation, and as such is limited in its effectiveness by the aforementioned terrain considerations. The curiosity lies in positioning a long-range SAM system in such a fashion to apparently purposely limit its effectiveness. This can be overlooked to a small degree as the SA-5 is not necessarily a choice system when it comes to engaging low-altitude targets, but the terrain in the area would seem to greatly reduce the effectiveness of the Esfahan site. The radar horizon is the key issue here, as each piece of terrain situated higher than the engagement radar will carve a significant portion out of the system's field of view and limit its ability to provide widespread coverage.
Iranian SA-5 sites are also purposely limited in their composition. Each site consists, unusually, of one 5N62 (SQUARE PAIR) engagement radar and two launch rails. For more information on this unusual practice, reference the following article on this site analyzing S-200 site layouts worldwide: LINK
Point Defense
The remainder of Iran's SAM sites are positioned in a point defense strategy to provide coverage of key areas in the nation. There are four key areas defended by shorter-range systems: Tehran, Esfahan, Bushehr, and Bandar Abbas. All of these areas are also covered by SA-5 sites, which are co-located in some instances, providing a degree of overlapping coverage in these locations.
The capital city of Tehran is defended by three HAWK sites and a solitary HQ-2 battery. There are three empty sites in the area. The outer two sites are prepared HQ-2 sites, while the inner site to the east is a prepared HAWK site. Were the empty sites to be occupied, they would form an inner HAWK barrier and an outer HQ-2 barrier oriented to defend against threats from the west and south. This layout may be a legacy leftover from the Iran-Iraq War. An SA-5 site is also in the vicinity, and the other two SA-5 sites to the east and west also provide limited coverage of the capital.
The following image depicts SAM coverage of Tehran:
There are two HAWK sites and one HQ-2 site in the vicinity of Esfahan. One of the HAWK sites, as well as the SA-5 site in the area, are located on the grounds of Esfahan AB, with the HAWK site likely situated to provide point defense of the airbase. The HQ-2 site and the remaining HAWK site are located near Kashan approximately 120 kilometers to the north. These sites provide point defense for the nuclear facility at Natanz. An empty HAWK site is also located in Esfahan proper, likely representing a dispersal site for the battery at Esfahan AB.
The following image depicts SAM coverage in the vicinity of Esfahan:
The Bushehr region, which contains a key nuclear facility, is defended by three HAWK sites. Two HAWK sites are located on the grounds of the Bushehr military comples, with a third site being located offshore on Khark Island. Bushehr AB is also home to an SA-5 battery. There are two unoccupied HQ-2 sites and a single unoccupied HAWK site in the area as well. The unoccupied sites are situated around the nuclear complex, perhaps suggesting that any weapons-related work has been moved from the facility to one of the various inland nuclear research and development locations such as Natanz. This would appear to be a sensible course of action given the serious vulnerability of the coastal Bushehr nuclear facility to enemy activity approaching from the Persian Gulf region.
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The following image depicts SAM coverage in the vicinity of Bushehr:
Bandar Abbas, home to the bulk of the Iranian Navy including the deadly Kilo SSK fleet, is defended by one HQ-2 battery and one HAWK battery. There is an empty HAWK site in the area, as well as an SA-5 site.
The following image depicts SAM coverage of Bandar Abbas:
Defending the Straits
The SA-5 sites located in the vicinity of both Bushehr and Bandar Abbas provide Iran with a significant air defense capability over not only a good portion of the Persian Gulf, but also over the critical Straits of Hormuz. This SAM coverage, which can be further expanded thanks to the presence of unoccupied, prepared HAWK sites on the islands of Abu Musa and Lavan, allows Iran to provide increased air defense in conjunction with fighter aircraft to protect any naval operations in the region, including the potentially catastrophic mining of the Straits of Hormuz.
Air Defense Issues
The problem with Iran's SAM network is the apparent over-reliance on the SA-5 system to provide air defense over most of the nation. The SA-5 is certainly a threat to ISR aircraft such as the U-2R or E-3, but the primary threat which Iran must consider is that of standoff cruise missiles and strike aircraft featuring comprehensive EW suites. Against these types of low-RCS or maneuverable targets, the SA-5 cannot be counted upon to be effective. Libyan SA-5 systems proved completely ineffective against USN and USAFE strike aircraft in 1986, and the Iranian SA-5s would certainly fare no better in a much more modern air combat environment.
As mentioned previously, the remainder of the air defense network is primarily situated to provide point defense and as such does not represent a serious threat to a dedicated and sophisticated enemy. Even lesser-equipped nations would be able to explot the various gaps and vulnerabilities in the network provided the SA-5s could be neutralized in some fashion, be it through ECM, technical capability, or direct attack.
This raises the question of the importance of SAM systems to Iran's air defense network. Given the current deployment strategy, the small number of sites, and the capability of the systems themselves, it is likely that Iran places more importance on the fighter force as an air defense element. This would explain the continued efforts to retain an operational fleet of F-14A interceptors. The short range of the HQ-2 and HAWK systems, coupled with the ineffectiveness of the SA-5 to deal with low-RCS targets, also explains the reports regarding Iranian attempts to purchase advanced SAM systems from Russia.
It is possible that Iran simply does not feel that a more robust SAM network is necessary. Given the aforementioned terrain constraints in some areas of the nation, as well as the lack of a large number of what may be regarded by the Iranian government as potential critical targets inside of Iran, the Persian nation may have simply taken a minimalist posture, relying on the SA-5 for long-range defense and the other systems as point defense weapons to defend Iran's critical military and political infrastructure.
Another reason for the lack of deployed SAM systems could be that the shorter-ranged HQ-2 and HAWK systems are no longer viewed as being effective enough to warrant widespread use. HQ-2 sites are currently 25% occupied, with HAWK sites being 50% occupied, perhaps signifying more faith in the HAWK system but still demonstrating a potential overall trend of perceived non-reliability. Iran does have reason to suspect the reliability of the HAWK SAM system against a Western opponent, as the missile was an American product and has been in widespread use throughout the West for decades. The HQ-2, however, should be regarded as potentially more reliable, as it is not a standard (and widely exploited) SA-2 but rather a Chinese-produced weapon with which the West should have a lesser degree of familiarity insofar as electronic performance, if not physical performance, is concerned.
A high ratio of unoccupied sites could be due to financial reasons (lack of operating funds may have resulted in a number of batteries placed in storage) or simple attrition (they may have been expended or destroyed in the Iran-Iraq War), of course, but those facets of the equation cannot be examined through imagery analysis alone. It should be mentioned that one possible source of attrition for the HQ-2 system is the conversion of many missiles to Mushak SSMs to complement CSS-8 SSMs (HQ-2 derivatives) obtained from China. Many batteries may also be out of service for modification to Sayyad-1 standard, which represents a modification of the HQ-2 design with some indigenous components.
CONCLUSION
On the surface, Iran's ground-based air defense picture appears to be relatively robust thanks to the presence and reach of the six SA-5 batteries. However, a closer analysis reveals a network which is currently full of holes and vulnerabilities that a potential aggressor could exploit. The Iranian SAM network is obviously in need of a serious upgrade, one which is more substantial than simply producing modified HQ-2 missiles. The presence of air interceptors and numerous terrain constraints do explain away some of the negative aspects of Iran's SAM network, but taken as a whole it represents a relatively ineffective form or defense against a modern agressor. Given the current political climate, it would be in the best interest of the Iranian military to proceed with a widespread upgrade, with the most effective option being the purchase of S-300PMU-2 or S-400 SAM systems for Russia, or perhaps the more cost-effective and similarly capable HQ-9 SAM system from China. Incorporating either purchase into a package deal with modern fighter aircraft such as the Su-30MK or J-10 would result in a much more robust air defense network overall.
SOURCES
-The aforementioned data is based on analysis of the available open-source satellite imagery of Iran and may not represent the entire air defense network. Tor-M1E units, for example, are known to be present, but are not yet visible in available imagery.
-SAM ranges used to construct the range rings were taken from Jane's Land Based Air Defence.
Bandar Abbas, home to the bulk of the Iranian Navy including the deadly Kilo SSK fleet, is defended by one HQ-2 battery and one HAWK battery. There is an empty HAWK site in the area, as well as an SA-5 site.
The following image depicts SAM coverage of Bandar Abbas:
Defending the Straits
The SA-5 sites located in the vicinity of both Bushehr and Bandar Abbas provide Iran with a significant air defense capability over not only a good portion of the Persian Gulf, but also over the critical Straits of Hormuz. This SAM coverage, which can be further expanded thanks to the presence of unoccupied, prepared HAWK sites on the islands of Abu Musa and Lavan, allows Iran to provide increased air defense in conjunction with fighter aircraft to protect any naval operations in the region, including the potentially catastrophic mining of the Straits of Hormuz.
Air Defense Issues
The problem with Iran's SAM network is the apparent over-reliance on the SA-5 system to provide air defense over most of the nation. The SA-5 is certainly a threat to ISR aircraft such as the U-2R or E-3, but the primary threat which Iran must consider is that of standoff cruise missiles and strike aircraft featuring comprehensive EW suites. Against these types of low-RCS or maneuverable targets, the SA-5 cannot be counted upon to be effective. Libyan SA-5 systems proved completely ineffective against USN and USAFE strike aircraft in 1986, and the Iranian SA-5s would certainly fare no better in a much more modern air combat environment.
As mentioned previously, the remainder of the air defense network is primarily situated to provide point defense and as such does not represent a serious threat to a dedicated and sophisticated enemy. Even lesser-equipped nations would be able to explot the various gaps and vulnerabilities in the network provided the SA-5s could be neutralized in some fashion, be it through ECM, technical capability, or direct attack.
This raises the question of the importance of SAM systems to Iran's air defense network. Given the current deployment strategy, the small number of sites, and the capability of the systems themselves, it is likely that Iran places more importance on the fighter force as an air defense element. This would explain the continued efforts to retain an operational fleet of F-14A interceptors. The short range of the HQ-2 and HAWK systems, coupled with the ineffectiveness of the SA-5 to deal with low-RCS targets, also explains the reports regarding Iranian attempts to purchase advanced SAM systems from Russia.
It is possible that Iran simply does not feel that a more robust SAM network is necessary. Given the aforementioned terrain constraints in some areas of the nation, as well as the lack of a large number of what may be regarded by the Iranian government as potential critical targets inside of Iran, the Persian nation may have simply taken a minimalist posture, relying on the SA-5 for long-range defense and the other systems as point defense weapons to defend Iran's critical military and political infrastructure.
Another reason for the lack of deployed SAM systems could be that the shorter-ranged HQ-2 and HAWK systems are no longer viewed as being effective enough to warrant widespread use. HQ-2 sites are currently 25% occupied, with HAWK sites being 50% occupied, perhaps signifying more faith in the HAWK system but still demonstrating a potential overall trend of perceived non-reliability. Iran does have reason to suspect the reliability of the HAWK SAM system against a Western opponent, as the missile was an American product and has been in widespread use throughout the West for decades. The HQ-2, however, should be regarded as potentially more reliable, as it is not a standard (and widely exploited) SA-2 but rather a Chinese-produced weapon with which the West should have a lesser degree of familiarity insofar as electronic performance, if not physical performance, is concerned.
A high ratio of unoccupied sites could be due to financial reasons (lack of operating funds may have resulted in a number of batteries placed in storage) or simple attrition (they may have been expended or destroyed in the Iran-Iraq War), of course, but those facets of the equation cannot be examined through imagery analysis alone. It should be mentioned that one possible source of attrition for the HQ-2 system is the conversion of many missiles to Mushak SSMs to complement CSS-8 SSMs (HQ-2 derivatives) obtained from China. Many batteries may also be out of service for modification to Sayyad-1 standard, which represents a modification of the HQ-2 design with some indigenous components.
CONCLUSION
On the surface, Iran's ground-based air defense picture appears to be relatively robust thanks to the presence and reach of the six SA-5 batteries. However, a closer analysis reveals a network which is currently full of holes and vulnerabilities that a potential aggressor could exploit. The Iranian SAM network is obviously in need of a serious upgrade, one which is more substantial than simply producing modified HQ-2 missiles. The presence of air interceptors and numerous terrain constraints do explain away some of the negative aspects of Iran's SAM network, but taken as a whole it represents a relatively ineffective form or defense against a modern agressor. Given the current political climate, it would be in the best interest of the Iranian military to proceed with a widespread upgrade, with the most effective option being the purchase of S-300PMU-2 or S-400 SAM systems for Russia, or perhaps the more cost-effective and similarly capable HQ-9 SAM system from China. Incorporating either purchase into a package deal with modern fighter aircraft such as the Su-30MK or J-10 would result in a much more robust air defense network overall.
SOURCES
-The aforementioned data is based on analysis of the available open-source satellite imagery of Iran and may not represent the entire air defense network. Tor-M1E units, for example, are known to be present, but are not yet visible in available imagery.
-SAM ranges used to construct the range rings were taken from Jane's Land Based Air Defence.
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C-300 i MOD's
INTRODUCTION
The S-300P family of strategic SAM systems represents one of the most capable collections of air defense assets in the world. The first variants, coded SA-10A GRUMBLE by Western intelligence agencies, heralded in a new level of complexity and capability for the then-Soviet SAM forces. The SA-10A and subsequent SAM systems were so potent that they were referred to as "double digit" SAM systems by Western military arms, a moniker stemming from their Western identifiers, denoting their increased lethality over their predecessors. This lethality has made the S-300P series of SAM systems highly sought after commodities on the export market.
EARLY DEVELOPMENT
The S-300 concept first took shape at the end of 1966. With S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON) firing trials all but complete, the VPK solicited concepts for the next-generation SAM system. This new SAM system, referred to as the S-300, was to be capable of engaging multiple targets, be highly mobile, and sufficient for employment by the Troops of Air Defense, the Soviet Army, and the Soviet Navy. One of the design bureaus to submit a proposal was MKB Strela, headed by Aleksandr Raspletin. MKB Strela would later go on to become NPO Almaz. Raspletin had been instrumental in the creation of the USSR's primary strategic SAM systems of the day: the S-25 (SA-1 GUILD), S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE), and S-200. The new system would be classified as a medium-range SAM system, designed to replace the various S-75 and S-125 (SA-3 GOA) batteries defending critical installations around the USSR, and would later be used to replace S-200 units as more batteries became available. Many S-300P batteries can be seen sited on former S-75 locations.
The S-300V Splits Off
There was a great deal of debate concerning the development of a single system to serve the three identified military branches. Each branch had a certain requirement that did not necessarily translate to the others: the PVO required a highly mobile system, the Army required a system capable of repelling the new Pershing tactical ballistic missile, and the Navy required a system capable of dealing with low-altitude cruise missiles. It was recognized that the proposed naval variant would be able to share many components with the PVO variant. The designers tackling the issue of the Army variant, however, were rapidly digressing along their own path, beginning with a switch to treaded chassis for the system components. In the end it took a decision by Central Committee for Defense Affairs Chairman Dmitry Ustinov to settle the issue. Ustinov determined that two systems would be developed: the S-300P, tailored for the PVO, and the S-300V, tailored for the Soviet Army. This decision is why the S-300P family and the S-300V family both share a common designator but represent two different SAM systems.
Raspletin's Final Inputs
MKB Strela went to work on the S-300P in 1969, being assigned to develop the PVO variant of the S-300 in a 27 May decree titled "On Creation of the Standardized S-300 System". The Altair and Antey design bureaus were assigned to develop the naval S-300F and army S-300V variants. The chief designer of the S-300P was Boris Bunkin, who had assumed the role after the death of Raspletin. Raspletin had made two key decisions regarding the new system before his passing, however. These decisions were to incorporate integrated circuitry in the system components and employ a phased array radar system for missile guidance.
As envisioned, the S-300P SAM system was to have the following characteristics:
-Emplacement and tear down time of no more than 5 minutes
-A command system capable of tracking 100 targets and controlling six subordinate batteries
-The ability to place the six batteries 30-40 kilometers from the command system
The following design bureaus would handle the development of key components for the S-300P:
-Almaz TkSB: 5N63 guidance radar and system components
-Fakel MKB: 5V55 missiles
-Novosibirsk Measuring Instrument NII: 5N64 battle management radar used by the 5N83 command system
-Leningrad KBSM: 5P851 TEL
THE S-300PT
The first variant of the S-300P to be completed and made available for operational service was the S-300PT (SA-10A GRUMBLE). Interestingly, the S-300PT was very nearly never created. The operational requirement called for a system capable of deploying and redeploying rapidly, with a set up and tear down time of no more than 5 minutes.
The Minsk Wheeled Prime Mover Plant was tasked with modifying the MAZ-543 all-terrain chassis to mount the components of the S-300P system. While component testing was taking place at Sary Shagan, it became clear that the system components would complete testing before the MAZ-543 chassis was ready. Ergo, a solution was derived in the form of the S-300PT. It would mount containerized system components at prepared sites, with the launchers being placed on 5P851 trailers. The system was still mobile, but the set up and tear down time did not fall within the prescribed requirement, taking up to 120 minutes depending on the configuration of the battery.
The 5V55 missiles for the S-300P were developed by the Fakel Moscow Design Bureau (MKB). MKB head Petr Grushin initially planned to employ a containerized hot launch system. In a hot launch, the missile's motor is ignited inside the launch canister, in the same fashion that a hot launched ICBM fires its boost motor inside the missile silo. When the S-300P and naval S-300F were standardized, it became obvious that a hot launch system would not be satisfactory. Grushin's solution was to employ a cold launch system, whereby the missile was ejected from the launch canister by compressed gas. When it reached an altitude of 20 meters, the motor would ignite. Thrust-vectoring control vanes would then point the missile towards the direction of the target, enabling the missiles to be fired without orienting the launcher in the direction of the target. An explosive charge blew apart the canister's lid before launch. The containerized launch system enabled the missiles to be stored without maintenance for a period of at least ten years.
The components of the S-300PT were completed and delivered to Sary Shagan for testing by 1973. Missile testing had begun in 1972 while awaiting the delivery of the remaining system components. Testing of the complete system continued for 5 years, being completed in 1978. The early results of the test program were satisfactory enough for serial production of S-300PT components to begin in 1975. In 1979, the S-300PT was accepted into the PVO to begin operational service.
THE S-300PS
Development of the mobile S-300PS (SA-10B GRUMBLE) began immediately following the 1969 decree. Due to the aforementioned delays with the development of the modified MAZ-543 vehicles used to mount the major system components, testing did not begin at Sary Shagan until 1978, the same year that S-300PT testing was completed. The test program lasted for three years, wrapping up in 1981. A requirement to develop support infrastructure for the mobile vehicles delayed service entry until 1983. The S-300PS has been exported as the S-300PMU.
S-300PS Mobility
The S-300PS has a set-up and tear-down time of 5 minutes, provided that a suitable deployment site is located not requiring the use of mast-mounted radars, which can take between 45 and 90 minutes to erect. This 5 minute time period was the source of doubt for some senior Soviet officers. Colonel-General Anatoliy Khyupenen, the chairman of the comission overseeing the testing of the S-300PS, was one of these individuals. To validate the performance of the system, a test was conducted, with amusing yet irrefutable results.
S-300P batteries operate as part of a SAM system, controlled by a central command post which operates the target acquisition radar set. Each battery is tied in to a specific location in order to facilitate automatic target engagement. If the battery's position is not accurately reported, then target deconfliction or track assignment functions may not be as effective. A 1T12 survey vehicle is used to perform automatic geodesic tie-in of a deployed battery to the surrounding area, a process which takes no more than 5 minutes. It should be noted that such functions are not necessary in tactical SAM batteries, who are not tied in to a specific firing zone.
The firing exercise conducted for Colonel-General Khyupenen was to involve the deployment of a battery to a preselected firing location. The location was pre-selected so that the maximum amount of telemetry data on the test could be gathered. This did not sit well with Colonel-General Khyupenen, who viewed the use of a pre-selected launch site as an inaccurate method of gauging the system's deployability. As it would turn out, an unexpected mishap ended up providing onlookers with a far more accurate demonstration. As the SAM battery was deploying to the launch site, the column of vehicles came to an unscheduled halt. The engine on one of the MAZ-543 vehicles had developed a mechanical problem and would not re-start. Seizing the opportunity, senior Almaz engineer Vyacheslav Volkov ordered the battery to deploy where it was. Geodesic tie-in was rapidly accomplished, and the target drone which had been fired was intercepted with a single missile. Deployment of the SAM battery and geodesic tie-in took 5 minutes, validating the mobility of the S-300PS.
THE S-300PT-1
A modified version of the S-300PT was produced during testing of the mobile S-300PS. The S-300PS had certain increased capabilities which were applied to the S-300PT to create the improved S-300PT-1 variant. Engagement range of the system was increased to 75 kilometers and a new guidance principle was introduced, to match the characteristics of the S-300PS. This improved variant entered service in 1981, with the first batteries being deployed near Severodvinsk.
THE S-300PM
While the S-300PS was entering service in 1983, the definitive version of the system outlined in the 1969 requirement, Almaz MKB was beginning work on developing a new, modified version of the system. The S-300PM (SA-20A GARGOYLE) would incorporate various new components, including a new engagement radar and a new missile system. The new missile system, developed by the Fakel MKB, was the 48N6. It used more efficient rocket propulsion to double the engagement range of the system without changing the dimensions of the missile to a degree significant enough to necessitate the use of new launch canisters and possibly new launch vehicles. Testing of the S-300PM concluded in 1988, and in 1989 the first operational batteries were deployed around Moscow. The S-300PM has been exported as the S-300PMU-1.
ATBM Capability
Testing of various S-300P variants at Sary Shagan and Kapustin Yar proved that the system did have the ability to effectively intercept tactical ballistic missiles at various ranges, depending on the missile system employed and the speed of the incoming target. Fakel MKB engineers, however, developed an even more effective solution in the aftermath of DESERT STORM: a special warhead designed to cause the inbound warhead to detonate in-flight. The first test firing of the modified warhead occurred in August of 1995 at Kapustin Yar. The missile's warhead successfully caused the warhead of the 8K14 (SS-1 SCUD) target to detonate in the atmosphere. The missile's warhead is a directional warhead, which is roughly analogous to a shaped charge system insofar as it is able to direct the bulk of the explosive force of the warhead towards the target.
Favorit
A further improved version of the S-300PM was marketed as the S-300PMU-2 Favorit. The Favorit missile system incorporated a new class of missiles from the Fakel MKB, along with the weapons used by previous iterations of the S-300P family. It was suggested at one point that the Favorit system modifications could be applied to S-300PM systems in Russian service. This appears to have been abandoned, however, with the introduction of the next-generation S-400 SAM system, the only sales successes of the Favorit being on the export market.
INTRODUCTION
The S-300P family of strategic SAM systems represents one of the most capable collections of air defense assets in the world. The first variants, coded SA-10A GRUMBLE by Western intelligence agencies, heralded in a new level of complexity and capability for the then-Soviet SAM forces. The SA-10A and subsequent SAM systems were so potent that they were referred to as "double digit" SAM systems by Western military arms, a moniker stemming from their Western identifiers, denoting their increased lethality over their predecessors. This lethality has made the S-300P series of SAM systems highly sought after commodities on the export market.
EARLY DEVELOPMENT
The S-300 concept first took shape at the end of 1966. With S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON) firing trials all but complete, the VPK solicited concepts for the next-generation SAM system. This new SAM system, referred to as the S-300, was to be capable of engaging multiple targets, be highly mobile, and sufficient for employment by the Troops of Air Defense, the Soviet Army, and the Soviet Navy. One of the design bureaus to submit a proposal was MKB Strela, headed by Aleksandr Raspletin. MKB Strela would later go on to become NPO Almaz. Raspletin had been instrumental in the creation of the USSR's primary strategic SAM systems of the day: the S-25 (SA-1 GUILD), S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE), and S-200. The new system would be classified as a medium-range SAM system, designed to replace the various S-75 and S-125 (SA-3 GOA) batteries defending critical installations around the USSR, and would later be used to replace S-200 units as more batteries became available. Many S-300P batteries can be seen sited on former S-75 locations.
The S-300V Splits Off
There was a great deal of debate concerning the development of a single system to serve the three identified military branches. Each branch had a certain requirement that did not necessarily translate to the others: the PVO required a highly mobile system, the Army required a system capable of repelling the new Pershing tactical ballistic missile, and the Navy required a system capable of dealing with low-altitude cruise missiles. It was recognized that the proposed naval variant would be able to share many components with the PVO variant. The designers tackling the issue of the Army variant, however, were rapidly digressing along their own path, beginning with a switch to treaded chassis for the system components. In the end it took a decision by Central Committee for Defense Affairs Chairman Dmitry Ustinov to settle the issue. Ustinov determined that two systems would be developed: the S-300P, tailored for the PVO, and the S-300V, tailored for the Soviet Army. This decision is why the S-300P family and the S-300V family both share a common designator but represent two different SAM systems.
Raspletin's Final Inputs
MKB Strela went to work on the S-300P in 1969, being assigned to develop the PVO variant of the S-300 in a 27 May decree titled "On Creation of the Standardized S-300 System". The Altair and Antey design bureaus were assigned to develop the naval S-300F and army S-300V variants. The chief designer of the S-300P was Boris Bunkin, who had assumed the role after the death of Raspletin. Raspletin had made two key decisions regarding the new system before his passing, however. These decisions were to incorporate integrated circuitry in the system components and employ a phased array radar system for missile guidance.
As envisioned, the S-300P SAM system was to have the following characteristics:
-Emplacement and tear down time of no more than 5 minutes
-A command system capable of tracking 100 targets and controlling six subordinate batteries
-The ability to place the six batteries 30-40 kilometers from the command system
The following design bureaus would handle the development of key components for the S-300P:
-Almaz TkSB: 5N63 guidance radar and system components
-Fakel MKB: 5V55 missiles
-Novosibirsk Measuring Instrument NII: 5N64 battle management radar used by the 5N83 command system
-Leningrad KBSM: 5P851 TEL
THE S-300PT
The first variant of the S-300P to be completed and made available for operational service was the S-300PT (SA-10A GRUMBLE). Interestingly, the S-300PT was very nearly never created. The operational requirement called for a system capable of deploying and redeploying rapidly, with a set up and tear down time of no more than 5 minutes.
The Minsk Wheeled Prime Mover Plant was tasked with modifying the MAZ-543 all-terrain chassis to mount the components of the S-300P system. While component testing was taking place at Sary Shagan, it became clear that the system components would complete testing before the MAZ-543 chassis was ready. Ergo, a solution was derived in the form of the S-300PT. It would mount containerized system components at prepared sites, with the launchers being placed on 5P851 trailers. The system was still mobile, but the set up and tear down time did not fall within the prescribed requirement, taking up to 120 minutes depending on the configuration of the battery.
The 5V55 missiles for the S-300P were developed by the Fakel Moscow Design Bureau (MKB). MKB head Petr Grushin initially planned to employ a containerized hot launch system. In a hot launch, the missile's motor is ignited inside the launch canister, in the same fashion that a hot launched ICBM fires its boost motor inside the missile silo. When the S-300P and naval S-300F were standardized, it became obvious that a hot launch system would not be satisfactory. Grushin's solution was to employ a cold launch system, whereby the missile was ejected from the launch canister by compressed gas. When it reached an altitude of 20 meters, the motor would ignite. Thrust-vectoring control vanes would then point the missile towards the direction of the target, enabling the missiles to be fired without orienting the launcher in the direction of the target. An explosive charge blew apart the canister's lid before launch. The containerized launch system enabled the missiles to be stored without maintenance for a period of at least ten years.
The components of the S-300PT were completed and delivered to Sary Shagan for testing by 1973. Missile testing had begun in 1972 while awaiting the delivery of the remaining system components. Testing of the complete system continued for 5 years, being completed in 1978. The early results of the test program were satisfactory enough for serial production of S-300PT components to begin in 1975. In 1979, the S-300PT was accepted into the PVO to begin operational service.
THE S-300PS
Development of the mobile S-300PS (SA-10B GRUMBLE) began immediately following the 1969 decree. Due to the aforementioned delays with the development of the modified MAZ-543 vehicles used to mount the major system components, testing did not begin at Sary Shagan until 1978, the same year that S-300PT testing was completed. The test program lasted for three years, wrapping up in 1981. A requirement to develop support infrastructure for the mobile vehicles delayed service entry until 1983. The S-300PS has been exported as the S-300PMU.
S-300PS Mobility
The S-300PS has a set-up and tear-down time of 5 minutes, provided that a suitable deployment site is located not requiring the use of mast-mounted radars, which can take between 45 and 90 minutes to erect. This 5 minute time period was the source of doubt for some senior Soviet officers. Colonel-General Anatoliy Khyupenen, the chairman of the comission overseeing the testing of the S-300PS, was one of these individuals. To validate the performance of the system, a test was conducted, with amusing yet irrefutable results.
S-300P batteries operate as part of a SAM system, controlled by a central command post which operates the target acquisition radar set. Each battery is tied in to a specific location in order to facilitate automatic target engagement. If the battery's position is not accurately reported, then target deconfliction or track assignment functions may not be as effective. A 1T12 survey vehicle is used to perform automatic geodesic tie-in of a deployed battery to the surrounding area, a process which takes no more than 5 minutes. It should be noted that such functions are not necessary in tactical SAM batteries, who are not tied in to a specific firing zone.
The firing exercise conducted for Colonel-General Khyupenen was to involve the deployment of a battery to a preselected firing location. The location was pre-selected so that the maximum amount of telemetry data on the test could be gathered. This did not sit well with Colonel-General Khyupenen, who viewed the use of a pre-selected launch site as an inaccurate method of gauging the system's deployability. As it would turn out, an unexpected mishap ended up providing onlookers with a far more accurate demonstration. As the SAM battery was deploying to the launch site, the column of vehicles came to an unscheduled halt. The engine on one of the MAZ-543 vehicles had developed a mechanical problem and would not re-start. Seizing the opportunity, senior Almaz engineer Vyacheslav Volkov ordered the battery to deploy where it was. Geodesic tie-in was rapidly accomplished, and the target drone which had been fired was intercepted with a single missile. Deployment of the SAM battery and geodesic tie-in took 5 minutes, validating the mobility of the S-300PS.
THE S-300PT-1
A modified version of the S-300PT was produced during testing of the mobile S-300PS. The S-300PS had certain increased capabilities which were applied to the S-300PT to create the improved S-300PT-1 variant. Engagement range of the system was increased to 75 kilometers and a new guidance principle was introduced, to match the characteristics of the S-300PS. This improved variant entered service in 1981, with the first batteries being deployed near Severodvinsk.
THE S-300PM
While the S-300PS was entering service in 1983, the definitive version of the system outlined in the 1969 requirement, Almaz MKB was beginning work on developing a new, modified version of the system. The S-300PM (SA-20A GARGOYLE) would incorporate various new components, including a new engagement radar and a new missile system. The new missile system, developed by the Fakel MKB, was the 48N6. It used more efficient rocket propulsion to double the engagement range of the system without changing the dimensions of the missile to a degree significant enough to necessitate the use of new launch canisters and possibly new launch vehicles. Testing of the S-300PM concluded in 1988, and in 1989 the first operational batteries were deployed around Moscow. The S-300PM has been exported as the S-300PMU-1.
ATBM Capability
Testing of various S-300P variants at Sary Shagan and Kapustin Yar proved that the system did have the ability to effectively intercept tactical ballistic missiles at various ranges, depending on the missile system employed and the speed of the incoming target. Fakel MKB engineers, however, developed an even more effective solution in the aftermath of DESERT STORM: a special warhead designed to cause the inbound warhead to detonate in-flight. The first test firing of the modified warhead occurred in August of 1995 at Kapustin Yar. The missile's warhead successfully caused the warhead of the 8K14 (SS-1 SCUD) target to detonate in the atmosphere. The missile's warhead is a directional warhead, which is roughly analogous to a shaped charge system insofar as it is able to direct the bulk of the explosive force of the warhead towards the target.
Favorit
A further improved version of the S-300PM was marketed as the S-300PMU-2 Favorit. The Favorit missile system incorporated a new class of missiles from the Fakel MKB, along with the weapons used by previous iterations of the S-300P family. It was suggested at one point that the Favorit system modifications could be applied to S-300PM systems in Russian service. This appears to have been abandoned, however, with the introduction of the next-generation S-400 SAM system, the only sales successes of the Favorit being on the export market.
R
RAYTHEON23
Гостин
C-400 i odbrana na moskva
THE S-400
Development of the S-400 (SA-X-21) was initiated in 1985 as a replacement for the S-200 strategic SAM system. The program had a stated range requirement of 400 kilometers, 100 kilometers greater than the latest S-200 systems. Almaz was assigned the task of developing the system, with Fakel developing the new long-range missile. In the early 1980's, Almaz had also begun work on the S-350, a next-generation SAM system designed to be the eventual successor to the S-300P family. During the course of preliminary research and design efforts for both systems, it was determined that both systems could be standardized, using the same components. The long-range missile designed by Fakel would be integrated to allow the system to meet the 400 kilometer range requirement. The preliminary design was approved in 1988, and had been given the name Triumf. The "new" S-400 began trials at Kapustin Yar in 1993. The system likely retained the S-400 designator to highlight the long-range performance. It would also be simpler to integrate shorter-ranged weapons from the S-350 complex into the S-400, rather than redesigning S-350 systems to handle the longer-ranged weapon of the S-400.
Fakel MKB engineers began work on dealing with the issue of a 400 kilometer ranged missile immediately upon the initiation of S-400 development. Boris Bunkin and Petr Grushin analyzed the characteristics of the 48N6 series missiles and realized that there was still potential in the missile for increased range. The missiles of the S-300P series weapons initially fly a near-ballistic profile towards their target. Increasing the altitude at apogee of the trajectory results in an increase in range. In-service weapons had their apogee restricted to 38 kilometers. This was due to the fact that at a higher altitude the aerodynamic control surfaces would no longer function effectively. Thrust vectoring control used during the boost stage was no longer viable either as the motor had already burnt out prior to reaching apogee. It was discovered that operating the control surfaces at higher altitudes resulted in an instability in the flight path, potentially impacting the accuracy of the weapon. Bunkin and Grushin's solution to increase the range of the missile system was to modify the control surfaces to allow them to lock during the near-ballistic portion of the trajectory. This would eliminate any unwanted movement, with the control surfaces unlocking upon reaching lower altitude to provide maneuverability during endgame. The new missile was tested in 1985 and reached an apogee of 70 kilometers. The significant increase in altitude enabled the missile to fly out to a range of 400 kilometers. Upon descending to 20 kilometers, the missile's guidance system was recaptured by an experimental engagement radar complex and guided normally, validating the concept of a 400 kilometer missile for the S-400.
After the 400 kilometer test firing, Almaz MKB set about redesigning the experimental engagement radar components to allow the system to be employed on a mobile chassis. The S-400 design was approved in 1988. Events surrounding the breakup of the Soviet Union would affect production of system components, so testing of the S-400 did not commence until 1993. By this time testing of strategic-level SAM systems had been relocated to Kapustin Yar in southwestern Russia as Sary Shagan now resided in the independent nation of Kazakhstan. System testing initially commenced with the existing 48N6D missile, with testing of the new 48N6DM designed for the S-400 being reported in 2004. The first S-400 battallion entered operational service near the town of Elektrostal in the Moscow region on 6 August 2007.
SYSTEM COMPONENTS
The S-300P can be described as a modular SAM system. Various different system components are required to make the system operational, and there is a degree of choice involved in which system components to employ. Certain deployment strategies may require the use of independent acquisition radars, for example, and there are numerous different TEL iterations available for the system.
ENGAGEMENT RADARS
The most critical radar in any SAM system is the target engagement radar. The engagement radars used by the S-300P and S-400 series SAM systems are large phased array radars. The initial engagement radar for the S-300PT was mounted on a trailer for transportation, but subsequent models have been mounted on all-terrain vehicles for rapid deployability and enhanced system mobility over rough terrain.
5N63
The initial engagement radar employed by the S-300P was the 5N63 (FLAP LID). This was produced in two primary versions: the 5N63 (FLAP LID A), a containerized system designed for the S-300PT, and the 5N63S (FLAP LID B), a mobile variant mounted on a MAZ-543M chassis for the S-300PS.
The 5N63 is transported on an FR-10 transport trailer. When deployed, the wheels are removed and the body of the trailer is placed on the ground where the radar is to be erected. The 5N63 radar system and array are referred to within the system's nomenclature as container F-1. Container F-2 houses the operator stations for the engagement radar, and container F-3A contains the electronics for controlling up to three TELs, which are connected to the F-3A by cables. Up to four F-3A containers can be controlled by container F-2, giving the battery up to 12 TELs.
The 5N63S retains the basic containerized architecture of the 5N63. The primary difference is the method of transportation. Containers F-1S and F-2S are mounted in tandem on the back of a MAZ-543M all-terrain chassis, with container F-3S being mounted behind the cabin of one of the TEL vehicles. The MAZ-543M also mounts a radio antenna for communicating with the command post and receiving target track data for the engagement radar.
The 5N63S has the following characteristics:
Target speed: 50 to 1200 meters per second
Autonomous detection sectors:
-Low altitude: 1 degree elevation by 105 degrees azimuth
-Medium and high altitude: 4 degrees elevation by 12 degrees azimuth
30N6
The engagement radar employed by the S-300PM is the 30N6 (TOMB STONE). The 30N6 features a redesigned radar array and improved performance over the earlier 5N63 series. As with the 5N63S, the F-1M and F-2M containers are mounted in tandem on the back of a MAZ-543M chassis. The radio antenna used to communicate with the command post has also been redesigned.
The 30N6 has the following characteristics:
Target speed: 0 to 2800 meters per second
Autonomous detection sectors:
-Low altitude: 1 degree elevation by 90 degrees azimuth
-Medium altitude: 5 degrees elevation by 64 degrees azimuth
-High altitude: 14 degrees elevation by 64 degrees azimuth
-ballistic targets: 10 degrees elevation by 32 degrees azimuth
Two variants of the 30N6 are available for export, the 30N6E1 and 30N6E2. The 30N6E2 is associated with the Favorit system and shares the same basic characteristics as the 30N6E1, differing primarily in the engagement range offered by the Favorit's longer-ranged missiles. All of the engagement radars used by the S-300PS and S-300PM share the following characteristics:
Simultaneous engagements: 6
Missiles guided per target: 2
Measurement accuracy:
-Range: 5 meters
-Speed: 1 meter per second
-Angular coordinate difference: 1 arc minute
Response time to targeting data from command post: 9 to 11 seconds
Emplacement time: 5 minutes
Crew: 6
92N6
The engagement radar used by the next-generation S-400 SAM system is the 92N6 (GRAVE STONE). The 92N6 features a further revised radar array when compared to the 30N6. The all-terrain chassis has been altered as well. In place of a MAZ-543M chassis, the 92N6 and its associated control container are mounted in tandem on the back of an MZKT-7930 chassis.
Characteristics of the 92N6 which have been publicly released are as follows:
Simultaneous engagements: 6
Missiles guided per target: 2
Target speed: 0 to 4800 meters per second
All engagement radars may be mounted atop either a 23.8 meter 40V6M mast assembly or a 38.8 meter 40V6MD mast assembly to increase low altitude capability in areas with uneven terrain or obstructions. A variant created for the 92N6 engagement radar is the 40V6MR. The mast assembly was developed in order to enhance the ability of the system to detect and prosecute low altitude targets. The masts themselves were at one juncture a point of contention with the then-CINC PVO, General I. M. Tret'yak. General Tret'yak was concerned that transporting the large, heavy mast assemblies would damage bridges all around the Moscow area. As it turned out, the system designers had selected the mast assemblies for a reason. Moscow was surrounded by forests which would otherwise have had to have been cleared in order to guarantee low altitude performance to a height of 50 meters. The choice was either to develop transportable masts or erect fixed towers at the launch sites. Obviously fixed towers were not a viable option, as they would effectively negate the mobility of the system by forcing it to remain tied to a fixed location. The only drawback to using the 40V6 series towers was the time it took to deploy them. The 40V6M takes 60 minutes, with the 40V6M requiring 120 minutes.
ACQUISITION RADARS
Various different target acquisition radars can be employed by the S-300P and S-400 variants. These range from dedicated battle management radars to specialized radars for detecting low-altitude targets.
Battle Management Complex
The battle management complex of the S-300P and S-400 represents the central command post for each SAM complex. In all versions, the complex can control up to six separate batteries. The central command post controls the primary acquisition radar and assigns target tracks to individual batteries, a process which can be accomplished automatically. The central command post also contains a 53L6 cabin used for interfacing with the Baikal automated control system. All of the associated engagement radars possess the ability to acquire targets in their assigned sectors independently, but the primary source of target track data remains the associated battle management complexes.
5N83
The battle management complex for the S-300P series is the 5N83. It consists of a 5K56 command post designated container F-9. Also present are containers F-6, the acquisition radar, F-7, and F-8, the latter two containing electronics related to the radar system. Two variants of the 5N83 were conceived: the 5N83 in containerized form for the S-300PT, and the 5N83S in mobile form for the S-300PS. In the 5N83S the 5K56 command post is mounted on a MAZ-543M chassis. Containers F-6, F-7, and F-8 are mounted on a 9988 trailer towed by a MAZ-7410.
The acquisition radar employed by the 5N83 complex is the 5N64. The 5N64 is a dual-sided radar system which utilizes a hybrid phased array radar. In the 5N64, radar signals are transmitted to the array faces using feedhorn assemblies. The containerized variant for the S-300PT is the 5N64 (BIG BIRD A), while the mobile variant for the S-300PS is the 5N64S (BIG BIRD B).
83M6
The battle management complex for the S-300PM is the 83M6. This complex consists of a 54K6 command post, container D-9, mounted on a MAZ-543M chassis, and an acquisition radar system. The acquisition radar system consists of containers F-6M, the acquisition radar, and F-8M, an electronic equipment station, and is mounted on a trailer towed by a MAZ-7410.
The acquisition radar employed by the 83M6 complex is the 64N6 (BIG BIRD D), a modification of the earlier 5N64 series radar systems. The 64N6 radar system has the following characteristics:
THE S-400
Development of the S-400 (SA-X-21) was initiated in 1985 as a replacement for the S-200 strategic SAM system. The program had a stated range requirement of 400 kilometers, 100 kilometers greater than the latest S-200 systems. Almaz was assigned the task of developing the system, with Fakel developing the new long-range missile. In the early 1980's, Almaz had also begun work on the S-350, a next-generation SAM system designed to be the eventual successor to the S-300P family. During the course of preliminary research and design efforts for both systems, it was determined that both systems could be standardized, using the same components. The long-range missile designed by Fakel would be integrated to allow the system to meet the 400 kilometer range requirement. The preliminary design was approved in 1988, and had been given the name Triumf. The "new" S-400 began trials at Kapustin Yar in 1993. The system likely retained the S-400 designator to highlight the long-range performance. It would also be simpler to integrate shorter-ranged weapons from the S-350 complex into the S-400, rather than redesigning S-350 systems to handle the longer-ranged weapon of the S-400.
Fakel MKB engineers began work on dealing with the issue of a 400 kilometer ranged missile immediately upon the initiation of S-400 development. Boris Bunkin and Petr Grushin analyzed the characteristics of the 48N6 series missiles and realized that there was still potential in the missile for increased range. The missiles of the S-300P series weapons initially fly a near-ballistic profile towards their target. Increasing the altitude at apogee of the trajectory results in an increase in range. In-service weapons had their apogee restricted to 38 kilometers. This was due to the fact that at a higher altitude the aerodynamic control surfaces would no longer function effectively. Thrust vectoring control used during the boost stage was no longer viable either as the motor had already burnt out prior to reaching apogee. It was discovered that operating the control surfaces at higher altitudes resulted in an instability in the flight path, potentially impacting the accuracy of the weapon. Bunkin and Grushin's solution to increase the range of the missile system was to modify the control surfaces to allow them to lock during the near-ballistic portion of the trajectory. This would eliminate any unwanted movement, with the control surfaces unlocking upon reaching lower altitude to provide maneuverability during endgame. The new missile was tested in 1985 and reached an apogee of 70 kilometers. The significant increase in altitude enabled the missile to fly out to a range of 400 kilometers. Upon descending to 20 kilometers, the missile's guidance system was recaptured by an experimental engagement radar complex and guided normally, validating the concept of a 400 kilometer missile for the S-400.
After the 400 kilometer test firing, Almaz MKB set about redesigning the experimental engagement radar components to allow the system to be employed on a mobile chassis. The S-400 design was approved in 1988. Events surrounding the breakup of the Soviet Union would affect production of system components, so testing of the S-400 did not commence until 1993. By this time testing of strategic-level SAM systems had been relocated to Kapustin Yar in southwestern Russia as Sary Shagan now resided in the independent nation of Kazakhstan. System testing initially commenced with the existing 48N6D missile, with testing of the new 48N6DM designed for the S-400 being reported in 2004. The first S-400 battallion entered operational service near the town of Elektrostal in the Moscow region on 6 August 2007.
SYSTEM COMPONENTS
The S-300P can be described as a modular SAM system. Various different system components are required to make the system operational, and there is a degree of choice involved in which system components to employ. Certain deployment strategies may require the use of independent acquisition radars, for example, and there are numerous different TEL iterations available for the system.
ENGAGEMENT RADARS
The most critical radar in any SAM system is the target engagement radar. The engagement radars used by the S-300P and S-400 series SAM systems are large phased array radars. The initial engagement radar for the S-300PT was mounted on a trailer for transportation, but subsequent models have been mounted on all-terrain vehicles for rapid deployability and enhanced system mobility over rough terrain.
5N63
The initial engagement radar employed by the S-300P was the 5N63 (FLAP LID). This was produced in two primary versions: the 5N63 (FLAP LID A), a containerized system designed for the S-300PT, and the 5N63S (FLAP LID B), a mobile variant mounted on a MAZ-543M chassis for the S-300PS.
The 5N63 is transported on an FR-10 transport trailer. When deployed, the wheels are removed and the body of the trailer is placed on the ground where the radar is to be erected. The 5N63 radar system and array are referred to within the system's nomenclature as container F-1. Container F-2 houses the operator stations for the engagement radar, and container F-3A contains the electronics for controlling up to three TELs, which are connected to the F-3A by cables. Up to four F-3A containers can be controlled by container F-2, giving the battery up to 12 TELs.
The 5N63S retains the basic containerized architecture of the 5N63. The primary difference is the method of transportation. Containers F-1S and F-2S are mounted in tandem on the back of a MAZ-543M all-terrain chassis, with container F-3S being mounted behind the cabin of one of the TEL vehicles. The MAZ-543M also mounts a radio antenna for communicating with the command post and receiving target track data for the engagement radar.
The 5N63S has the following characteristics:
Target speed: 50 to 1200 meters per second
Autonomous detection sectors:
-Low altitude: 1 degree elevation by 105 degrees azimuth
-Medium and high altitude: 4 degrees elevation by 12 degrees azimuth
30N6
The engagement radar employed by the S-300PM is the 30N6 (TOMB STONE). The 30N6 features a redesigned radar array and improved performance over the earlier 5N63 series. As with the 5N63S, the F-1M and F-2M containers are mounted in tandem on the back of a MAZ-543M chassis. The radio antenna used to communicate with the command post has also been redesigned.
The 30N6 has the following characteristics:
Target speed: 0 to 2800 meters per second
Autonomous detection sectors:
-Low altitude: 1 degree elevation by 90 degrees azimuth
-Medium altitude: 5 degrees elevation by 64 degrees azimuth
-High altitude: 14 degrees elevation by 64 degrees azimuth
-ballistic targets: 10 degrees elevation by 32 degrees azimuth
Two variants of the 30N6 are available for export, the 30N6E1 and 30N6E2. The 30N6E2 is associated with the Favorit system and shares the same basic characteristics as the 30N6E1, differing primarily in the engagement range offered by the Favorit's longer-ranged missiles. All of the engagement radars used by the S-300PS and S-300PM share the following characteristics:
Simultaneous engagements: 6
Missiles guided per target: 2
Measurement accuracy:
-Range: 5 meters
-Speed: 1 meter per second
-Angular coordinate difference: 1 arc minute
Response time to targeting data from command post: 9 to 11 seconds
Emplacement time: 5 minutes
Crew: 6
92N6
The engagement radar used by the next-generation S-400 SAM system is the 92N6 (GRAVE STONE). The 92N6 features a further revised radar array when compared to the 30N6. The all-terrain chassis has been altered as well. In place of a MAZ-543M chassis, the 92N6 and its associated control container are mounted in tandem on the back of an MZKT-7930 chassis.
Characteristics of the 92N6 which have been publicly released are as follows:
Simultaneous engagements: 6
Missiles guided per target: 2
Target speed: 0 to 4800 meters per second
All engagement radars may be mounted atop either a 23.8 meter 40V6M mast assembly or a 38.8 meter 40V6MD mast assembly to increase low altitude capability in areas with uneven terrain or obstructions. A variant created for the 92N6 engagement radar is the 40V6MR. The mast assembly was developed in order to enhance the ability of the system to detect and prosecute low altitude targets. The masts themselves were at one juncture a point of contention with the then-CINC PVO, General I. M. Tret'yak. General Tret'yak was concerned that transporting the large, heavy mast assemblies would damage bridges all around the Moscow area. As it turned out, the system designers had selected the mast assemblies for a reason. Moscow was surrounded by forests which would otherwise have had to have been cleared in order to guarantee low altitude performance to a height of 50 meters. The choice was either to develop transportable masts or erect fixed towers at the launch sites. Obviously fixed towers were not a viable option, as they would effectively negate the mobility of the system by forcing it to remain tied to a fixed location. The only drawback to using the 40V6 series towers was the time it took to deploy them. The 40V6M takes 60 minutes, with the 40V6M requiring 120 minutes.
ACQUISITION RADARS
Various different target acquisition radars can be employed by the S-300P and S-400 variants. These range from dedicated battle management radars to specialized radars for detecting low-altitude targets.
Battle Management Complex
The battle management complex of the S-300P and S-400 represents the central command post for each SAM complex. In all versions, the complex can control up to six separate batteries. The central command post controls the primary acquisition radar and assigns target tracks to individual batteries, a process which can be accomplished automatically. The central command post also contains a 53L6 cabin used for interfacing with the Baikal automated control system. All of the associated engagement radars possess the ability to acquire targets in their assigned sectors independently, but the primary source of target track data remains the associated battle management complexes.
5N83
The battle management complex for the S-300P series is the 5N83. It consists of a 5K56 command post designated container F-9. Also present are containers F-6, the acquisition radar, F-7, and F-8, the latter two containing electronics related to the radar system. Two variants of the 5N83 were conceived: the 5N83 in containerized form for the S-300PT, and the 5N83S in mobile form for the S-300PS. In the 5N83S the 5K56 command post is mounted on a MAZ-543M chassis. Containers F-6, F-7, and F-8 are mounted on a 9988 trailer towed by a MAZ-7410.
The acquisition radar employed by the 5N83 complex is the 5N64. The 5N64 is a dual-sided radar system which utilizes a hybrid phased array radar. In the 5N64, radar signals are transmitted to the array faces using feedhorn assemblies. The containerized variant for the S-300PT is the 5N64 (BIG BIRD A), while the mobile variant for the S-300PS is the 5N64S (BIG BIRD B).
83M6
The battle management complex for the S-300PM is the 83M6. This complex consists of a 54K6 command post, container D-9, mounted on a MAZ-543M chassis, and an acquisition radar system. The acquisition radar system consists of containers F-6M, the acquisition radar, and F-8M, an electronic equipment station, and is mounted on a trailer towed by a MAZ-7410.
The acquisition radar employed by the 83M6 complex is the 64N6 (BIG BIRD D), a modification of the earlier 5N64 series radar systems. The 64N6 radar system has the following characteristics:
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Гостин
Targets detected in one scan: 300
Targets tracked: 100
Targets assigned: 36 (6 to each of 6 batteries)
Maximum detection range:
-Airborne target: 300 kilometers
-Ballistic target: 127 kilometers with an RCS of 0.4 square meters
Scanned area:
-Azimuth: 360 degrees or 180 degrees
-Elevation: 0 to 14 degrees or 0 to 28 degrees
Ballistic target detection sector:
-Azimuth: up to 60 degrees
-Elevation: 0 to 55 degrees or 20 to 75 degrees
Target speed: 2800 meters per second
Measurement accuracy:
-Range: 150 meters
-Azimuth: 0.5 degrees
-Elevation: 0.5 degrees
Revolutions per minute: 5
Emplacement time: 5 minutes
Crew: 6
The 83M6 has been exported with the S-300PMU and S-300PMU-1 as the 83M6E, with the 54K6E command post and the 64N6E acquisition radar system. Export of the system with the S-300PMU, based on the S-300PS, implies that the 83M6 complex can control both S-300PM and S-300PS batteries. The system exported with the S-300PMU-2 is the 83M6E2, with the 54K6E2 command post andthe 64N6E2 acquisition radar. The 64N6E2 differs in performance with the 64N6 only in the area of the ballistic target detection sector. In the 64N6E2 radar, the elevation value is from 0 to 75 degrees.
30K6
The battle management complex for the S-400 is the 30K6. This complex consists of a 55K6 command post mounted on a Ural-532301 chassis and a 91N6 (BIG BIRD E) acquisition radar mounted in a similar fashion to the 64N6 or 5N64S. The 30K6 complex can interface with 83M6 complexes to allow control of S-300PM batteries.
The 91N6 has significantly increased capability over the previous acquisition radar systems employed with the S-300P variants. Major capabilities include the following:
Targets tracked: 300
Maximum detection range: 600 kilometers
Enhancing Low-altitude Detection
The acquisition radars utilized by the S-300P and S-400 are very capable systems, but an increase in low-altitude target tracking was desired for the S-300P.
The low altitude radar system developed for the S-300PT was the 5N66 (CLAM SHELL). The 5N66 was mounted atop a 23.8 meter 40V6 mast assembly. The radar array was designated container F-5, and was controlled from the battery's F-2 container. The radar was designed to determine the range, speed, and azimuth of low altitude targets with the following accuracy levels:
Range: 250 meters
Speed: 2.4 meters per second
Azimuth: 20 minutes
An improved 5N66M radar system was developed for the S-300PS. This consisted of a container F-5M for the radar system itself, and a container F-52M housing electronic equipment. In this variant the radar system is either controlled from the F-2S container of the S-300PS, or from the F-52M container. A further improved variant developed for the S-300PM is the 76N6. This variant consists of the F-5MU and F-52MU containers and is exported as the 76N6E for use with S-300PMU and S-300PMU-1 systems. A MAZ-537 is used to tow the 40V6M for transport, with the 19 meter extension used by the 40V6MD being mounted on a CHMZAP trailer towed by a KrAZ-250.
The 5N66M and 76N6 have the following characteristics:
Altitude threshold: 3 kilometers
Maximum detection range:
-Low altitude: limited by radar horizon
-500 meters: 90 kilometers
-100 meters: 120 kilometers
Revolutions per minute: 20
Self-sufficient EW
A self-sufficient target acquisition capability can also be afforded to individual batteries by employing either the 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) or 96L6 radar system. Employing one of these radar systems allows individual batteries to operate without support from a battle management complex. Alternatively, these radar systems, in conjunction with deployed low altitude radar systems, can be used to refine target track data and pass this information along to the engagement radar.
The first battery-level acquisition radar to be deployed with the S-300P family was the 36D6. The 36D6 radar system is self-contained on a trailer unit, with a radar antenna assembly and a control cabin. Variants of the 36D6 associated with the S-300P family include the 19Zh6 and ST-68U. The 36D6 can be deployed atop the 40V6M and 40V6MD mast assemblies.
Characteristics of the 36D6 are as follows:
Altitude threshold: 20 kilometers
Maximum detection range: 5 to 160 kilometers
Emplacement time:
-Power on time: 3 minutes
-Emplacement time: 60 minutes
Crew: 3
A next-generation acquisition radar was first advertised with the S-300PMU-2. This radar, the 96L6, is mounted on a MAZ-7930 chassis, and can be deployed atop 40V6 series mast assemblies. The 96L6 can operate with all S-300P variants and is also associated with the S-400. Characteristics of the 96L6 are as follows:
Maximum detection range: 300 kilometers
Scanned area:
-Azimuth: 360 degrees
-Elevation: -30 to 60 degrees
Target speed: 30 to 2800 meters per second
Revolutions per minute: 15
Emplacement time: 5 minutes
Crew: 3
LAUNCH VEHICLES
Various different TELs have been employed with the S-300P and S-400 systems. All TELs contain an erecting arm for four missile canisters.
The TEL employed by the S-300PT is the 5P851. This TEL has an unusual onfiguration. The TEL is towed to a launch position by a KrAZ-258 tractor and then must be decoupled from the tractor to be emplaced. The missile canisters are erected forward towards the front of the trailer, which splits apart to form two stabilizing arms. This unusual configuration resulted in an emplacement time of 30 minutes. An improved TEL, the 5P851A, was developed for the S-300PT-1 system. This TEL had improved maintenance characteristics.
The 5P85SD TEL complex employed by the S-300PS consists of two different TELs mounted on MAZ-543M chassis. The 5P85S TEL contains the system's F-3S cabin used for interfacing with the engagement radar complex and processing launch commands. The 5P85D TEL lacks the F-3S cabin. Each F-2S cabin is connected by cable to up to four 5P85S TELs. Each 5P85S TEL is connected by cable to two 5P85D TELs, giving an S-300PS battery a total of up to 12 TELs. A radio antenna can also be employed by the 5P85S and 5P85D TELs to communicate with the F-2 container of the engagement radar complex. Early and late model 5P85SD complexes were fielded, differing primarily in the size and shape of the equipment areas aft of the operator's cabin.
The S-300PM has reverted back to a towed TEL, the 5P85T. The 5P85T retains the 5 minute setup time of the MAZ-543M based 5P85SD complex thanks to a different configuration when compared to the 5P851. The 5P85T does not need to be decoupled prior to being emplaced, as the missile canisters are erected to the rear of the trailer. A KrAZ-260 is used to tow the 5P85T. Communication with the 30N6 engagement radar's F-2M cabin is accomplished by either radio signal using a disc-shaped antenna or by cable connection. It would appear that the S-300PM has done away with the F-3 container used by previous iterations to pass commands along to the TELs.
A modified 5P85S TEL variant has been advertised as an option for both the S-300PMU-1 and S-300PMU-2. This new TEL is the 5P85SM. It can be differentiated visually from earlier 5P85S variants by the use of a disc antenna for communicating with the F-2M container, and by the situating of the missile canisters in the stowed position. In earlier 5P85S and 5P85D TELs, the missile canisters extend forward to the second set of wheels. In the 5P85SM, the missile canisters extend forward past the rear of the second set of wheels. As with the 5P85T, the F-3 container is absent. Cable connections can also be employed for communicating with the F-2M container. The 5P85SM is advertised for export with the S-300PMU-2 as the 5P85SE2, and does not appear to have been adopted by Russian S-300P batteries.
The TEL employed by the S-400 is the 5P85T2. This is a modified 5P85T towed by a BAZ-64022, and employs a disc antenna for communicating with the 92N6 engagement radar. Cable connections may also be used.
MISSILES
All of the missiles employed by the S-300P and S-400 variants were developed by the Fakel MKB. Engagement range of the S-300P family has increased with each variant and now stands at 200 kilometers when the latest 48N6D missiles are employed.
5V55 Series
The original missile family developed for the S-300P was Fakel's 5V55 series. The 5V55 missile is available in four different variants. The initial 5V55K was a command-guided missile with a maximum range of 47 kilometers. The 5V55KD was introduced with the S-300PT-1, with range increased to 75 kilometers to match that of the 5V55R introduced with the S-300PS. The S-300PT-1 was also capable of employing the 5V55R missile. Likewise, the S-300PS is compatible with the 5V55K and 5V55KD missiles as well. The fourth variant was the 5V55RD with increased range employed by the S-300PS and S-300PMU.
Characteristics of the 5V55 series weapons are as follows:
5V55K
Mass: 1480 kilograms
Warhead: 130 kilogram HE fragmentation
Engagement range: 5 to 47 kilometers
Engagement altitude: 25 to 25,000 meters
Target speed: 1200 meters per second
5V55KD
Mass: 1660 kilograms
Warhead: 130 kilogram HE fragmentation
Engagement range: 5 to 75 kilometers
Engagement altitude: 25 to 25,000 meters
Target speed: 1200 meters per second
5V55R
Mass: 1660 kilograms
Warhead: 130 kilogram HE fragmentation
Engagement range:
-Aerial target: 5 to 75 kilometers
-Ballistic target: 5 to 35 kilometers
Engagement altitude: 25 to 25,000 meters
Target speed: 1200 meters per second
5V55RD
Mass: 1660 kilograms
Warhead: 130 kilogram HE fragmentation
Engagement range:
-Aerial target: 5 to 90 kilometers
-Ballistic target: 5 to 35 kilometers
Engagement altitude: 25 to 25,000 meters
Target speed: 1200 meters per second
48N6 Series
The Fakel MKB developed a new missile, the 48N6, for use with the S-300PM system. The 48N6 has double the range of the 5V55R thanks to a new rocket motor. A further improved variant, the 48N6D, was developed for the S-300PMU-2 Favorit. The S-400 employs the latest 48N6 variant, the 48N6DM. Export designators of the 48N6 missiles are 48N6E, 48N6E2, and 48N6E3. The 48N6D and 48N6DM incorporate Fakel's directional warhead for enhanced ATBM capability. The S-300PM may also employ the earlier 5V55 series missiles.
Characteristics of the 48N6 series weapons are as follows:
48N6
Mass: 1800 kilograms
Warhead: 143 kilogram HE fragmentation
Engagement range:
-Aerial target: 5 to 150 kilometers
-Ballistic target: 5 to 40 kilometers
Engagement altitude: 10 to 27,000 meters
Target speed: 2800 meters per second
48N6D
Mass: 1835 kilograms
Warhead: 180 kilogram directional
Engagement range:
-Aerial target: 3 to 200 kilometers
-Ballistic target: 5 to 40 kilometers
Engagement altitude: 10 to 27,000 meters
Target speed: 2800 meters per second
48N6DM
Mass: 1835 kilograms
Warhead: 180 kilogram directional
Engagement range:
-Aerial target: 3 to 240 kilometers
-Ballistic target: 5 to 60 kilometers
Engagement altitude: 10 to 27,000 meters
Target speed: 4800 meters per second
Targets tracked: 100
Targets assigned: 36 (6 to each of 6 batteries)
Maximum detection range:
-Airborne target: 300 kilometers
-Ballistic target: 127 kilometers with an RCS of 0.4 square meters
Scanned area:
-Azimuth: 360 degrees or 180 degrees
-Elevation: 0 to 14 degrees or 0 to 28 degrees
Ballistic target detection sector:
-Azimuth: up to 60 degrees
-Elevation: 0 to 55 degrees or 20 to 75 degrees
Target speed: 2800 meters per second
Measurement accuracy:
-Range: 150 meters
-Azimuth: 0.5 degrees
-Elevation: 0.5 degrees
Revolutions per minute: 5
Emplacement time: 5 minutes
Crew: 6
The 83M6 has been exported with the S-300PMU and S-300PMU-1 as the 83M6E, with the 54K6E command post and the 64N6E acquisition radar system. Export of the system with the S-300PMU, based on the S-300PS, implies that the 83M6 complex can control both S-300PM and S-300PS batteries. The system exported with the S-300PMU-2 is the 83M6E2, with the 54K6E2 command post andthe 64N6E2 acquisition radar. The 64N6E2 differs in performance with the 64N6 only in the area of the ballistic target detection sector. In the 64N6E2 radar, the elevation value is from 0 to 75 degrees.
30K6
The battle management complex for the S-400 is the 30K6. This complex consists of a 55K6 command post mounted on a Ural-532301 chassis and a 91N6 (BIG BIRD E) acquisition radar mounted in a similar fashion to the 64N6 or 5N64S. The 30K6 complex can interface with 83M6 complexes to allow control of S-300PM batteries.
The 91N6 has significantly increased capability over the previous acquisition radar systems employed with the S-300P variants. Major capabilities include the following:
Targets tracked: 300
Maximum detection range: 600 kilometers
Enhancing Low-altitude Detection
The acquisition radars utilized by the S-300P and S-400 are very capable systems, but an increase in low-altitude target tracking was desired for the S-300P.
The low altitude radar system developed for the S-300PT was the 5N66 (CLAM SHELL). The 5N66 was mounted atop a 23.8 meter 40V6 mast assembly. The radar array was designated container F-5, and was controlled from the battery's F-2 container. The radar was designed to determine the range, speed, and azimuth of low altitude targets with the following accuracy levels:
Range: 250 meters
Speed: 2.4 meters per second
Azimuth: 20 minutes
An improved 5N66M radar system was developed for the S-300PS. This consisted of a container F-5M for the radar system itself, and a container F-52M housing electronic equipment. In this variant the radar system is either controlled from the F-2S container of the S-300PS, or from the F-52M container. A further improved variant developed for the S-300PM is the 76N6. This variant consists of the F-5MU and F-52MU containers and is exported as the 76N6E for use with S-300PMU and S-300PMU-1 systems. A MAZ-537 is used to tow the 40V6M for transport, with the 19 meter extension used by the 40V6MD being mounted on a CHMZAP trailer towed by a KrAZ-250.
The 5N66M and 76N6 have the following characteristics:
Altitude threshold: 3 kilometers
Maximum detection range:
-Low altitude: limited by radar horizon
-500 meters: 90 kilometers
-100 meters: 120 kilometers
Revolutions per minute: 20
Self-sufficient EW
A self-sufficient target acquisition capability can also be afforded to individual batteries by employing either the 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) or 96L6 radar system. Employing one of these radar systems allows individual batteries to operate without support from a battle management complex. Alternatively, these radar systems, in conjunction with deployed low altitude radar systems, can be used to refine target track data and pass this information along to the engagement radar.
The first battery-level acquisition radar to be deployed with the S-300P family was the 36D6. The 36D6 radar system is self-contained on a trailer unit, with a radar antenna assembly and a control cabin. Variants of the 36D6 associated with the S-300P family include the 19Zh6 and ST-68U. The 36D6 can be deployed atop the 40V6M and 40V6MD mast assemblies.
Characteristics of the 36D6 are as follows:
Altitude threshold: 20 kilometers
Maximum detection range: 5 to 160 kilometers
Emplacement time:
-Power on time: 3 minutes
-Emplacement time: 60 minutes
Crew: 3
A next-generation acquisition radar was first advertised with the S-300PMU-2. This radar, the 96L6, is mounted on a MAZ-7930 chassis, and can be deployed atop 40V6 series mast assemblies. The 96L6 can operate with all S-300P variants and is also associated with the S-400. Characteristics of the 96L6 are as follows:
Maximum detection range: 300 kilometers
Scanned area:
-Azimuth: 360 degrees
-Elevation: -30 to 60 degrees
Target speed: 30 to 2800 meters per second
Revolutions per minute: 15
Emplacement time: 5 minutes
Crew: 3
LAUNCH VEHICLES
Various different TELs have been employed with the S-300P and S-400 systems. All TELs contain an erecting arm for four missile canisters.
The TEL employed by the S-300PT is the 5P851. This TEL has an unusual onfiguration. The TEL is towed to a launch position by a KrAZ-258 tractor and then must be decoupled from the tractor to be emplaced. The missile canisters are erected forward towards the front of the trailer, which splits apart to form two stabilizing arms. This unusual configuration resulted in an emplacement time of 30 minutes. An improved TEL, the 5P851A, was developed for the S-300PT-1 system. This TEL had improved maintenance characteristics.
The 5P85SD TEL complex employed by the S-300PS consists of two different TELs mounted on MAZ-543M chassis. The 5P85S TEL contains the system's F-3S cabin used for interfacing with the engagement radar complex and processing launch commands. The 5P85D TEL lacks the F-3S cabin. Each F-2S cabin is connected by cable to up to four 5P85S TELs. Each 5P85S TEL is connected by cable to two 5P85D TELs, giving an S-300PS battery a total of up to 12 TELs. A radio antenna can also be employed by the 5P85S and 5P85D TELs to communicate with the F-2 container of the engagement radar complex. Early and late model 5P85SD complexes were fielded, differing primarily in the size and shape of the equipment areas aft of the operator's cabin.
The S-300PM has reverted back to a towed TEL, the 5P85T. The 5P85T retains the 5 minute setup time of the MAZ-543M based 5P85SD complex thanks to a different configuration when compared to the 5P851. The 5P85T does not need to be decoupled prior to being emplaced, as the missile canisters are erected to the rear of the trailer. A KrAZ-260 is used to tow the 5P85T. Communication with the 30N6 engagement radar's F-2M cabin is accomplished by either radio signal using a disc-shaped antenna or by cable connection. It would appear that the S-300PM has done away with the F-3 container used by previous iterations to pass commands along to the TELs.
A modified 5P85S TEL variant has been advertised as an option for both the S-300PMU-1 and S-300PMU-2. This new TEL is the 5P85SM. It can be differentiated visually from earlier 5P85S variants by the use of a disc antenna for communicating with the F-2M container, and by the situating of the missile canisters in the stowed position. In earlier 5P85S and 5P85D TELs, the missile canisters extend forward to the second set of wheels. In the 5P85SM, the missile canisters extend forward past the rear of the second set of wheels. As with the 5P85T, the F-3 container is absent. Cable connections can also be employed for communicating with the F-2M container. The 5P85SM is advertised for export with the S-300PMU-2 as the 5P85SE2, and does not appear to have been adopted by Russian S-300P batteries.
The TEL employed by the S-400 is the 5P85T2. This is a modified 5P85T towed by a BAZ-64022, and employs a disc antenna for communicating with the 92N6 engagement radar. Cable connections may also be used.
MISSILES
All of the missiles employed by the S-300P and S-400 variants were developed by the Fakel MKB. Engagement range of the S-300P family has increased with each variant and now stands at 200 kilometers when the latest 48N6D missiles are employed.
5V55 Series
The original missile family developed for the S-300P was Fakel's 5V55 series. The 5V55 missile is available in four different variants. The initial 5V55K was a command-guided missile with a maximum range of 47 kilometers. The 5V55KD was introduced with the S-300PT-1, with range increased to 75 kilometers to match that of the 5V55R introduced with the S-300PS. The S-300PT-1 was also capable of employing the 5V55R missile. Likewise, the S-300PS is compatible with the 5V55K and 5V55KD missiles as well. The fourth variant was the 5V55RD with increased range employed by the S-300PS and S-300PMU.
Characteristics of the 5V55 series weapons are as follows:
5V55K
Mass: 1480 kilograms
Warhead: 130 kilogram HE fragmentation
Engagement range: 5 to 47 kilometers
Engagement altitude: 25 to 25,000 meters
Target speed: 1200 meters per second
5V55KD
Mass: 1660 kilograms
Warhead: 130 kilogram HE fragmentation
Engagement range: 5 to 75 kilometers
Engagement altitude: 25 to 25,000 meters
Target speed: 1200 meters per second
5V55R
Mass: 1660 kilograms
Warhead: 130 kilogram HE fragmentation
Engagement range:
-Aerial target: 5 to 75 kilometers
-Ballistic target: 5 to 35 kilometers
Engagement altitude: 25 to 25,000 meters
Target speed: 1200 meters per second
5V55RD
Mass: 1660 kilograms
Warhead: 130 kilogram HE fragmentation
Engagement range:
-Aerial target: 5 to 90 kilometers
-Ballistic target: 5 to 35 kilometers
Engagement altitude: 25 to 25,000 meters
Target speed: 1200 meters per second
48N6 Series
The Fakel MKB developed a new missile, the 48N6, for use with the S-300PM system. The 48N6 has double the range of the 5V55R thanks to a new rocket motor. A further improved variant, the 48N6D, was developed for the S-300PMU-2 Favorit. The S-400 employs the latest 48N6 variant, the 48N6DM. Export designators of the 48N6 missiles are 48N6E, 48N6E2, and 48N6E3. The 48N6D and 48N6DM incorporate Fakel's directional warhead for enhanced ATBM capability. The S-300PM may also employ the earlier 5V55 series missiles.
Characteristics of the 48N6 series weapons are as follows:
48N6
Mass: 1800 kilograms
Warhead: 143 kilogram HE fragmentation
Engagement range:
-Aerial target: 5 to 150 kilometers
-Ballistic target: 5 to 40 kilometers
Engagement altitude: 10 to 27,000 meters
Target speed: 2800 meters per second
48N6D
Mass: 1835 kilograms
Warhead: 180 kilogram directional
Engagement range:
-Aerial target: 3 to 200 kilometers
-Ballistic target: 5 to 40 kilometers
Engagement altitude: 10 to 27,000 meters
Target speed: 2800 meters per second
48N6DM
Mass: 1835 kilograms
Warhead: 180 kilogram directional
Engagement range:
-Aerial target: 3 to 240 kilometers
-Ballistic target: 5 to 60 kilometers
Engagement altitude: 10 to 27,000 meters
Target speed: 4800 meters per second
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9M96 Series
A new missile family is being developed by the Fakel MKB for the Favorit and S-400 systems. The 9M96 missiles are highly accurate thanks to the inclusion of advanced gas-dynamic thrust vectoring control systems, which is used in terminal homing to provide a hit-to-kill capability enhanced by the inclusion of an HE warhead. The 9M96 missiles are compact enough to enable four of them to be carried in a specially designed canister sized to displace one of the 48N6 canisters on an associated TEL. This enables each TEL to carry up to 16 9M96 series weapons, or a mixture of 9M96 and 48N6 weapons. The two variants of the 9M96 are the 9M96 and the logner-ranged 9M96D with an extended motor section. These weapons are offered for export as the 9M96E and 9M96E2.
Characteristics of the 9M96 series weapons are as follows:
9M96
Mass: 333 kilograms
Warhead: 24 kilogram HE fragmentation
Engagement range: 1 to 40 kilometers
Engagement altitude: 5 to 25,000 meters
9M96D
Mass: 420 kilograms
Warhead: 24 kilogram HE fragmentation
Engagement range: 1 to 120 kilometers
Engagement altitude: 5 to 25,000 meters
Guidance Modes
Missiles employed by the S-300P variants employ one of three different guidance systems: command, seeker aided ground guidance (SAGG), and active radar. The 5V55K and 5V55KD are standard command guided missiles, relying on targeting data from the engagement radar complexes. The 5V55R, 5V55RD and all variants of the 48N6 series employ SAGG. SAGG is a form of guidance similar to the track via missile (TVM) guidance mode employed by the American PATRIOT SAM system. In SAGG, the missiles are fitted with semi-active homing heads. Missiles are fired towards their targets relying on inertial guidance based on target position data provided by the engagement radar complex prior to launch. Midcourse updates are provided using a datalink with the engagement radar complex. Upon reaching a predetermined range, the engagement radar illuminates the target. The semi-active seeker and the engagement radar both receive reflections from the target and generate independent sets of position data. The seeker's position data is downlinked to the engagement radar complex, which can also accept updated data from offboard sources such as the 5N66 or 64N6 radar systems. The engagement radar complex then compares all available sets of data to determine the most accurate target position, and guidance commands are then uplinked to the missile. Comparing different sets of data from different perspectives allows the missile system to be extremely accurate, even at very long ranges. The 9M96 missile systems employ basic active radar homing, relying on inertial guidance and midcourse updates from the engagement radar complex to get them within seeker range of their targets.
Diversification
The ability of the S-300P variants to employ various types of missiles is an important attribute of the system. The plethora of available weapons allows the SAM complex to select the most appropriate weapon for the designated target. For instance, in a jamming-free environment, a 5V55K missile may be selected, reserving the 5V55R or 48N6 weapons for more difficult targets. The S-300P may select different missile types automatically, as evidenced by S-300PT operational testing from December 1983 to January 1984 at the Telemba SAM training range. In one particular instance, a test was conducted to evaluate the automatic engagement mode of the system. In this mode, every process from track hand-down to missile spin-up is accomplished automatically, with the only human input being to press the launch button. During the test, a target was to be engaged at maximum range with a 5V55R missile. The target entered the launch range, but the target track was not assigned to a missile so a launch could not occur. As it turned out, the system's missile economy algorithm had activated. The missile economy algorithm, when active, will allow the system to select a 5V55K weapon if the engagement environment is free from jamming or interference. The system had designated the target for intercept by a 5V55K missile, which has a much smaller engagement range. As the target had not yet passed within the range of the 5V55K, track assignment had not yet been accomplished. As it turned out, the operators had not realized that the missile economy algorithm was set to active, resulting in the appearance of a failed test! Once the error was realized, testing progressed and the system's automatic performance was validated.
The Big Stick
The long-range weapon designed to give the S-400 its 400 kilometer engagement range is believed to be designated 40N6. As mentioned previously, the 48N6 has proved capable of operating effectively at this range, so 40N6 may in fact be a cover designation for an appropriately modified 400 kilometer ranged 48N6 series weapon destined for the S-400. Alternatively, it may be a wholly different missile designed for a different weapon system, such as the forthcoming S-500 strategic defense system. Ergo, despite rumors persisting of the continued development of what is referred to as the 40N6, it may well be that the S-400 is already capable of engaging targets at maximum range using the existing 48N6DM. This is reinforced by the fact that some sources claim that a 400 kilometer range missile has been in service with air defense units around Moscow since 2001. Were this to be the case, the 400 kilometer missile would almost certainly have to be a variant of the 48N6, as the only air defense units capable of operating such a system around Moscow would have been the various S-300PM batteries. This would also likely imply that off-board targeting of the missile for extreme-range engagements is possible, perhaps using the 64N6 battle management radar system. Endgame intercept without the standard SAGG guidance mode provided by the engagement radar would likely be performed using active radar homing were this to be the case. Active radar homing is another feature commonly attributed to the 40N6 missile, further reinforcing the fact that the missile may be the 48N6DM or another unknown variant. With active radar homing missiles could theoretically be fired using off-board targeting data, allowing them to engage targets outside the range of the engagement radar as SAGG guidance commands would not be required. It may even be possible that new-build 48N6 series weapons came with Bunkin and Grushin's locking control surfaces, allowing them to be operated at extreme range. Until Russia releases information regarding the 400 kilometer missile system employed by the S-400, the missile providing this capability will have to remain an enigma.
The following image provides a comparison of the ranges of the aforementioned missiles employed by the S-300P and S-400 complexes, based on a site located near Elektrostal:
SUPPORT VEHICLES
Various support systems and vehicles are provided for operating S-300P batteries.
Each S-300P battery will possess the following equipment:
-5T99 missile loading vehicle on KrAZ-255 chassis
-5T99M missile loading vehicle on KrAZ-260 chassis (introduced in 1980s)
-5I57 diesel generators and 5I58 or 63T6A power converters for operating electrical systems transported on MAZ-5224V trailers
-1T12 site survey vehicle
-Command staff vehicle on GAZ-66 vehicle
-5T58-2 trailer transports missile reload bundles
An alert duty support module can be provided to service field deployed batteries. This consists of a guard room, crew quarters, and a mess hall mounted individually on MAZ-543M chassis and a power unit mounted on a MAZ-543A.
S-300P battle management complexes will possess the following equipment:
-1T12 site survey vehicle
-Command staff vehicle on GAZ-66 vehicle
-2 5I57 diesel generators and 3 63T6A power converters for operating electrical systems
SYSTEM OPERATION
The S-300P and S-400 SAM are deployed as complexes responsible for specific sectors. Each complex consists first of a battle management systems with the associated 5N64, 64N6, or 91N6 radar system. The battle management system can manage up to six individual batteries, placed at distances of up to 100 kilometers from the battle management complex. When placed within 20 kilometers of the battle management complex, the engagement radars may communicate directly with the battle management complex usind radio command signals to pass target track data. At distances of over 20 kilometers, 25 meter FL-95 antenna masts are employed to facilitate radio communication over long range.
When 5P85SD TEL complexes are employed, they are grouped in threes. One 5P85S TEL is placed between two subordinate 5P85D TELs. The 5P85D TEL cabins are angled towards the cabin of the 5P85S, with separation at the front of the vehicles being 2 to 3 meters and separation at the rear of the vehicles being 5 to 6 meters. Cable connections are used to connect the 5P85D TELs to the 5P85S TEL's F-3S container. 5P85S TELs can be placed up to 100 meters from the engagement radar complex's F2 container and communicate via radio or cable connections.
The engagement sequence for the S-300P is as follows:
-Targets are located and tracked by the battle management radar
-Track data is fed into the battle management complex
-Targets are prioritized according to the potential threat
-The battle management complex assigns target track data to subordinate engagement radars
-Track data is processed by engagement radar complexes to generate initial guidance commands
-Missile guidance commands are loaded into the missile guidance systems
-Missiles are launched 3-5 seconds apart, up to 2 missiles per target
-Missile guidance is accomplished
-Targets are reattacked if necessary
Defending Moscow
While the S-300P was not conceived as a direct replacement for the S-25 SAM system used to defend Moscow, it would play a significant part in modernizing the Russian capital's air defenses. The Ministry of Defense began developing concepts for an improved air defense network for the capital in 1978. The advent of low-altitude and low-RCS targets such as cruise missiles represented targets that the S-25 was not capable of effectively countering. Development of plans to employ S-300P complexes as S-25 replacements began in 1980. S-25 sites were located in two rings around Moscow, and sites along the outer ring were the first to receive the new SAM system. The new capital area air defense network was completed in 1994.
Moscow-area S-300P SAM battery locations, as well as associated support systems and facilities, can be seen in the image below. Former S-25 locations are denoted by white diamonds. Red triangles represent S-300PM batteries, orange triangles represent S-300PS batteries, blue triangles represent battle management system locations, white triangles represent unoccupied S-300P series prepared sites, and green squares represent S-300P series garrison and support facilities.
Deploying the S-300P at S-25 sites around Moscow required the addition of a 19 meter
A new missile family is being developed by the Fakel MKB for the Favorit and S-400 systems. The 9M96 missiles are highly accurate thanks to the inclusion of advanced gas-dynamic thrust vectoring control systems, which is used in terminal homing to provide a hit-to-kill capability enhanced by the inclusion of an HE warhead. The 9M96 missiles are compact enough to enable four of them to be carried in a specially designed canister sized to displace one of the 48N6 canisters on an associated TEL. This enables each TEL to carry up to 16 9M96 series weapons, or a mixture of 9M96 and 48N6 weapons. The two variants of the 9M96 are the 9M96 and the logner-ranged 9M96D with an extended motor section. These weapons are offered for export as the 9M96E and 9M96E2.
Characteristics of the 9M96 series weapons are as follows:
9M96
Mass: 333 kilograms
Warhead: 24 kilogram HE fragmentation
Engagement range: 1 to 40 kilometers
Engagement altitude: 5 to 25,000 meters
9M96D
Mass: 420 kilograms
Warhead: 24 kilogram HE fragmentation
Engagement range: 1 to 120 kilometers
Engagement altitude: 5 to 25,000 meters
Guidance Modes
Missiles employed by the S-300P variants employ one of three different guidance systems: command, seeker aided ground guidance (SAGG), and active radar. The 5V55K and 5V55KD are standard command guided missiles, relying on targeting data from the engagement radar complexes. The 5V55R, 5V55RD and all variants of the 48N6 series employ SAGG. SAGG is a form of guidance similar to the track via missile (TVM) guidance mode employed by the American PATRIOT SAM system. In SAGG, the missiles are fitted with semi-active homing heads. Missiles are fired towards their targets relying on inertial guidance based on target position data provided by the engagement radar complex prior to launch. Midcourse updates are provided using a datalink with the engagement radar complex. Upon reaching a predetermined range, the engagement radar illuminates the target. The semi-active seeker and the engagement radar both receive reflections from the target and generate independent sets of position data. The seeker's position data is downlinked to the engagement radar complex, which can also accept updated data from offboard sources such as the 5N66 or 64N6 radar systems. The engagement radar complex then compares all available sets of data to determine the most accurate target position, and guidance commands are then uplinked to the missile. Comparing different sets of data from different perspectives allows the missile system to be extremely accurate, even at very long ranges. The 9M96 missile systems employ basic active radar homing, relying on inertial guidance and midcourse updates from the engagement radar complex to get them within seeker range of their targets.
Diversification
The ability of the S-300P variants to employ various types of missiles is an important attribute of the system. The plethora of available weapons allows the SAM complex to select the most appropriate weapon for the designated target. For instance, in a jamming-free environment, a 5V55K missile may be selected, reserving the 5V55R or 48N6 weapons for more difficult targets. The S-300P may select different missile types automatically, as evidenced by S-300PT operational testing from December 1983 to January 1984 at the Telemba SAM training range. In one particular instance, a test was conducted to evaluate the automatic engagement mode of the system. In this mode, every process from track hand-down to missile spin-up is accomplished automatically, with the only human input being to press the launch button. During the test, a target was to be engaged at maximum range with a 5V55R missile. The target entered the launch range, but the target track was not assigned to a missile so a launch could not occur. As it turned out, the system's missile economy algorithm had activated. The missile economy algorithm, when active, will allow the system to select a 5V55K weapon if the engagement environment is free from jamming or interference. The system had designated the target for intercept by a 5V55K missile, which has a much smaller engagement range. As the target had not yet passed within the range of the 5V55K, track assignment had not yet been accomplished. As it turned out, the operators had not realized that the missile economy algorithm was set to active, resulting in the appearance of a failed test! Once the error was realized, testing progressed and the system's automatic performance was validated.
The Big Stick
The long-range weapon designed to give the S-400 its 400 kilometer engagement range is believed to be designated 40N6. As mentioned previously, the 48N6 has proved capable of operating effectively at this range, so 40N6 may in fact be a cover designation for an appropriately modified 400 kilometer ranged 48N6 series weapon destined for the S-400. Alternatively, it may be a wholly different missile designed for a different weapon system, such as the forthcoming S-500 strategic defense system. Ergo, despite rumors persisting of the continued development of what is referred to as the 40N6, it may well be that the S-400 is already capable of engaging targets at maximum range using the existing 48N6DM. This is reinforced by the fact that some sources claim that a 400 kilometer range missile has been in service with air defense units around Moscow since 2001. Were this to be the case, the 400 kilometer missile would almost certainly have to be a variant of the 48N6, as the only air defense units capable of operating such a system around Moscow would have been the various S-300PM batteries. This would also likely imply that off-board targeting of the missile for extreme-range engagements is possible, perhaps using the 64N6 battle management radar system. Endgame intercept without the standard SAGG guidance mode provided by the engagement radar would likely be performed using active radar homing were this to be the case. Active radar homing is another feature commonly attributed to the 40N6 missile, further reinforcing the fact that the missile may be the 48N6DM or another unknown variant. With active radar homing missiles could theoretically be fired using off-board targeting data, allowing them to engage targets outside the range of the engagement radar as SAGG guidance commands would not be required. It may even be possible that new-build 48N6 series weapons came with Bunkin and Grushin's locking control surfaces, allowing them to be operated at extreme range. Until Russia releases information regarding the 400 kilometer missile system employed by the S-400, the missile providing this capability will have to remain an enigma.
The following image provides a comparison of the ranges of the aforementioned missiles employed by the S-300P and S-400 complexes, based on a site located near Elektrostal:
SUPPORT VEHICLES
Various support systems and vehicles are provided for operating S-300P batteries.
Each S-300P battery will possess the following equipment:
-5T99 missile loading vehicle on KrAZ-255 chassis
-5T99M missile loading vehicle on KrAZ-260 chassis (introduced in 1980s)
-5I57 diesel generators and 5I58 or 63T6A power converters for operating electrical systems transported on MAZ-5224V trailers
-1T12 site survey vehicle
-Command staff vehicle on GAZ-66 vehicle
-5T58-2 trailer transports missile reload bundles
An alert duty support module can be provided to service field deployed batteries. This consists of a guard room, crew quarters, and a mess hall mounted individually on MAZ-543M chassis and a power unit mounted on a MAZ-543A.
S-300P battle management complexes will possess the following equipment:
-1T12 site survey vehicle
-Command staff vehicle on GAZ-66 vehicle
-2 5I57 diesel generators and 3 63T6A power converters for operating electrical systems
SYSTEM OPERATION
The S-300P and S-400 SAM are deployed as complexes responsible for specific sectors. Each complex consists first of a battle management systems with the associated 5N64, 64N6, or 91N6 radar system. The battle management system can manage up to six individual batteries, placed at distances of up to 100 kilometers from the battle management complex. When placed within 20 kilometers of the battle management complex, the engagement radars may communicate directly with the battle management complex usind radio command signals to pass target track data. At distances of over 20 kilometers, 25 meter FL-95 antenna masts are employed to facilitate radio communication over long range.
When 5P85SD TEL complexes are employed, they are grouped in threes. One 5P85S TEL is placed between two subordinate 5P85D TELs. The 5P85D TEL cabins are angled towards the cabin of the 5P85S, with separation at the front of the vehicles being 2 to 3 meters and separation at the rear of the vehicles being 5 to 6 meters. Cable connections are used to connect the 5P85D TELs to the 5P85S TEL's F-3S container. 5P85S TELs can be placed up to 100 meters from the engagement radar complex's F2 container and communicate via radio or cable connections.
The engagement sequence for the S-300P is as follows:
-Targets are located and tracked by the battle management radar
-Track data is fed into the battle management complex
-Targets are prioritized according to the potential threat
-The battle management complex assigns target track data to subordinate engagement radars
-Track data is processed by engagement radar complexes to generate initial guidance commands
-Missile guidance commands are loaded into the missile guidance systems
-Missiles are launched 3-5 seconds apart, up to 2 missiles per target
-Missile guidance is accomplished
-Targets are reattacked if necessary
Defending Moscow
While the S-300P was not conceived as a direct replacement for the S-25 SAM system used to defend Moscow, it would play a significant part in modernizing the Russian capital's air defenses. The Ministry of Defense began developing concepts for an improved air defense network for the capital in 1978. The advent of low-altitude and low-RCS targets such as cruise missiles represented targets that the S-25 was not capable of effectively countering. Development of plans to employ S-300P complexes as S-25 replacements began in 1980. S-25 sites were located in two rings around Moscow, and sites along the outer ring were the first to receive the new SAM system. The new capital area air defense network was completed in 1994.
Moscow-area S-300P SAM battery locations, as well as associated support systems and facilities, can be seen in the image below. Former S-25 locations are denoted by white diamonds. Red triangles represent S-300PM batteries, orange triangles represent S-300PS batteries, blue triangles represent battle management system locations, white triangles represent unoccupied S-300P series prepared sites, and green squares represent S-300P series garrison and support facilities.
Deploying the S-300P at S-25 sites around Moscow required the addition of a 19 meter
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insert to the existing 40V6M mast assembly, resulting in the 40V6MD variant, to ensure a clear field of view for the battery-level radar systems. The battle management radar systems would suffer the same issues as the engagement radars and low altitude detection radars if a similar solution was not devised. As the individual SAM complexes were tied in to separate zones around Moscow, it was decided to emplace the battle management complexes at fixed locations, with large elevating platforms being consructed to raise the battle management radars above the forests and terrain. Individual batteries would retain the 40V6 series mast assemblies to enable them to be redeployed to a degree within their assigned zones. This arrangement is unique to the Moscow area and is possible due to the fact that the SAM complexes are in place to defend the capital, and as such the battle management complexes are not expected to be redeployed to a great degree.
The following image depicts one of the Moscow 64N6 battle management radar installations:
USERS
The S-300P and S-400 SAM complexes have been employed by the following nations: the USSR, Russia, Algeria, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, China, East Germany, Greece, Kazakhstan, Slovakia, Ukraine, and Vietnam. customer for some time. For more information on this issue, reference the following . Croatia was reportedly negotiating for the purchase of an S-300PMU battery before the NATO campaign of 1999.
The following data represents the visible S-300P series SAM batteries deployed worldwide as depicted in available overhead imagery, as well as inactive fixed site locations:
Russia: S-300PT (6), S-300PS (26), S-300PM (20), 64N6 (22), Inactive (41)
Belarus: S-300PT (3), S-300PS (5), 64N6 (2)
Bulgaria: S-300PMU (1)
China: S-300PMU (4), S-300PMU-1 (8), 64N6 (3), Inactive (7)
Cyprus: 64N6 (1, inactive), Inactive (2)
Greece: S-300PMU-1 (1)
Kazakhstan: S-300PMU (3), 64N6 (2)
Latvia: Inactive (2)
Nagorno-Karabakh: Inactive (1)
Poland: Inactive (1)
Slovakia: S-300PMU (1)
Ukraine: S-300PT (14), S-300PS (11), 64N6 (9), Inactive (18)
The following image depicts one of the Moscow 64N6 battle management radar installations:
USERS
The S-300P and S-400 SAM complexes have been employed by the following nations: the USSR, Russia, Algeria, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, China, East Germany, Greece, Kazakhstan, Slovakia, Ukraine, and Vietnam. customer for some time. For more information on this issue, reference the following . Croatia was reportedly negotiating for the purchase of an S-300PMU battery before the NATO campaign of 1999.
The following data represents the visible S-300P series SAM batteries deployed worldwide as depicted in available overhead imagery, as well as inactive fixed site locations:
Russia: S-300PT (6), S-300PS (26), S-300PM (20), 64N6 (22), Inactive (41)
Belarus: S-300PT (3), S-300PS (5), 64N6 (2)
Bulgaria: S-300PMU (1)
China: S-300PMU (4), S-300PMU-1 (8), 64N6 (3), Inactive (7)
Cyprus: 64N6 (1, inactive), Inactive (2)
Greece: S-300PMU-1 (1)
Kazakhstan: S-300PMU (3), 64N6 (2)
Latvia: Inactive (2)
Nagorno-Karabakh: Inactive (1)
Poland: Inactive (1)
Slovakia: S-300PMU (1)
Ukraine: S-300PT (14), S-300PS (11), 64N6 (9), Inactive (18)
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me cudi ovaj poljacive imaat eden-i toj neaktiven...tolku li amerika ke gi brani....ako zemat predvid deka pri eventualen konflikt prvi ke go oberat bostanot:helou:
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SA-7 racen i ova dobro masince SA-13(mislam deka imame 4 ovakvi)
SA-13 GOPHER
ZRK-BD Strela-10
The SA-13 GOPHER [ZRK-BD Strela-10] is a short-range, low altitude SAM system. The SA-13 missile (9M37) is 2.2 m long, 0.12 m in diameter with a 0.4 m wingspan and has a maximum speed of Mach 2. It carries a 5 kg HE warhead and is fitted with either an improved passive lead sulfide all-aspect infra-red seeker unit, or a cryogenically cooled passive all-aspect infra-red seeker unit. The estimated minimum range of the SA-13 is 500 meters and the maximum effective range of 5000 meters with altitude engagement limits of 10 to 3500 meters. The SA-13 Strela-10M3 variant is designed to defend troops on the march from low level aircraft and helicopters, precision-guided munitions and reconnaissance RPVs. The major change is the adoption of a dual mode guidance system for the missile seeker - optical 'photo-contrast' and dual band passive IR. The 9M333 missile weighs 42 kg at launch and when in its container-launcher the box-like canister has a total mass of 74 kg. Target acquisition range using the optical 'photo-contrast' channel is between 2000-8000 meters while for the IR channel it is between 2300-5300 meters. Altitude engagement limits are from 10 meter up to 3500 meters at a maximum range of 5000 meters. Average missile speed is 550 m/s. The HE-fragmentation rod warhead weighs 5 kg in total (including 2.6 kg of HE) and uses both contact and active laser proximity fusing systems. The actuation radius of the proximity fuse is up to 4 meters. The dual mode passive optical 'photo-contrast/IR seeker ensures good IR decoy counter-countermeasures discrimination capability and optimum use of the system against extremely low altitude targets and in adverse weather conditions. The SA-13 incorporates the range-only HAT BOX radar which provides the operator the targets range to the system to prevent wastage of missiles outside the effective range of the system. The HAT BOX circular parabolic radar antenna is located between the two pairs of missile canisters. There are two versions of the SA-13 transporter erector launcher and radar (TELAR). The TELAR-1 carries four FLAT BOX B passive radar detection antenna units, one on either corner of the vehicle's rear deck, one facing aft and one between the driver's vision ports at the front, whereas the TELAR-2, which is used by the SA-13 battery commander, has none. The SA-13 TELAR is a modified MT-LB amphibious armored tracked vehicle with the machine-gun turret removed. The launcher pedestal mounted to the rear of center of the vehicle is 360º traversable. It incorporates the operators position behind a large, rectangular window at its base. Normally the TELAR carries four ready to fire SA-13 missile container-launchers and eight reloads in the cargo compartment but it can also carry either SA-9 GASKIN container-launcher boxes in their place or a mixture of the two. This enables the the cheaper SA-9 (Strela-1) to be used against the easier targets and the more expensive and sophisticated SA-13 (Strela-10) against the difficult targets. The missile mix also allows a choice of infra-red (IR) seeker types on the missiles for use against extremely low altitude targets and in adverse weather.
SpecificationsContractor
Entered Service
Total length
Diameter
Wingspan
Weight
Warhead Weight
Propulsion
Maximum Speed
Effective range 600-5000 meters Altitude 10-3500 meters Guidance mode IR homing, cooled seeker, dual frequency Single-shot hit probability basic load on vehicle 8 reload time (min) 3 fire control IR homing, cooled seeker, dual frequency radar(s) SNAP SHOT (range only)
PIE RACK (IFF) emplace/displace time (min) 40 sec support vehicles 14631 chassis MT-LB speed, road 60 water 6 road range (kg) 500 crew 3
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sega ke go pretstavam SAM sistemot SA-3 (a postov resiv da go pisuvam na makedonski poradi pred se celta na forumot da deli info...a na angliski ne mozam da go spodelam so site)..
ovoj sistem se dokaza(ne zaradi soboruvanjeto na F-117-koj i nema nekoi posebni manevarski sposobnosti-srbija oficijalno go povlece od upotreba inaku)tuku poradi negovata namena,a i e graden na baza na ucenje od ggreski ili potocno od praksa-gi resi problemite na zenit raketnite sistemi S-75 i S-125 koi bea skroeni od a do s za 4 godini 57-61.
namenata na sistemov kazuva za vnimanieto kako i performansite i standardite koi gi ispolnuva,imeno sistemot e graden so cel da zastiti vazni objekti-infrastrukturni, od napadi od avioni,helikopteri i krstosuvacki raketi(bese na vremeto slicen i sporedliv so amerikanskiot MIM-23 HAWK no denes HAWK-ot otide cekor ponapred).
interesno-duri i na brzina od 3,5 maha raketata e dosta manevrabilna a toa znaci duri i brzite meti ne mozat da se cuvstvuvaat sigurni.
vsusnost prvobitnata verzija imala domet od 15km no so upgrade vo pechora 2A maksimalniot domet dostignuva 35 km i pri eksplozijata se disperziraat okolu 400 fragmenti...ne me ni cudi sto nevidliviot padna(tezina na boeva glava e 70kg)
sistemot ima poseben altmetar-radar koj ja meri brzinata i glavniot P-15 kako i T.N Low-Blow radar za naveduvanje.LOW BLOW
interesni se i razlikite pomegu radarite kako i nivnite moznsti..na primer P-15
FLAT FACE
P-15
Function:
Target acquisition
Range
200-250 km
Frequency
C band (UHF)
Associated weapon system
SA_3 GOA possibly SA-8 GECKO SAM, LOW BLOW missile control radar
Can guide three missiles simultaneosly
Power 380kw,
BW AZ 4.3deg-ELEV 4.3 deg
PW 2us,
PRF 200-700pps,
70km range at 300m alt,
accuracy 650m range, 1.8 deg AZ
Recognition:
# Van mounted
# Two eliptical parabolic reflectors measuring 11x5.5 m
# Reflectors arranged one above the other on van roof
kako sistem za PVO vo svoe vreme mozel da sledi istovremeno 6meti a da navveduva raketi kon 2 istovremeno.ima vgradeno i TV(termo-vizisko) naveduvanje so domet od 20 kilometri toa garantira otpor kon protiv elektronski merki.
inaku raketata na sistemov e vtorostepena so cvrsto gorivo.dosta interesena osobina e naveduvanjeto...koe ovozmozuvalo raketata da se koristi i a celi na zemja kako i protiv brodovi(a so taa brzina 60setti godini-stvarno da im zavidime na sovetite)
platformata e fiksna no toa ne znaci deka ne moze da bide relocirana-zatoa se ZIL-157 kamionite neli..inaku SA-3 ili C-125 imase na petrovec koj bese ukraden od makedonija kako i ostanatiot arsenal od bivsata JNA za koj i makedonija plakase...
sepak iako mnogumina bi pomislile star sistem ama eve go najnoviot upgrade i sto vklucuva
New 18 July 2002
Yet another new upgrade is now available known as a Pechora-2M upgrade. This carried on the process of replacing old components with modern upgrade equivalents. In this upgrade the folowind system parts are changed.
1) a new Laser/IR tracker is added to the guidance system allowing the main radar to remain quiet during the engagement.
2) Analogue components are replaced with their digital equivalents
3) Coax cables are replaced with fibre.
4) Distance of the radar from the command post increased to 150m.
5) Distance of the launchers from the command post increased to 10Km.
6) Number of truck based launchers increased to 8 from 4.
7) More powerful boosters.
8) New RF fuse for warhead.
specijalno za egipetskata armija e napravena raketata da moze da se ispaluva od tenk T-55(eve i slika ke stavam)
voglavno stanuva zbor za sistem koj ucestvuvase vo odbranata na moskva od WMD(oruzje za masovno unisuvanje) pa ottuka i negovite prednosti kako i vnimanie posveteno...vsusnostSA-10 (c-300) prakticno go zameni SA-3
godina na oficijalno pretstavuvanje
1961
6.70
Diameter (m)
.60
Weight at launch (kg)
400
Propulsion system
Booster
Solid
Sustainer
Solid
Launch rails/tubes
2 or 4 rails, ground mounted (not mobile)
Guidance
Command, (poss. IR terminal homing)
Warhead (type)
HE
Kill Radius
12.5 m
ovoj sistem se dokaza(ne zaradi soboruvanjeto na F-117-koj i nema nekoi posebni manevarski sposobnosti-srbija oficijalno go povlece od upotreba inaku)tuku poradi negovata namena,a i e graden na baza na ucenje od ggreski ili potocno od praksa-gi resi problemite na zenit raketnite sistemi S-75 i S-125 koi bea skroeni od a do s za 4 godini 57-61.
namenata na sistemov kazuva za vnimanieto kako i performansite i standardite koi gi ispolnuva,imeno sistemot e graden so cel da zastiti vazni objekti-infrastrukturni, od napadi od avioni,helikopteri i krstosuvacki raketi(bese na vremeto slicen i sporedliv so amerikanskiot MIM-23 HAWK no denes HAWK-ot otide cekor ponapred).
interesno-duri i na brzina od 3,5 maha raketata e dosta manevrabilna a toa znaci duri i brzite meti ne mozat da se cuvstvuvaat sigurni.
vsusnost prvobitnata verzija imala domet od 15km no so upgrade vo pechora 2A maksimalniot domet dostignuva 35 km i pri eksplozijata se disperziraat okolu 400 fragmenti...ne me ni cudi sto nevidliviot padna(tezina na boeva glava e 70kg)
sistemot ima poseben altmetar-radar koj ja meri brzinata i glavniot P-15 kako i T.N Low-Blow radar za naveduvanje.LOW BLOW
interesni se i razlikite pomegu radarite kako i nivnite moznsti..na primer P-15
FLAT FACE
P-15
Function:
Target acquisition
Range
200-250 km
Frequency
C band (UHF)
Associated weapon system
SA_3 GOA possibly SA-8 GECKO SAM, LOW BLOW missile control radar
Can guide three missiles simultaneosly
Power 380kw,
BW AZ 4.3deg-ELEV 4.3 deg
PW 2us,
PRF 200-700pps,
70km range at 300m alt,
accuracy 650m range, 1.8 deg AZ
Recognition:
# Van mounted
# Two eliptical parabolic reflectors measuring 11x5.5 m
# Reflectors arranged one above the other on van roof
kako sistem za PVO vo svoe vreme mozel da sledi istovremeno 6meti a da navveduva raketi kon 2 istovremeno.ima vgradeno i TV(termo-vizisko) naveduvanje so domet od 20 kilometri toa garantira otpor kon protiv elektronski merki.
inaku raketata na sistemov e vtorostepena so cvrsto gorivo.dosta interesena osobina e naveduvanjeto...koe ovozmozuvalo raketata da se koristi i a celi na zemja kako i protiv brodovi(a so taa brzina 60setti godini-stvarno da im zavidime na sovetite)
platformata e fiksna no toa ne znaci deka ne moze da bide relocirana-zatoa se ZIL-157 kamionite neli..inaku SA-3 ili C-125 imase na petrovec koj bese ukraden od makedonija kako i ostanatiot arsenal od bivsata JNA za koj i makedonija plakase...
sepak iako mnogumina bi pomislile star sistem ama eve go najnoviot upgrade i sto vklucuva
New 18 July 2002
Yet another new upgrade is now available known as a Pechora-2M upgrade. This carried on the process of replacing old components with modern upgrade equivalents. In this upgrade the folowind system parts are changed.
1) a new Laser/IR tracker is added to the guidance system allowing the main radar to remain quiet during the engagement.
2) Analogue components are replaced with their digital equivalents
3) Coax cables are replaced with fibre.
4) Distance of the radar from the command post increased to 150m.
5) Distance of the launchers from the command post increased to 10Km.
6) Number of truck based launchers increased to 8 from 4.
7) More powerful boosters.
8) New RF fuse for warhead.
specijalno za egipetskata armija e napravena raketata da moze da se ispaluva od tenk T-55(eve i slika ke stavam)
voglavno stanuva zbor za sistem koj ucestvuvase vo odbranata na moskva od WMD(oruzje za masovno unisuvanje) pa ottuka i negovite prednosti kako i vnimanie posveteno...vsusnostSA-10 (c-300) prakticno go zameni SA-3
godina na oficijalno pretstavuvanje
1961
6.70
Diameter (m)
.60
Weight at launch (kg)
400
Propulsion system
Booster
Solid
Sustainer
Solid
Launch rails/tubes
2 or 4 rails, ground mounted (not mobile)
Guidance
Command, (poss. IR terminal homing)
Warhead (type)
HE
Kill Radius
12.5 m