Умот сфатен како способност на човекот за рационално размислување. Тој ум, немаме друг. Дури и Ноус на Аристотел понатаму му дава отчет на тој ум. Еве прочитај што пишувам за тоа:
Shortly after Aristotle establishes his concept of the Nous, he dissolves his metaphysics into logic. After all the work he goes through to establish direct access to Being, he in a way ruins his own efforts. He first exempts metaphysics from the jurisdiction of logic and consciously refuses to set metaphysics according to the model of apodictic sciences. Thus, he secures an advantage of metaphysics over scientific knowledge. Soon after, he changes his mind, and he justifies this by the need for metaphysics to express itself through the stance of reason. He is not satisfied with phasis, he wants Being to express itself through kataphasis and apophasis. The simple words uttered by Being are no longer enough for him, he wants to reveal the truth of Being through logical judgments. Aristotle thinks that the Nous has a natural tendency to express itself through reason, and he is more than willing to facilitate that. He is actually worried that if Being were not to be able to express itself through the words of reason, it might remain closed in itself, that it could be lost in the chaos of unconnected truths. That’s why intuitive thinking must be subjected to a more precise determination — it must resort to logical judgments. In this way, however, it obviously loses its independence because it falls under the laws of discursive thinking. This turn from metaphysics to logic could have been foreseen, from the very moment Aristotle tried to determine metaphysics as a science (episteme). Metaphysics, for Aristotle, is always a science — sometimes the highest science (malista episteme), (Metafizika I 2, 32), sometimes the only independent science (mone eleuthera ton epistemon), (Metafizika I 2, 27) — but it is always science, even when it is only a science yet to be founded (episteme zetoumene). (Metafizika I 2, 4) In the mind of Aristotle, science and reason are always closely connected. Even when the object of the science is Being as Being, he formulates the science of metaphysics in a way that places logical demands for the greatest possible determination of the subject, as he would have done with any other science. According to him, metaphysics approaches Being from a certain point of view, from a certain perspective, considering the common state of all beings denoted by the word “exist.” (Metafizika IV 1, 21-22) Aristotle makes it clear that metaphysics is not logic, but it is on the best way of becoming so. In this way, Aristotle traced the path of metaphysics as logic, and thus determined its later development, which eventually ended twenty-three centuries later with Nietzsche’s claim that Being is nothing more than a kind of haze, a kind of deception. Of course, this Being that Nietzsche talks about is no more the Being that once appeared to Aristotle’s Nous in its fullness and purity; it is a fake Being that has been through the lies of logic, and through the fake separation of the subject and object. Nietzsche renounces that Being and starts to look for the true on his own.
