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- 17 март 2005
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Најавуваат Грција (официјално) да банкротира во март.
Еве на што спадна ЕУ, на дупка од 2.7 трилиони евра (2700 милијарди):
The ECB’s balance sheet now stands at a pretty scary €2.7 trillion, higher than that of the money-printing Federal Reserve in the US. By buying government bonds and providing cheap cash to banks around the eurozone, the ECB is now leveraged 33 times – up from 24 times only last summer. This means that for every €1 the ECB holds in reserves and cash, it has €33 swirling around somewhere in the eurosystem.
But it isn’t the size of its balance sheet that keeps ECB officials awake at night – all central banks are leveraged – as much as the circa €60bn of (nominal) Greek bonds festering on its books. This (relatively) tiny item has become political dynamite, as Greece is set to default on its debt in March, either through a voluntary agreement with its creditors or by simply running out of money.
As creditors and the Greek government are locked in to talks over which one it’ll be, big question is: will the ECB be forced to take a hit?
The question is crucial as the ECB has said in the past that it will not take losses on its eurozone exposure – ever. For the Germans, losses for the ECB would mark a huge betrayal of the Bundesbank-model, in which a central bank is trusted and prudent, and doesn't take on excessive risks – and therefore has the credibility to control inflation. Many German commentators have spent the past year grumbling about the ECB’s back-handed Quantitative Easing and illegal financing of state deficits. The ECB has got around this by purchasing the bonds on the secondary market, but if it took losses on Greek debt, this argument falls.
But at the same time, if “public” bodies, including the ECB, holding Greek debt don’t accept losses in a Greek default, the write-down may not be large enough to give the country even a hypothetical chance of bouncing back, meaning the EU/IMF cannot give it more loans. For the ECB, this amounts to a pretty awful catch-22: accept losses and see your credibility and rationale undermined or reject losses and at worst prompt a disorderly Greek default or possibly just massive distortions in eurozone bond markets.
http://www.openeuropeblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/what-keeps-central-bankers-in-frankfurt.html
.
Еве на што спадна ЕУ, на дупка од 2.7 трилиони евра (2700 милијарди):
The ECB’s balance sheet now stands at a pretty scary €2.7 trillion, higher than that of the money-printing Federal Reserve in the US. By buying government bonds and providing cheap cash to banks around the eurozone, the ECB is now leveraged 33 times – up from 24 times only last summer. This means that for every €1 the ECB holds in reserves and cash, it has €33 swirling around somewhere in the eurosystem.
But it isn’t the size of its balance sheet that keeps ECB officials awake at night – all central banks are leveraged – as much as the circa €60bn of (nominal) Greek bonds festering on its books. This (relatively) tiny item has become political dynamite, as Greece is set to default on its debt in March, either through a voluntary agreement with its creditors or by simply running out of money.
As creditors and the Greek government are locked in to talks over which one it’ll be, big question is: will the ECB be forced to take a hit?
The question is crucial as the ECB has said in the past that it will not take losses on its eurozone exposure – ever. For the Germans, losses for the ECB would mark a huge betrayal of the Bundesbank-model, in which a central bank is trusted and prudent, and doesn't take on excessive risks – and therefore has the credibility to control inflation. Many German commentators have spent the past year grumbling about the ECB’s back-handed Quantitative Easing and illegal financing of state deficits. The ECB has got around this by purchasing the bonds on the secondary market, but if it took losses on Greek debt, this argument falls.
But at the same time, if “public” bodies, including the ECB, holding Greek debt don’t accept losses in a Greek default, the write-down may not be large enough to give the country even a hypothetical chance of bouncing back, meaning the EU/IMF cannot give it more loans. For the ECB, this amounts to a pretty awful catch-22: accept losses and see your credibility and rationale undermined or reject losses and at worst prompt a disorderly Greek default or possibly just massive distortions in eurozone bond markets.
http://www.openeuropeblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/what-keeps-central-bankers-in-frankfurt.html
.
