абе објасни ми како тоа атомска експлозија без радијација??????????
Да не веруваш или да веруваш во нешто тоае твое апсолутно легитимно право и се е во ред.
Но јас ти претставувам
цитати,видеа, пред некое време ти дадов и една страна
БИБЛИОГРАФИЈА од разно - разни научници иноватори, ти праќам мислење од
научници, експерти (кои патем не се на платниот списон на циа или на некоја др. служба) и ти пак онака ццццц:pos2:, абе ова, абе она
па пак ццц, па пак
:pos2:
Ако ова се твоите ``докази`` во ред
ако имаш контра мислење од некој научник или истражувач или ....те молам дај ОБЈАВИ ГО.
Вака дискусијата се врти во круг БЕСПОЛЕЗНА Е како дискусија:helou:
кажи ми мило каде е ХААРП БЕ а..... можам да ти ја ставам и САМ одбраната на иран на тајван на Русија ја имам пшостирано...кај се тие безвезални проекти а:??????????
величествие величествие
SPACE SYSTEMS VS AIRBORNE SYSTEMS
One of the major development and procurement efforts currently being considered by the USAF will result in a new long-range strike aircraft. The current fleet of B-52H, B-1B, and B-2A strategic bombers will need to be replaced around 2040.[1] The USAF is also considering a shorter-ranged, theater strike aircraft to be available around 2015. Apparently, the current focus in this regard is a derivative of the Lockheed F-22A, known as the FB-22.[2] Under the banner of “Prompt Global Strike,” the USAF is currently conducting a two-year study to outline a future strike system capable of striking targets anywhere in the globe in a matter of minutes. Such a system, if procured, is expected to be available in the 2012 to 2015 timeframe.[3]
The problem the USAF will face in coming months is one of funding. It is illogical to assume that Congress will authorize funding for three independent programs, especially given the fact that at least two of those programs, the new strategic bomber and the “Prompt Global Strike” program, seem to have similar goals in mind and as a result offer similar capabilities. The USAF wants a quick-reaction strike capability, both over intermediate and global ranges. The USAF will need a new strategic bomber. By combining the strategic bomber requirement, the intermediate strike aircraft requirement, and the quick-strike program, the USAF will be in a position to maximize its resources and minimize the costs involved, and will finally obtain a truly transformational and revolutionary weapon system.
FINDING THE ANSWER
There are a number of concepts which could provide the USAF with the quick-strike capability it desires in the near future. The first of these is a simple modification of current intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and possibly submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), with conventional warheads. The conventional ICBM system offers a global strike capability with a minimum of development work at a minimum cost. A conventional ICBM could be in service in a short amount of time, using modified versions of existing systems. One such proposal is the Minotaur III. Minotaur III would employ components from deactivated Peacekeeper ICBMs in concert with a new third stage designed to deploy conventional weapons.[4]
The main argument against a conventional ICBM system is political. How will conventional ICBM launches be differentiated from their nuclear-tipped brethren? Such a differentiation must be made in order to assure other nuclear powers that the United States is not in the process of launching nuclear weapons. Minotaur III answers this question by employing a unique launch signature which will be detectable by launch detection systems. Also, Minotaur III will not be silo-based, negating the need for basing conventional ICBMs at current nuclear launch facilities.[5]
The conventional ICBM system is not without problems. First, there is the issue of accuracy. ICBMs are designed as nuclear delivery systems. Simply mating a conventional warhead to an ICBM would not provide pinpoint accuracy; ICBMs are not designed to provide such a degree of accuracy as such accuracy levels are not necessary when delivering a nuclear warhead. Second, once an ICBM is launched, it cannot be recalled without complete loss of the system by remote detonation. Conventional strike aircraft hold an advantage in this regard: if intelligence changes or is found to be in error, a mission can be cancelled without loss of a multi-million dollar strike aircraft.
Another concept which could provide the required strike capability is a subsonic platform capable of employing weapons or armed unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). One such concept involves a Boeing 747, equipped with the facilities to launch and recover both an F-22A (mounted dorsally) and a UCAV (mounted under the fuselage).[6] On the surface, the 747 concept seems to be cost-effective: existing 747s and F-22As would merely need to be modified, and UCAVs are comparatively cheap systems to develop and procure. Such a proposal would certainly be ambitious and seem to offer a good deal of capability, but is not necessarily the right answer. A subsonic platform would require refueling support, basing, and would not provide the quick-reaction capability desired by the USAF, necessitating the development and procurement of a second system to satisfy that requirement.
A third concept to be considered for a future strikes system is an armed orbital satellite. Logistically and politically, this presents the least feasible option. While a satellite could easily be configured to deploy a weapon, it comes with a myriad of logistical issues. First and foremost, satellites are not unlimited resources. They must be maintained and fueled, and in this case rearmed. Those factors necessitate the presence of an orbital system capable of mating with these weaponized satellites. Such a system is not currently available on a consistent basis, as the Space Shuttle program is currently struggling with technical issues. Furthermore, if a new orbital system is to be developed to service these satellites, then it would seem more logical to arm the orbiter rather than the satellites! Launch systems would also be required to place these satellites into orbit.
From a political standpoint, armed satellites present two major problems. First, to be most effective, a satellite should be locked into a geostationary orbit over a potentially hostile nation. This would help to alleviate the need for refueling maneuvering systems, but does mean that the satellite is not available to cover other areas without maneuvering and using valuable fuel. The political argument against such an action would be that orbiting a weapon directly over a nation is an overtly hostile action. Such an action would likely be attacked as an example of the aggressiveness of the United States; a nation with an armed satellite positioned directly over its capital could argue that it is being convicted without a trial, as it has not (yet) acted in a hostile manner.
Second, there is the issue of a technical problem occurring and an armed satellite crashing into a populated area. While the satellite itself would likely burn up upon reentry, the weapons themselves would likely survive reentry and fall to Earth as that is, after all, their designed function. The United States would be the target of severe backlash if the weapons impacted in a friendly nation, and could find itself in the middle of an unwanted war if the weapons impact in a neutral or potentially hostile nation state’s territory.
A fourth concept capable of meeting the goals of quick response and global strike is an aerospace craft. Such a craft would be capable of launching and recovering from the CONUS. When considering such an aerospace craft, the question that must be answered is one of system characteristics: is the answer a single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) or two-stage-to-orbit (TSTO) craft?
From a technical standpoint, a SSTO platform offers fewer risks. A TSTO platform must achieve a clean separation; launching aircraft at the comparatively benign speed of Mach 3 was proven to be troublesome in the 1960’s during the CIA’s TAGBOARD program and has not been attempted since.[7] The TAGBOARD program utilized two specially modified OXCART reconnaissance aircraft to deploy D-21 drones for reconnaissance sorties.[8] Three clean separations were achieved before a failed fourth attempt resulted in the cancellation of the program after the loss of the M-21 launch aircraft, the D-21 drone, and the life of Launch Control Officer (LCO) Ray Torick.[9]
TSTO craft also present financial and developmental concerns. A TSTO craft requires two components, and both components must be funded, developed, and procured. If one component is found to be lacking during development, then the entire program must be put on hold while a suitable alternative can be developed. Support equipment for both craft must also be developed and procured. The size of the orbital component of the TSTO craft is dictated by the carriage capability (or throw weight, if a conventional space launch vehicle is used) of the launch system. A SSTO craft can be considerably larger than a TSTO craft’s orbital stage, and as such would prove to be more useful as it would possess a larger payload capacity. Insofar as aerospace craft are concerned, the more attractive option is clearly that of a SSTO craft.
The concept of an orbital strike aircraft is not new, and is certainly not a concept conceived in the 21st Century. Indeed, the concept of an orbital strike aircraft even predates supersonic flight. The first orbital strike aircraft concept was under development in Nazi Germany during the Second World War.
In the early 1930’s, Austrian-born scientist Dr. Eugen Sänger began studying a rocket powered commercial transport capable of speeds of up to 29,000 kilometers per hour. Dr. Sänger was one of the first “rocket scientists” in the world, and his 1933 book titled Raketenflugtechnik (translated as “The Technique of Rocket Flight”) is widely regarded as the first practical text covering rocket-powered flight.[10] Dr. Sänger conducted private research throughout the 1930s until he found work with a rocket research firm in 1936, the Hermann Göring Institute in Germany.[11]
