Иран

[Klin]

povtorno gluposti... jasno mi e mene sto flag of conveniance tebe ne ti e jasno zosto bas marshal island se bira i zosto ova ne e izvodlivo za kineski tanker a prakticno za tajvanski... ti nacrtav ednas, ima sankcii megu drugoto, marshall islands ima specijalni odnosi so amerika za zastita itn...

aj prouci i toa i ne dosagaj poveke.

Еве проучив:

The "reported destination" of CHINA OWNER.CREW is a tactical security measure used by commercial vessels to signal their identity and affiliation to regional forces, such as the Iranian military or Houthi rebels, in an effort to avoid being targeted or seized.
By broadcasting this information via the Automatic Identification System (AIS), ships hope to leverage China's diplomatic and economic ties with regional actors like Iran to ensure "safe passage" through high-risk chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz.

Why Ships Use This Tactic

• Safety Signal: In conflict zones, vessels often change their AIS destination to phrases like "ALL CHINESE CREW" or "MUSLIM SHIP" to indicate they are not affiliated with Western interests (such as the U.S. or Israel) that may be active targets.
• Political Shield: Because China is a major buyer of Iranian oil and a key partner, ships broadcasting a Chinese connection are often perceived as less likely to be harassed.
• Risk Reduction: For many ship operators, this is considered a "digital trick" or a "precautionary signal" to navigate through blockades or high-tension areas.

The Case of the JV INNOVATION
While the ship in your image, the JV INNOVATION (IMO: 9276688), used this specific signal, it was reportedly attacked on May 4, 2026, off the coast of the UAE. Despite the reported destination "CHINA OWNER.CREW" and physical markings on its hull, the vessel was struck by a projectile that caused a fire on its deck. This was the first such incident involving a Chinese-linked oil tanker since the regional conflict intensified in early 2026




Ајде сега: jas sum bil glafen na tija tankerite tamu, vrsan sum edno sam so cajnesite ne mi kazvaj ti na mene...

 

[Joey-Jojo Jr. Shabadoo]

Јас ако сум НВО тогаш ти со дел од анти НАТО пропагандно-шпионска мрежа.

Како го кажа ова ко да е нешто лошо.
Ја се надевам дека Русија или Кина овде така дејствува.

 

[kano]

Зборот ми беше дефакто кинески државјанин газда ако регистрирал брод под било кое друго знаме а не кинеско или руско, е легитимна мета на иранците. Не зборам за оваа ситуација, општо зборам. Дали иранците проверуваат/воопшто се замараат кој е газда на бродот или само гледаат знамето?

znameto.

taman rabota do tolku da istrazuvaat. zatoa se tie poraki takvi, da proverat i u toj slucaj najverojatno ako imaat vreme i volja proveruvaat preku ambasada ili nekakov sistem ako vospostavile ali takvi brodovi se obicno najaveni, kina ke kaze toj i toj broj pod takvo zname e nas proaga togas i togas pustete go. znaci si ima procedura.

ona sto gledame u momentot e vakvi najavi vo AIS zosto do imeto na brodot se pojavuva i bas toj fild so destinacija pa obicno kinezite i indijcite se najavuvaat taka. sega site gi kopiraat toa so nadez deka ke pominat ama veke toa ne proaga, najverojatno imaat vospostaveno nekakov sistem na najava.

druga rabota e sto tanker ne e isto kako jahta. aj jahti ima kinezi gazdi sto registrirale na marshall islands imas bar 1000 ako ne i poveke, obcno preku shell od HK ili singapur i so niv normalno ne plovat u kina. megutoa tanker koj treba da ti se zakotvi u zaliv u kina 3 dena da istovara/utovara nafta NEMA sansi da ne e proveren od kineski vlasti. jas ne gledam kako prvo ovoj bi se registriral tamu pod sankcii a vtoro kako kina bi dozvolila toa koga kina e jasna deka saka pod nejzino zname da plovat drzavnite brodovite a privatnicite moze da registriraat pod drugo zname ako i samo ako imaat legitimen biznis nadvor. onie tea pot rafinerii (mali privatni) imaat takvi tankeri ama tie se registrirani u africki drzavi od kade i kupuvaat nafta. zatoa i spomnav obicno liberija, gambija, angola panama...

 

[Klin]

znameto.

taman rabota do tolku da istrazuvaat. zatoa se tie poraki takvi, da proverat i u toj slucaj najverojatno ako imaat vreme i volja proveruvaat preku ambasada ili nekakov sistem ako vospostavile ali takvi brodovi se obicno najaveni, kina ke kaze toj i toj broj pod takvo zname e nas proaga togas i togas pustete go. znaci si ima procedura.

ona sto gledame u momentot e vakvi najavi vo AIS zosto do imeto na brodot se pojavuva i bas toj fild so destinacija pa obicno kinezite i indijcite se najavuvaat taka. sega site gi kopiraat toa so nadez deka ke pominat ama veke toa ne proaga, najverojatno imaat vospostaveno nekakov sistem na najava.

druga rabota e sto tanker ne e isto kako jahta. aj jahti ima kinezi gazdi sto registrirale na marshall islands imas bar 1000 ako ne i poveke, obcno preku shell od HK ili singapur i so niv normalno ne plovat u kina. megutoa tanker koj treba da ti se zakotvi u zaliv u kina 3 dena da istovara/utovara nafta NEMA sansi da ne e proveren od kineski vlasti. jas ne gledam kako prvo ovoj bi se registriral tamu pod sankcii a vtoro kako kina bi dozvolila toa koga kina e jasna deka saka pod nejzino zname da plovat drzavnite brodovite a privatnicite moze da registriraat pod drugo zname ako i samo ako imaat legitimen biznis nadvor. onie tea pot rafinerii (mali privatni) imaat takvi tankeri ama tie se registrirani u africki drzavi od kade i kupuvaat nafta. zatoa i spomnav obicno liberija, gambija, angola panama...

The Iranian Navy uses several layers of verification to ensure that ships broadcasting "CHINA OWNER" are legitimate before allowing them through the Strait of Hormuz. While a ship can manually type whatever it wants into its AIS "destination" field, military forces in the region do not take those messages at face value.

1. Mandatory Pre-Approval and Documentation
As of May 2026, Iran has established a strict selective management process requiring vessels to obtain approval before crossing the waterway.

• Submission of Records: Ships must submit detailed ownership, insurance, and crew information to Iranian authorities prior to transit.
• Official Verification: Authorities cross-reference these submissions with maritime databases using the ship's IMO number—a unique, permanent identifier that links to the vessel's registered owner and commercial operator history

2. Radio Inquiries and Interceptions
The Iranian Navy and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) frequently conduct "bridge-to-bridge" radio checks.

• Questioning: Personnel will contact the ship directly to verify its flag, name, origin, and cargo.
• Crew Nationality Checks: They may ask specifically about the nationality of the crew members on board to see if it matches the broadcasted signal.

3. Physical Inspection and Diversion
If a vessel’s status is unclear or suspicious, the Iranian Navy may take more direct action:

• Diversions: Some ships are diverted through the Larak-Qeshm Channel, where Iranian officials can physically confirm there is no U.S. connection.
• Armed Boarding: In high-risk scenarios, IRGC gunboats have intercepted and boarded tankers to verify paperwork and crew identities manually before either allowing passage or ordering a U-turn.

Even with these methods, the tactic is not foolproof. As seen with the JV INNOVATION, even ships that broadcast Chinese links and have Chinese markings can still be targeted if regional tensions are high enough.

Автоматски споено мислење: вчера во 21:31

Како го кажа ова ко да е нешто лошо.
Ја се надевам дека Русија или Кина овде така дејствува.

Сите српско-бугарски структури се на нивна страна, работат жестоко против евроатлантската интеграција на МКД како петта колона, а нивните сојузници во соседството креираат проблеми да можат да глумат патриоти по дома.

 

[kano]

The Iranian Navy uses several layers of verification to ensure that ships broadcasting "CHINA OWNER" are legitimate before allowing them through the Strait of Hormuz. While a ship can manually type whatever it wants into its AIS "destination" field, military forces in the region do not take those messages at face value.

1. Mandatory Pre-Approval and Documentation
As of May 2026, Iran has established a strict selective management process requiring vessels to obtain approval before crossing the waterway.

• Submission of Records: Ships must submit detailed ownership, insurance, and crew information to Iranian authorities prior to transit.
• Official Verification: Authorities cross-reference these submissions with maritime databases using the ship's IMO number—a unique, permanent identifier that links to the vessel's registered owner and commercial operator history

2. Radio Inquiries and Interceptions
The Iranian Navy and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) frequently conduct "bridge-to-bridge" radio checks.

• Questioning: Personnel will contact the ship directly to verify its flag, name, origin, and cargo.
• Crew Nationality Checks: They may ask specifically about the nationality of the crew members on board to see if it matches the broadcasted signal.

3. Physical Inspection and Diversion
If a vessel’s status is unclear or suspicious, the Iranian Navy may take more direct action:

• Diversions: Some ships are diverted through the Larak-Qeshm Channel, where Iranian officials can physically confirm there is no U.S. connection.
• Armed Boarding: In high-risk scenarios, IRGC gunboats have intercepted and boarded tankers to verify paperwork and crew identities manually before either allowing passage or ordering a U-turn.

Even with these methods, the tactic is not foolproof. As seen with the JV INNOVATION, even ships that broadcast Chinese links and have Chinese markings can still be targeted if regional tensions are high enough.

Автоматски споено мислење: вчера во 21:31

Сите српско-бугарски структури се на нивна страна, работат жестоко против евроатлантската интеграција на МКД како петта колона, а нивните сојузници во соседството креираат проблеми да можат да глумат патриоти по дома.

tebe uste ne ti e jasno deka toa ne e kineski brod...

 

[The xx]

Suspiciously well-timed oil and prediction market trades tied to the Iran-U.S. conflict totaled roughly $7 billion.
Traders executed massive sell orders in Brent, WTI, gasoline, and diesel futures shortly before ceasefire announcements, strike delays, and Strait of Hormuz reopening news, with some accounts reportedly achieving win rates as high as 93%.

$7 Billion In Perfectly Timed Oil Bets Sparks Insider Trading Fears | OilPrice.com

Traders executed massive sell orders in Brent, WTI, gasoline, and diesel futures shortly before ceasefire announcements, strike delays, and Strait of Hormuz reopening news, with some accounts reportedly achieving win rates as high as 93%.

oilprice.com

7 милиарди долари точно егзекутуирани со 93% успешност. Ама ехееееееј сега некој варшавски тинканк ќе пише Русиве колку се корумпирани. И дека Путин има 40 деца