INDIJANEC123
Женкар, Илуватар
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Викаш ќе се разбегаат сега од Соледар?Аха...
Војна во Украина (исклучиво воена перспектива)
- Креатор на темата Vanlok
- Време на започнување
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Сега гледам изгледа се троица од кои еден мртов, нема да е чудо тие дваица да се во шок од гранатава што ја фрли прво русинот, како и да е после ова и да преживееш нормален не верујем да си…
Vanlok
deus ex machina
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Неколку пати заборавам да ги линкам текстовиве за рудниците за сол кај Соледар... Се работи за огромен подземен простор и тунели, на времето наводно било познато туристичко место:
www.thegatewaypundit.com
What Is Ukraine Hiding in the Bakhmut Salt Mines? | The Gateway Pundit | by Larry Johnson
The prolonged battle for Bakhmut is portrayed in the press as a symbol of Russian weakness.
www.thegatewaypundit.com
Vanlok
deus ex machina
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Што е сценариото не разбрав, ги опколиле, скокале од прозори нешто?
devilko
♆ wicked one ♆
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Ова значи дека цела советска техника од овие земји е испратена (и веќе уништена) во Украина. Цело источно НАТО крило е порозно и нема со што да се брани, па мора да доставуваат ново оружје.
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абе бато авионите на нато се приземјени затоа што ова не е либија,ирак,авганистанАј мајката види толкување на нештата. Легенди сте.
Нато поразено, колку авиони на нато се уништени, остана нешо од авијацијата? Сигурно и војници немаат веќе.
голем срам на нато толкава алијанса да помага со оклопни возила,хаубици и панцири,наместо да пушти миражи,фантоми,грипени,раптори да заличи малце небото над наскоро новозападна русија
- Член од
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поневидливи авиони нема од нато авионите кога станува збор за русија
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Where might Russia commit forces on an offensive? Let's do a quick parsing of the situation and examine the possibilities.
Right now, the contact line is some 700 kilometers stretching from the Dnieper estuary in the south to northern Lugansk oblast. Troop concentrations and active combat are broadly present on four major axes.
The Svatove axis is where Ukraine's Kharkov counteroffensive was stonewalled after crossing the Oskil river and struggling to break Lyman in a timely manner. Ukrainian efforts to continue the advance have been repeatedly defeated.
The Bakhmut axis has been the subject of most attention lately, but there is a paucity of Russian regular forces in this direction. Most of the work here is being achieved by the Wagner PMC and LNR forces, assisted by VDV.
Most of the Russian army forces currently committed in Ukraine are currently on the Svatove and Zaporozhia axes in a defensive stance. Contrary to the impression given by western sources, the regular Russian Army has not been engaged in widespread attacking activity lately.
Much of Russia's combat power is currently uncommitted and will be used to renew offensive operations in the coming weeks and months. The question is when and where.
There remains a distinct possibility that there will be no "Big Arrow" offensive, and instead we will see lots of "small arrow" attacks with Russia going over to the offensive on all the existing Axes. This would mean forward progress, but no major new fronts being opened.
Let's contemplate big arrow scenarios. There are four broad possibilities, so let's consider them in turn. The first (1) is for an operation aimed southward on the west bank of the Oskil river. This is one that I find appealing.
This would target the Kupyansk-Izyum corridor, and has two major advantages. First, it would collapse and potentially encircle Ukraine's force grouping on the Svatove axis. Secondly, the capture of Izyum (along with Bakhmut) makes Slavyansk essentially indefensible.
The second option (2) is a mixed solution which would repeat Russia's thrust towards Sumy at the beginning of the war. This is less mutually supportive of the existing axes but has the advantage of pressuring Kiev directly and forcing massive internal redeployment.
Then we have the Zaporozhia option (3) which would push north, aiming to clear the east bank of the Dnieper. The draw here is the ability to interdict Ukraine's lines of communication.
Ideally, any offensive from the south would reach Pavlograd. This is the major city on the highway between Dnipro and Donetsk. Capturing or screening Pavlograd would wreck Ukraine's logistics on the Donetsk axis.
Finally, we have the nuclear option, number 4: the west bank offensive from Belarus. We've seen a huge amount of material flowing into Belarus recently, which has lent credence to this theory. This is the high risk-high reward option.
A Belarusian offensive would presumably target Zhytomyr and Vinnytsia, rather than Kiev. The obvious benefit of such a gambit is the potential to entirely interdict the flow of weapons from Ukraine's NATO partners, which must traverse the entirety of Ukraine. (14/N)
Of course, an operation on the west bank of the Dnieper would be an independent axis, not supportive of other fronts and complicating Russia's sustainment problems.
It's possible that we see some combination of these. Ultimately, Russia has a very very long border to play with (courtesy of Uncle Sasha and Belarus), and a significant share of their combat power uncommitted. They are spoiled for choice.
I am personally an advocate of the Oskil option, pushing forces directly south from Belgorod towards Izyum. However, the amount of material that has been seen flowing into Belarus leaves me unable to rule anything out at this point.
(1) Big Serge
on Twitter: "Where might Russia commit forces on an offensive? Let's do a quick parsing of the situation and examine the possibilities. (1/N) https://t.co/dokohzld4a" / Twitter
Right now, the contact line is some 700 kilometers stretching from the Dnieper estuary in the south to northern Lugansk oblast. Troop concentrations and active combat are broadly present on four major axes.
The Svatove axis is where Ukraine's Kharkov counteroffensive was stonewalled after crossing the Oskil river and struggling to break Lyman in a timely manner. Ukrainian efforts to continue the advance have been repeatedly defeated.
The Bakhmut axis has been the subject of most attention lately, but there is a paucity of Russian regular forces in this direction. Most of the work here is being achieved by the Wagner PMC and LNR forces, assisted by VDV.
Most of the Russian army forces currently committed in Ukraine are currently on the Svatove and Zaporozhia axes in a defensive stance. Contrary to the impression given by western sources, the regular Russian Army has not been engaged in widespread attacking activity lately.
Much of Russia's combat power is currently uncommitted and will be used to renew offensive operations in the coming weeks and months. The question is when and where.
There remains a distinct possibility that there will be no "Big Arrow" offensive, and instead we will see lots of "small arrow" attacks with Russia going over to the offensive on all the existing Axes. This would mean forward progress, but no major new fronts being opened.
Let's contemplate big arrow scenarios. There are four broad possibilities, so let's consider them in turn. The first (1) is for an operation aimed southward on the west bank of the Oskil river. This is one that I find appealing.
This would target the Kupyansk-Izyum corridor, and has two major advantages. First, it would collapse and potentially encircle Ukraine's force grouping on the Svatove axis. Secondly, the capture of Izyum (along with Bakhmut) makes Slavyansk essentially indefensible.
The second option (2) is a mixed solution which would repeat Russia's thrust towards Sumy at the beginning of the war. This is less mutually supportive of the existing axes but has the advantage of pressuring Kiev directly and forcing massive internal redeployment.
Then we have the Zaporozhia option (3) which would push north, aiming to clear the east bank of the Dnieper. The draw here is the ability to interdict Ukraine's lines of communication.
Ideally, any offensive from the south would reach Pavlograd. This is the major city on the highway between Dnipro and Donetsk. Capturing or screening Pavlograd would wreck Ukraine's logistics on the Donetsk axis.
Finally, we have the nuclear option, number 4: the west bank offensive from Belarus. We've seen a huge amount of material flowing into Belarus recently, which has lent credence to this theory. This is the high risk-high reward option.
A Belarusian offensive would presumably target Zhytomyr and Vinnytsia, rather than Kiev. The obvious benefit of such a gambit is the potential to entirely interdict the flow of weapons from Ukraine's NATO partners, which must traverse the entirety of Ukraine. (14/N)
Of course, an operation on the west bank of the Dnieper would be an independent axis, not supportive of other fronts and complicating Russia's sustainment problems.
It's possible that we see some combination of these. Ultimately, Russia has a very very long border to play with (courtesy of Uncle Sasha and Belarus), and a significant share of their combat power uncommitted. They are spoiled for choice.
I am personally an advocate of the Oskil option, pushing forces directly south from Belgorod towards Izyum. However, the amount of material that has been seen flowing into Belarus leaves me unable to rule anything out at this point.
(1) Big Serge
on Twitter: "Where might Russia commit forces on an offensive? Let's do a quick parsing of the situation and examine the possibilities. (1/N) https://t.co/dokohzld4a" / Twitter
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Russian Army, DPR and LPR forces managed to secure the rest of Soledar center after combats with the remaining Ukrainian soldiers. Now 80% of the city is under Russian control, while Ukrainian Army still at Sil and Dvorichia suburbs.
Vanlok
deus ex machina
- Член од
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Берик иронијата е што луѓето како Игорче (а не е само тој туку ги има баш многу), со испрани мозоци од медиумите навиваат за војната, да се дава оружје за Украина да се „бранела“ итн. Ама кога ќе видат точно што се случува во војната. Кога ќе видат видеа како она последното кога (18+) на украински војници им се даваат сите шанси да се предадат ама овие не разбираат точно што се случува и одбиваат), тогаш Игорче се жали зошто воопшто се постираат тие видеа. Не разбира дека видеата се потребни за луѓето како него да видат за колку е безумна војната и што всушност навиваат кога поддржуваат давање оружје и долевање масло на оганот на војната.
Затоа се потребни ваквите видеа, за нубовите да видат и за што е војна и дека секојдневно безумно и непотребно гинат млади луѓе.
Во Украина тоа се случува секојдневно. Секојдневно и на најмирниот ден на фронтот гинат барем троцифрени бројки луѓе кои се против своја волја бутнати да војуваат. Доброволците како тие од Азов/Ајдар тие се позади фронтот со примарна задача не да војуваат туку да спречуваат десертирање (десертерите се вонсудски убивани на лице место). Да не е тој систем на спречување на десертирање, досега војната одамна ќе завршеше. Обичните луѓе од Украина не се толку будали да влагаат во мелница за месо да гинат за туѓи интереси.
Vanlok
deus ex machina
- Член од
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Мои (лаички) размислувања:Where might Russia commit forces on an offensive? Let's do a quick parsing of the situation and examine the possibilities.
This would target the Kupyansk-Izyum corridor, and has two major advantages. First, it would collapse and potentially encircle Ukraine's force grouping on the Svatove axis. Secondly, the capture of Izyum (along with Bakhmut) makes Slavyansk essentially indefensible.
The second option (2) is a mixed solution which would repeat Russia's thrust towards Sumy at the beginning of the war. This is less mutually supportive of the existing axes but has the advantage of pressuring Kiev directly and forcing massive internal redeployment.
Then we have the Zaporozhia option (3) which would push north, aiming to clear the east bank of the Dnieper. The draw here is the ability to interdict Ukraine's lines of communication.
Ideally, any offensive from the south would reach Pavlograd. This is the major city on the highway between Dnipro and Donetsk. Capturing or screening Pavlograd would wreck Ukraine's logistics on the Donetsk axis.
Finally, we have the nuclear option, number 4: the west bank offensive from Belarus. We've seen a huge amount of material flowing into Belarus recently, which has lent credence to this theory. This is the high risk-high reward option.
A Belarusian offensive would presumably target Zhytomyr and Vinnytsia, rather than Kiev. The obvious benefit of such a gambit is the potential to entirely interdict the flow of weapons from Ukraine's NATO partners, which must traverse the entirety of Ukraine. (14/N)
Of course, an operation on the west bank of the Dnieper would be an independent axis, not supportive of other fronts and complicating Russia's sustainment problems.
It's possible that we see some combination of these. Ultimately, Russia has a very very long border to play with (courtesy of Uncle Sasha and Belarus), and a significant share of their combat power uncommitted. They are spoiled for choice.
I am personally an advocate of the Oskil option, pushing forces directly south from Belgorod towards Izyum. However, the amount of material that has been seen flowing into Belarus leaves me unable to rule anything out at this point.
(1) Big Serge
- Наспроти мислењето на Серж сметам дека Бахмут оската (1) нема некоја воена логика, освен уништување на војска. Освен тоа таму фронтот сам ќе колапсира ако престанат да праќаат засилувања што природно ќе се случи ако има успешен продор на друга страна.
- Суми оската (2) има стратешка логика од аспект што ќе се отсечат таму важни железнички и речни патишта за логистиката на сегашниот фронт.
- Запорожје оската (3) исто некако не нуди голем бенефит, освен тоа и логистиката таму ќе биде отежната
- Киев оската (4) од правец на север (Белорусија) е со наголем ризик/бенефит однос, тешко ќе биде да се изведе и исклучително ризично но успешен и добро реализиран продор таму ќе постигне многу стратешки цели и значајно ќе го забрза крајот на војната. Но некако не гледам таму доволно луѓе и техника за тоа. Можеби ќе има уште еден лажњак продор во комбинација со некоја од другите 3 опции.
Добра анализа од Серж, фала што ја постави.
