Конфликтот во Сирија
- Креатор на темата Misirkov
- Време на започнување
Vanlok
deus ex machina
- Член од
- 30 мај 2009
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Не, иако има закон кој спречува уствари не е забрането пошто можеш скришно онлјан да нарачаш тест. И нормално после не смееш да го објавиш. Што кријат? Кријат дека Ашкензаите (мнозинството Израелци), не се Семити. Штом не се Семити го немаат ни тој банале изговор за „враќање“ дома.
И пази колку 100% го игнорира моментот дека има закон баш за регулирање на генетско тестирање. Чуму им е освен ако не кријат нешто. Зошто тоа го нема во САД на пример? Итн, итн.
Автоматски споено мислење:
Ретко понекој џеб има каде што се бранат... Ама:
jamajka
mode: Calm
- Член од
- 28 април 2007
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- 19.640
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Како тоа е забрането да се објави? Кај го прочита тоа дека е забрането да се објави. Зошто збориш напамет све со цел да испаднеш во право? Кој и како може на некој во Израел да му забрани да ги објави резултатите на независна лабораторија ? Можда не може да се користат доколку ти требаат некакви си официјални резултати, попут доказ за татковство или разно-разни глупости, но да кријат... Дај те молам, Израел каков и да е, не е држава која до толку има контрола врз својот народ.
Еве на што се однесува регулацијата:
„Genetic information law – 2000
The purpose of the law is described in its introduction: “to regulate the conducting of genetic testing and the provision of genetic counseling, and to protect the right to privacy of the person subject to such testing in respect of identified genetic information, but without derogating from the quality of the medical treatment, medical and genetic research, the advancement of medicine and the protection of public welfare.” The law defines a “genetic test” as a test performed to determine sequence of human DNA. The law deals with all the aspects of the genetic tests from the genetic testing laboratories, the information that must be given before and after any genetic test and the different individuals who may give genetic counseling in Israel. One of the bases of the law is that genetic tests must be done in laboratories accredited by the Ministry of Health or, in other words, Israeli laboratories; however, the Ministry of Health allows the possibility to perform tests outside the country when necessary after special authorization. Another aspect of the law is the interdiction to conduct in minors either genetic tests for reproductive purposes or presymptomatic tests without immediate implications. In addition to physician medical geneticists and genetic counselors, the law authorizes MDs to give genetic counseling in the field of their specialty. The law also forbids discrimination at work or for insurance on the basis of genetic tests.
While Israel was among the first countries in which a genetic law was promulgated, the law needs to be updated and discussions about its revision begun. The major change concerns the definition of genetic tests which is planned to be changed to include all the tests providing genetic information on the individual.“
Значи врска нема со некаква си конспирација, туку е чиста бирократија и заштита на правата на поединецот.
Последно уредено:
Vanlok
deus ex machina
- Член од
- 30 мај 2009
- Мислења
- 27.327
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- 36.491
Автоматски споено мислење:
Ај остави го fineprint-от, скроз немам намера да чешлам закони ниту па ти си ги чешлал (со тој еден пасос изваден од целиот закон).... Едноставано кажи без релативизирање зошто воопшто имаат потреба од закон кој ќе регулира генетско тестирање? Чуму?
jamajka
mode: Calm
- Член од
- 28 април 2007
- Мислења
- 19.640
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- 27.598
Зошто САД има закон за генетско тестирање ?
Зошто Русија има закон за регулација на генетско тестирање ?
Зошто Франција и Швајцарија не дозволуваат приватни лаборатории да прават генетски тестови ?
И знам дека немаш намера да чешлаш ништо што нема да се совпаѓа со твојот светоглед.
Автоматски споено мислење:
Да, ама што ќе значи тоа за 3 милиони православни... можеме да замислиме. Оставање на цедило.
Vanlok
deus ex machina
- Член од
- 30 мај 2009
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Од SouthFront.
However, it is impossible to accomplish these tasks without critically examining the fundamental reasons for the failure. The militant offensive exposed fatal wounds in the Syrian Arab Republic’s state and military apparatus. Information about the impending offensive had been reaching Damascus through the Russian Defense Ministry since the end of August 2024. The accumulation of ammunition in warehouses and the arrival of new recruits were recorded. Attempts at tactical offensives began in late September. The network of HTS agents in the rear of the Syrian Armed Forces became more active, but the SAA command and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps were de-facto inactive.
Damascus did nothing to equip fortifications in Aleppo province. Troop density was low, and there were no continuous minefields or reserve positions. There was a lack of reinforcement units in the front line. The positions of 2012-2016 were not used, being in a state of abandonment. The army was retreating into the void.
The most acute problem of the SAA was and is the lack of personnel in the units. Active units lack about 40% of fighters, sometimes up to 60%. As a result, there are full-blooded divisions on paper, but not in reality. The reinforcements reflect an even deeper problem – the widespread corruption of the Syrian army’s officer corps.
The motivation of SAA soldiers and officers is extremely low, whilst material support is at a very low level. This has led to numerous acts of extortion by the military against the local population. The authority of the authorities has been seriously undermined by outright extortion by the military. The M5 highway between Aleppo and Damascus has been illegally taxed, as in the Middle Ages; it has become impossible to pass without paying a bribe. Thus, undertaking military service has become a business. The situation has been exacerbated by ethno-religious differences between the local population and the troops. The Syrian Arab Army is half Alawite, and among the officers, there are even more Alawites, which is anathema to the Sunni majority. With an average salary of 20-30 dollars, Alawites in Syria receive significantly more.
The central government has relied mostly on the Alawite population. The formation of troops on a narrow sectarian basis has been intended to prevent possible rebellions. It is also related to the purging of the most professional commanders who had proved themselves in battles before the 2020 ceasefire. The most combat-ready units have been disbanded or reassigned. Ineffective socio-economic policies based on mundane corruption have resulted in a standard of living in the SAR that is inferior even to such poor neighboring countries as Lebanon and Iraq. The degradation of the economy and social infrastructure is in many cases greater than in areas controlled by the Kurds and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.
The Syrian Arab Army is completely unprepared for the methods of modern warfare. The experience of the special military operation in Ukraine has passed them by, although the Syrian commanders could have gone directly to the Russians to learn the lessons of the violent conflict in Eastern Europe. They could have sent their representatives to the Ukrainian front and trained them directly in the field of combat operations, but nothing was done.
Unlike the Syrian troops, the HTS fighters have closely interacted with the Ukrainian security services. As a result, we see the extensive and effective use of FPV drones, resulting in the HTS groups having a significant advantage in aerial reconnaissance. The acute shortage of reconnaissance equipment held by the Syrian government forces has not been eliminated for 4 years. Only 2 Russian Zala reconnaissance drones were operating in the direction of Aleppo, and they could only fly 2 km beyond the line of contact, as Turkish electronic warfare systems did not allow them to operate further.
Finally, information security was not established at all, given that methods of communicating with the population are now extremely outdated. While the militants flood the Internet space with their content, the Syrian press is in a vacuum, resulting in inadequate responses to threats. The fact that the Syrian army retained control over Hama had to be confirmed by ordinary SAA soldiers, who recorded videos and posted them on social media to prevent panic.
However, it is impossible to accomplish these tasks without critically examining the fundamental reasons for the failure. The militant offensive exposed fatal wounds in the Syrian Arab Republic’s state and military apparatus. Information about the impending offensive had been reaching Damascus through the Russian Defense Ministry since the end of August 2024. The accumulation of ammunition in warehouses and the arrival of new recruits were recorded. Attempts at tactical offensives began in late September. The network of HTS agents in the rear of the Syrian Armed Forces became more active, but the SAA command and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps were de-facto inactive.
Damascus did nothing to equip fortifications in Aleppo province. Troop density was low, and there were no continuous minefields or reserve positions. There was a lack of reinforcement units in the front line. The positions of 2012-2016 were not used, being in a state of abandonment. The army was retreating into the void.
The most acute problem of the SAA was and is the lack of personnel in the units. Active units lack about 40% of fighters, sometimes up to 60%. As a result, there are full-blooded divisions on paper, but not in reality. The reinforcements reflect an even deeper problem – the widespread corruption of the Syrian army’s officer corps.
The motivation of SAA soldiers and officers is extremely low, whilst material support is at a very low level. This has led to numerous acts of extortion by the military against the local population. The authority of the authorities has been seriously undermined by outright extortion by the military. The M5 highway between Aleppo and Damascus has been illegally taxed, as in the Middle Ages; it has become impossible to pass without paying a bribe. Thus, undertaking military service has become a business. The situation has been exacerbated by ethno-religious differences between the local population and the troops. The Syrian Arab Army is half Alawite, and among the officers, there are even more Alawites, which is anathema to the Sunni majority. With an average salary of 20-30 dollars, Alawites in Syria receive significantly more.
The central government has relied mostly on the Alawite population. The formation of troops on a narrow sectarian basis has been intended to prevent possible rebellions. It is also related to the purging of the most professional commanders who had proved themselves in battles before the 2020 ceasefire. The most combat-ready units have been disbanded or reassigned. Ineffective socio-economic policies based on mundane corruption have resulted in a standard of living in the SAR that is inferior even to such poor neighboring countries as Lebanon and Iraq. The degradation of the economy and social infrastructure is in many cases greater than in areas controlled by the Kurds and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.
The Syrian Arab Army is completely unprepared for the methods of modern warfare. The experience of the special military operation in Ukraine has passed them by, although the Syrian commanders could have gone directly to the Russians to learn the lessons of the violent conflict in Eastern Europe. They could have sent their representatives to the Ukrainian front and trained them directly in the field of combat operations, but nothing was done.
Unlike the Syrian troops, the HTS fighters have closely interacted with the Ukrainian security services. As a result, we see the extensive and effective use of FPV drones, resulting in the HTS groups having a significant advantage in aerial reconnaissance. The acute shortage of reconnaissance equipment held by the Syrian government forces has not been eliminated for 4 years. Only 2 Russian Zala reconnaissance drones were operating in the direction of Aleppo, and they could only fly 2 km beyond the line of contact, as Turkish electronic warfare systems did not allow them to operate further.
Finally, information security was not established at all, given that methods of communicating with the population are now extremely outdated. While the militants flood the Internet space with their content, the Syrian press is in a vacuum, resulting in inadequate responses to threats. The fact that the Syrian army retained control over Hama had to be confirmed by ordinary SAA soldiers, who recorded videos and posted them on social media to prevent panic.
Автоматски споено мислење:
Ете ти си читал сите овие закони па кажи кои од регулациите во Русија и САД забрануваат генетско тестирање што не е со дозвола од државата?
Darling
High Value
Tebe samo koga ti odgovara postojat hristijani vo bliski istok, inaku izumreni se ko mamuti.
The xx
Russia state-affiliated bot. ☑️
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filjandecko
Komandant benzini-HAVUZ
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Сиријците во Германија се затекнати од оваа ситуација,,све беше мирно одеднаш војна кажуваат
Vanlok
deus ex machina
- Член од
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The war whores of the military-industrial complex are lighting the world on fire
Syria is just the latest case of U.S. medling and the timing could not be more suspicious
leohohmann.substack.com
Ska Maniac
Бараба
Тажното е што тие 1.5 милоиони што ќе дојдат у ЕУ нема да бидат овие жени и деца на сликава туку ташаци од 20- 40 години .За многумина на кои не ви е јасно (да не пингам сега сите), еве што се дешава и што тек ќе се дешава.
Vanlok
deus ex machina
- Член од
- 30 мај 2009
- Мислења
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Taжното е што суртуците со кои си имаме работа овде, пак нема да ја научат лекцијата и нема да го сменат мислењето.
Автоматски споено мислење: