Ми се чини 4 носачи се во прашање.
Значи четри ударни групи што се сериозна ефектива.
Ако Иран наскоро не зазаме некој венецуелски танкер (што значи ги почитува санкциите на Калигула кон венецуела) и со тоа ги забрза настаните, не би ме чудело на крајот и иранското раководство биде УАПСЕНО од г-дин Калигула.
Времето не игра во интерес на иран!
Before the negotiations, Trump reportedly sent Iran a message through an intermediary country, saying: “Let me strike 2 locations in Iran—you respond, and then it’s over.”
We told them: If you make even the slightest move, we will certainly inflict 3,000–4,000 casualties on you.“
Автоматски споено мислење:
Ако ништо друго многу појасно е што се деси пред 12-дневната војна, од аспект на Америте.
А нафо екипата баш се спремаше за втора тура „Америка стронк“ свршaвање.
Одлично е тоа што Иран се врти повеќе кон Кина отколку кон Русија. Русија за жал сеуште калкулира и обожава да има добри односи со Сад/Еу. Поради тоа е и дистанцата на Кина кон Русија и нивната претпазливост. Плус тука е и корењата кои Евреите ги имаат пуштено во Русија.
Ова инфо е уште порелевантно и за овде, па го пренесувам.
China Intensifies Support for Iran and Could Change the Game
After sending a Type 055 destroyer and a Type 052 to the Sea of Oman region to escort the Ocean No. 1 intelligence ship, the Chinese are stepping up intelligence support to Iran.
The Ocean No. 1 is likely monitoring all movements of U.S. Navy ships and submarines and passing the information to Iran. But in an increasingly bold move, the Chinese are photographing U.S. bases and making the photos public, and this time they photographed a newly installed THAAD battery and posted the images with location data online.
Many people, including me, see this as a sign that the Chinese will not hesitate to provide full support to Iran, which appears to have turned to the Chinese after realizing that Russia’s ties with Israel were limiting the desired support.
With two modern destroyers and the Ocean No. 1 in the region providing data to Iran, there is no chance of a surprise attack, making a zero-casualty strike even more difficult for US-Israel.
Today alone, multiple Iranian facilities were hit by explosions, bringing the total to more than ten successful sabotage operations against the Iranian government in just the last ten days, including military targets.
Yes, I’m raising the hypothesis that the Chinese are giving Iran something similar to what they gave Pakistan in the last conflict with India, even though they deny it.
The Chinese support obviously goes beyond radars, which they know were easy targets last June. Those flights from China to Iran in the last two months, sometimes multiple times a day, didn’t have the capacity to carry anti-aircraft batteries, but they certainly had the capacity to carry a lot of integration equipment, including for ground BeiDou stations.
It seems to me that after Iran migrated almost its entire arsenal to BeiDou and acquired more Chinese radas, they are either already operating or planning to operate something similar to Pakistan’s Link 17.
If this happens, it would mean the Chinese are directly involved in target acquisition for the Iranians, completely preventing the kind of blackout that occurred last June.
That would be a game-changer almost impossible to overcome at this moment.
Iran’s C4ISR capabilities have received major investment in the last seven months, and China’s release of photos of U.S. bases clearly shows they intend to supply Iran with as much intelligence as possible.
(подвлекувањата се мои)
Patricia’s analysis is sharp, timely, and grounded in observable shifts rather than speculation. What stands out is not merely China’s physical presence near the Sea of Oman, but the signaling logic behind it. By escorting an intelligence-gathering vessel with top-tier destroyers and publicly releasing geolocated imagery of U.S. assets, Beijing is practicing calibrated transparency: revealing just enough to deter escalation without declaring alliance. This is classic Chinese strategic ambiguity—deterrence through information dominance rather than overt force.
Several additional points deepen the picture. First, intelligence sharing today is less about single platforms and more about network integration. If Iran has indeed migrated key systems to BeiDou and layered Chinese radars with indigenous sensors, the real gain is resilience. Redundancy across satellites, datalinks, and ground stations sharply reduces the effectiveness of sabotage and surprise strikes.
Second, China’s posture suggests a shift from transactional support to systemic enablement. This mirrors its approach with Pakistan: not fighting wars on behalf of partners, but ensuring they cannot be blinded, isolated, or coerced. The release of base imagery is less about Iran and more about Washington—signaling that escalation will be observed, recorded, and countered in real time.
Third, the timing matters. With Russia constrained by competing equities, China fills the gap as the only power capable of providing scale, technology, and political cover simultaneously. This does not mean a formal alliance, but it does mean the erosion of unilateral strike options.
The strategic consequence is clear: the cost of coercion rises, timelines lengthen, and uncertainty grows for planners accustomed to information asymmetry. In that sense, the “game change” is not kinetic—it is epistemic. Control of the battlespace increasingly begins with control of knowledge.
Dr. Arshad Afzal
Former Faculty Member, Umm Al-Qura University, Makkah, KSA
Звучи логично... Тоа е тоа, се штитат од радијација која истекла пошто овие се неспособни.
И тајмингот е таман, сега и Америте и Израел ќе избомбардираат за додатно да заштитат.
И можеби најголемото потопување на носачи на авиони после Битката кај Мидвеј во 1942 година.
За потсетување и кај Мидвеј во 1942 една од двете завојувани страни беше премногу самоуверена во "заседата" која и` ја подготвуваше на другата страна, за во две деноноќија да ги изгуби сите 4 (ЧЕТИРИ) носачи на авиони кои ги испрати во "заседата", наспроти спротивната страна која загуби само 1 (ЕДЕН) од 3 (ТРИ) носачи на авиони.
Овие кои изгубија исто така го поседуваа и најголемиот борбен брод во целиот свет во текот на целата Втора Светска Војна, но на крајот потпишаа безусловна капитулација во пристаништето на сопствениот главен град.
Колку поголеми и посилни = толку посамоуверени = толку посилно паѓаат.
Оваа страница користи колачиња за персонализирање на содржината. Со продолжување на користењето, се согласувате со нашата политика за користење колачиња.
