Пресвртница за Украина

[Gags]

Ама во право е.
Повеќето артикли, особено од почетокот на војната и тоа од двете страни беа полни со глупости.
Од тоа дека тенковите биле минато до "револуционерните" дронови на Турците. Снемувањето ракети на едните, артилерија на другите итн итн. И да, повеќето од нив носеа до погрешни заклучоци.

Да, 100% е во право, иронијата е што он беше меѓу тие кои ги креираа овие глупости а сеа као демек не знае што како, во подрум бил он тоа време.

 

[Scirea]

Скоро пола земја загубија, другата половина секако е во тешки говна, се ради тоа што го послушаа Борис Џонсон... Борис ФАКИНГ Џонсон, човекот кој 50 и кусур години не знае фризурата да ја намести...

 

[Gags]

Детална статија од страна на WP за украинската офанзива и нејзиниот неуспех. Четивото е огромно, ќе го споделам во целост за тие кои не би можеле да го прочитаат поради претплата и ќе го поделам во два поста поради обемноста. Се уште го немам прочитано но видов дека почнува да се цитира и споделува од страна на релевантни лица.

Miscalculations, divisions marked offensive planning by U.S., Ukraine​

On June 15, in a conference room at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, flanked by top U.S. commanders, sat around a table with his Ukrainian counterpart, who was joined by aides from Kyiv. The room was heavy with an air of frustration.

Austin, in his deliberate baritone, asked Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov about Ukraine’s decision-making in the opening days of its long-awaited counteroffensive, pressing him on why his forces weren’t using Western-supplied mine-clearing equipment to enable a larger, mechanized assault, or using smoke to conceal their advances. Despite Russia’s thick defensive lines, Austin said, the Kremlin’s troops weren’t invincible.

Reznikov, a bald, bespectacled lawyer, said Ukraine’s military commanders were the ones making those decisions. But he noted that Ukraine’s armored vehicles were being destroyed by Russian helicopters, drones and artillery with every attempt to advance. Without air support, he said, the only option was to use artillery to shell Russian lines, dismount from the targeted vehicles and proceed on foot.

“We can’t maneuver because of the land-mine density and tank ambushes,” Reznikov said, according to an official who was present.

The meeting in Brussels, less than two weeks into the campaign, illustrates how a counteroffensive born in optimism has failed to deliver its expected punch, generating friction and second-guessing between Washington and Kyiv and raising deeper questions about Ukraine’s ability to retake decisive amounts of territory.

As winter approaches, and the front lines freeze into place, Ukraine’s most senior military officials acknowledge that the war has reached a stalemate.

This examination of the lead-up to Ukraine’s counteroffensive is based on interviews with more than 30 senior officials from Ukraine, the United States and European nations. It provides new insights and previously unreported details about America’s deep involvement in the military planning behind the counteroffensive and the factors that contributed to its disappointments. The second part of this two-part account examines how the battle unfolded on the ground over the summer and fall, and the widening fissures between Washington and Kyiv. Some of the officials spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive deliberations.

Key elements that shaped the counteroffensive and the initial outcome include:

● Ukrainian, U.S. and British military officers held eight major tabletop war games to build a campaign plan. But Washington miscalculated the extent to which Ukraine’s forces could be transformed into a Western-style fighting force in a short period — especially without giving Kyiv air power integral to modern militaries.

● U.S. and Ukrainian officials sharply disagreed at times over strategy, tactics and timing. The Pentagon wanted the assault to begin in mid-April to prevent Russia from continuing to strengthen its lines. The Ukrainians hesitated, insisting they weren’t ready without additional weapons and training.

● U.S. military officials were confident that a mechanized frontal attack on Russian lines was feasible with the troops and weapons that Ukraine had. The simulations concluded that Kyiv’s forces, in the best case, could reach the Sea of Azov and cut off Russian troops in the south in 60 to 90 days.

● The United States advocated a focused assault along that southern axis, but Ukraine’s leadership believed its forces had to attack at three distinct points along the 600-mile front, southward toward both Melitopol and Berdyansk on the Sea of Azov and east toward the embattled city of Bakhmut.

● The U.S. intelligence community had a more downbeat view than the U.S. military, assessing that the offensive had only a 50-50 chance of success given the stout, multilayered defenses Russia had built up over the winter and spring.

● Many in Ukraine and the West underestimated Russia’s ability to rebound from battlefield disasters and exploit its perennial strengths: manpower, mines and a willingness to sacrifice lives on a scale that few other countries can countenance.

● As the expected launch of the offensive approached, Ukrainian military officials feared they would suffer catastrophic losses — while American officials believed the toll would ultimately be higher without a decisive assault.

The year began with Western resolve at its peak, Ukrainian forces highly confident and President Volodymyr Zelensky predicting a decisive victory. But now, there is uncertainty on all fronts. Morale in Ukraine is waning. International attention has been diverted to the Middle East. Even among Ukraine’s supporters, there is growing political reluctance to contribute more to a precarious cause. At almost every point along the front, expectations and results have diverged as Ukraine has shifted to a slow-moving dismounted slog that has retaken only slivers of territory.

“We wanted faster results,” Zelensky said in an interview with the Associated Press last week. “From that perspective, unfortunately, we did not achieve the desired results. And this is a fact.”

Together, all these factors make victory for Ukraine far less likely than years of war and destruction.

The campaign’s inconclusive and discouraging early months pose sobering questions for Kyiv’s Western backers about the future, as Zelensky — supported by an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians — vows to fight until Ukraine restores the borders established in its 1991 independence from the Soviet Union.

“That’s going to take years and a lot of blood,” a British security official said, if it’s even possible. “Is Ukraine up for that? What are the manpower implications? The economic implications? Implications for Western support?”

The year now stands to end with Russian President Vladimir Putin more certain than ever that he can wait out a fickle West and fully absorb the Ukrainian territory already seized by his troops.

Автоматски споено мислење: 5 декември 2023

Дел втори.

Gaming out the battle plan​

In a conference call in the late fall of 2022, after Kyiv had won back territory in the north and south, Austin spoke with Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s top military commander, and asked him what he would need for a spring offensive. Zaluzhny responded that he required 1,000 armored vehicles and nine new brigades, trained in Germany and ready for battle.

“I took a big gulp,” Austin said later, according to an official with knowledge of the call. “That’s near-impossible,” he told colleagues.

In the first months of 2023, military officials from Britain, Ukraine and the United States concluded a series of war games at a U.S. Army base in Wiesbaden, Germany, where Ukrainian officers were embedded with a newly established command responsible for supporting Kyiv’s fight.

The sequence of eight high-level tabletop exercises formed the backbone for the U.S.-enabled effort to hone a viable, detailed campaign plan, and to determine what Western nations would need to provide to give it the means to succeed.

“We brought all the allies and partners together and really squeezed them hard to get additional mechanized vehicles,” a senior U.S. defense official said.

During the simulations, each of which lasted several days, participants were designated to play the part either of Russian forces — whose capabilities and behavior were informed by Ukrainian and allied intelligence — or Ukrainian troops and commanders, whose performance was bound by the reality that they would be facing serious constraints in manpower and ammunition.

Russia held these Ukrainian teens captive. Their testimonies could be used against Putin.

The planners ran the exercises using specialized war-gaming software and Excel spreadsheets — and, sometimes, simply by moving pieces around on a map. The simulations included smaller component exercises that each focused on a particular element of the fight — offensive operations or logistics. The conclusions were then fed back into the evolving campaign plan.

Top officials including Gen. Mark A. Milley, then chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Col. Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky, commander of Ukrainian ground forces, attended several of the simulations and were briefed on the results.

During one visit to Wiesbaden, Milley spoke with Ukrainian special operations troops — who were working with American Green Berets — in the hope of inspiring them ahead of operations in enemy-controlled areas.

“There should be no Russian who goes to sleep without wondering if they’re going to get their throat slit in the middle of the night,” Milley said, according to an official with knowledge of the event. “You gotta get back there, and create a campaign behind the lines.”

Ukrainian officials hoped the offensive could re-create the success of the fall of 2022, when they recovered parts of the Kharkiv region in the northeast and the city of Kherson in the south in a campaign that surprised even Ukraine’s biggest backers. Again, their focus would be in more than one place.

But Western officials said the war games affirmed their assessment that Ukraine would be best served by concentrating its forces on a single strategic objective — a massed attack through Russian-held areas to the Sea of Azov, severing the Kremlin’s land route from Russia to Crimea, a critical supply line.

The rehearsals gave the United States the opportunity to say at several points to the Ukrainians, “I know you really, really, really want to do this, but it’s not going to work,” one former U.S. official said.

At the end of the day, though, it would be Zelensky, Zaluzhny and other Ukrainian leaders who would make the decision, the former official noted.

Officials tried to assign probabilities to different scenarios, including a Russian capitulation — deemed a “really low likelihood” — or a major Ukrainian setback that would create an opening for a major Russian counterattack — also a slim probability.

“Then what you’ve got is the reality in the middle, with degrees of success,” a British official said.

The most optimistic scenario for cutting the land bridge was 60 to 90 days. The exercises also predicted a difficult and bloody fight, with losses of soldiers and equipment as high as 30 to 40 percent, according to U.S. officials.

American military officers had seen casualties come in far lower than estimated in the major battles of Iraq and Afghanistan. They considered the estimates a starting point for planning medical care and battlefield evacuation so that losses never reached the projected levels.

The numbers “can be sobering,” the senior U.S. defense official said. “But they never are as high as predicted, because we know we have to do things to make sure we don’t.”

U.S. officials also believed that more Ukrainian troops would ultimately be killed if Kyiv failed to mount a decisive assault and the conflict became a drawn-out war of attrition.

But they acknowledged the delicacy of suggesting a strategy that would entail significant losses, no matter the final figure.

“It was easy for us to tell them in a tabletop exercise, ‘Okay, you’ve just got to focus on one place and push really hard,’” a senior U.S. official said. “They were going to lose a lot of people and they were going to lose a lot of the equipment.”

Those choices, the senior official said, become “much harder on the battlefield.”

On that, a senior Ukrainian military official agreed. War-gaming “doesn’t work,” the official said in retrospect, in part because of the new technology that was transforming the battlefield. Ukrainian soldiers were fighting a war unlike anything NATO forces had experienced: a large conventional conflict, with World World I-style trenches overlaid by omnipresent drones and other futuristic tools — and without the air superiority the U.S. military has had in every modern conflict it has fought.

“All these methods … you can take them neatly and throw them away, you know?” the senior Ukrainian said of the war-game scenarios. “And throw them away because it doesn’t work like that now.”

Disagreements about deployments​

The Americans had long questioned the wisdom of Kyiv’s decision to keep forces around the besieged eastern city of Bakhmut.

Ukrainians saw it differently. “Bakhmut holds” had become shorthand for pride in their troops’ fierce resistance against a bigger enemy. For months, Russian and Ukrainian artillery had pulverized the city. Soldiers killed and wounded one another by the thousands to make gains measured sometimes by city blocks.

The city finally fell to Russia in May.

Zelensky, backed by his top commander, stood firm about the need to retain a major presence around Bakhmut and strike Russian forces there as part of the counteroffensive. To that end, Zaluzhny maintained more forces near Bakhmut than he did in the south, including the country’s most experienced units, U.S. officials observed with frustration.

Ukrainian officials argued that they needed to sustain a robust fight in the Bakhmut area because otherwise Russia would try to reoccupy parts of the Kharkiv region and advance in Donetsk — a key objective for Putin, who wants to seize that whole region.

“We told [the Americans], ‘If you assumed the seats of our generals, you’d see that if we don’t make Bakhmut a point of contention, [the Russians] would,’” one senior Ukrainian official said. “We can’t let that happen.”

In addition, Zaluzhny envisioned making the formidable length of the 600-mile front a problem for Russia, according to the senior British official. The Ukrainian general wanted to stretch Russia’s much larger occupying force — unfamiliar with the terrain and already facing challenges with morale and logistics — to dilute its fighting power.

Western officials saw problems with that approach, which would also diminish the firepower of Ukraine’s military at any single point of attack. Western military doctrine dictated a concentrated push toward a single objective.

The Americans yielded, however.

“They know the terrain. They know the Russians,” said a senior U.S. official. “It’s not our war. And we had to kind of sit back into that.”

Автоматски споено мислење: 5 декември 2023

Дел трети.

The weapons Kyiv needed​

On Feb. 3, Jake Sullivan, President Biden’s national security adviser, called together the administration’s top national security officials to review the counteroffensive plan.

The White House’s subterranean Situation Room was being renovated, so the top echelons of the State, Defense and Treasury departments, along with the CIA, gathered in a secure conference room in the adjacent Eisenhower Executive Office Building.

Most were already familiar with Ukraine’s three-pronged approach. The goal was for Biden’s senior advisers to voice their approval or reservations to one another and try to reach consensus on their joint advice to the president.

The questions posed by Sullivan were simple, said a person who attended. First, could Washington and its partners successfully prepare Ukraine to break through Russia’s heavily fortified defenses?

And then, even if the Ukrainians were prepared, “could they actually do it?”

Milley, with his ever-ready green maps of Ukraine, displayed the potential axes of attack and the deployment of Ukrainian and Russian forces. He and Austin explained their conclusion that “Ukraine, to be successful, needed to fight a different way,” one senior administration official closely involved in the planning recalled.

Ukraine’s military, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, had become a defensive force. Since 2014 it had focused on a grinding but low-level fight against Russian-backed forces in the eastern Donbas region. To orchestrate a large-scale advance would require a significant shift in its force structure and tactics.

The planning called for wider and better Western training, which up to that point had focused on teaching small groups and individuals to use Western-provided weapons. Thousands of troops would be instructed in Germany in large unit formations and U.S.-style battlefield maneuvers, whose principles dated to World War II. For American troops, training in what was known as “combined arms” operations often lasted more than a year. The Ukraine plan proposed condensing that into a few months.

Instead of firing artillery, then “inching forward” and firing some more, the Ukrainians would be “fighting and shooting at the same time,” with newly trained brigades moving forward with armored vehicles and artillery support “in a kind of symphonic way,” the senior administration official said.

Има уште доста текст но Кајгана не ми дозволува повеќе да пишувам, доколку некој не може да го отвори линкот а е заинтересиран нека пише да го споделам остатокот од текстот.

 

[Vanlok]

Ajде втор дел.

Автоматски споено мислење: 5 декември 2023

Ова реално е за во другата тема. Ја покажува делузијата на западниве ама и интересно е ако е фактичко точно. Пошто токму тука каде Америте инсистирале да се напаѓа, тука најмногу запињаа (и гинеа) Украинците.

Автоматски споено мислење: 5 декември 2023

Автоматски споено мислење: 5 декември 2023

Упс... Азерите биле немирни.

 

[The xx]

Осеќам лимон и шеќер ќе треба за напатениве куртони на форумов.

 

[Klinton]

Ne e za site

Спојлер: 18+

 

[Vanlok]

Осеќам лимон и шеќер ќе треба за напатениве куртони на форумов.

И копиум... поише копиум.

Автоматски споено мислење: 6 декември 2023

Резидентните воени лица на форумов, и западните фанови се кинеа од смеење за користењето на постари тенкови во други улоги освен main battle tank. Ама како и за многу други работи, искача дека појма немаат.



The tankers target was a field active firing position of a mortar unit of the 53rd mechanised brigade of the AFU, which is responsible for the entire south-western flank of Avdeevka.

The 2A46M-1 125-mm gun fires with a small angular elevation above the target at a distance of about 5500-6000 metres using ЗОФ26 fragmentation projectiles as part of ЗВОФ36 rounds. The muzzle velocity of this projectile is 850 m/s and the average trajectory velocity is 670 - 620 m/s.

The vehicle itself is a trophy which came into the possession of the 1st Army Corps of the DPR, presumably between 2014 and 2015.

The T-64BV tank is a worthy representative of the Kharkiv Soviet school of tank building. The equivalent resistance of the turret's frontal armour plates against APFSDS projectiles reaches 530 - 550 mm and about 800 - 850 mm from shaped charge projectiles, which is fully consistent with the Ural T-72B of the 1984 model.

Автоматски споено мислење: 6 декември 2023

 

[Gags]

МО на ОК вели дека бројот на загинати руски војници е 50.000 неброејќи ги платениците на Вагнер за кои сметаат дека се 20.000.

Како бе вака па нели минимум 300.000 загинати имаат Русите? Или сеа и Енглезите работат за Путлер и шират руска пропаганда за нивните загуби?

Што е до мене јас воопшто не верувам на Англичани али проукраинската страна се пали на нивните дневни извештаи па баш ме интересира дали сега лажат или говорат вистина. Ако они говорат вистина тогаш Украинците лажат, вич веј дечки?

Британците велат дека ова се загуби до ноември, Украинците го рачунаат и декември, можно е дека Русите загубиле 300.000 за 6 дена, ете и двете страни се во право. - слободоумен проукраински просветлен граџанин, најверојатно.

Инаку не, Украинците ги рачунаат овие бројки како загинати а не како плус ранети и заробени.

 

[Vanlok]

 

[HolyDebarca]

Една Кива помалце, го рокнале предавникот.

Труха⚡️Україна

❗️Официально: Кива скончалсја на месте, в него стрелјали, – Подмосковныј главк СК. ТРУХА⚡️Украина | Прислать новость

t.me

 

[Vanlok]

Браво, ова ќе ја одлучи војната како ништо друго... Или не?

Автоматски споено мислење: 6 декември 2023

За другите: Применето е ретко појавување на ендемски вид за кој почнавме да се сомневаме дека имаат extinct статус.

 

[Таксист]

Кажи ми за некој друг случај каде шо љугето биле живи запалени затоа шо излегле на референдум?

Да бидеме прецизни молам.
Настанот е од 2 мај 2014. Се работи за собир на комунисти и нивни симпатизери.
Бидејќи убивање на комунисти не е забрането дури и е посакувано овој настан денес сосема поинаку се пренесува, значи не се работи за никаков референдум...
...видео кое донекаде дава слика иако скромна доволна за да се има представа за настанот.

Форумските профили кои денес ја оправдуваат ОТАН и нивната агрсија врз Украина (државниот удар од февруари е нивно масло) избегнуваат да говорат за ова, за нив се започна на 24 февруари 2022.

Дали се надзира крајот?

Ако прашуваш дали е познат крајот , ДА познат е.
Ако пак прашуваш кога ќе дојде крајот, одговорот е кој би знаел, има многу непознати и можни сценарија.

Најолема грешка на украинците е што ги слушаат англичаните а не ги слушаат шкотланѓаните кои имаат златна крилатица која секој треба да ја знае - "Ако видиш двајца браќа да се караат, тука поминал англичанец".

Ако добро помнам изреката е на Ганди и оригиналот е вака некако:
Ако длабоко во морето на дното, наидеш на две риби како се расправаат, погледни наоколу мора во близина да има некој Британец.

 

[Vanlok]

Кај Кринки (јужно, кај Херсон), од дронови не можат да мрднат надвор од засолниште. Скоро како кај Авдивка.

 

[Vanlok]

 

[Gags]

18+ Прилично голема група, којзнае како завршиле вака.