The news of Ukrainian forces amassing a 60k grouping to take on Kherson and Novaya Kakhovka is more than likely a feint to conceal the true plans of the Ukrainian command.
Whenever the Ukrainian forces have faced layered defensive formations of the Russian Army, they became bogged down in heavy fighting with little forward advance.
This is evident from the fighting in and around the Andreevka bridgehead and at Davydov Brod. This is also clear from the Ukrainian experience of assaulting Krasny Liman, where the heroic defence of the vastly outnumbered BARS-16 volunteer battalion of the Russian forces caused the Ukrainian army to lose its momentum and initiative, resulting in the stalemate along the Svatovo front and in a pullback of Ukrainian units and the loss of territory in the Kremennaya sector, along the Zherebets river boundary.
It is only where Ukraine has been able to exploit the sparsely (and lightly) defended front lines in the Balakleya-Kupyansk-Izyum triangle and to attack with mobile units at the junctures between Russian units that the Ukrainian army has had success.
This is also precisely what happened in the Krivoy Rog-northeastern Kherson direction. Just as on the Kharkov front, the area northeast of Dudchany, in the Vysokopolye-Novovorontsovka-Dudchany triangle was sparsely and lightly defended, as all the attention of the strained Russian defensive lines was focused on the defence of the Andreevka-Davydov Brod incursion.
With Ukraine exploiting this advantage—an advantage that existed solely because of Ukraine's numerical superiority—the Russian army pulled back, vacating the salient north of the Davydov Brod-Dudchany line. The pullback made the porous front line solid, and the Ukrainian advance stalled, with the Russian forces even attempting limited counter-maneuvers in the direction of Sukhoi Stavok.
This has been the story of the Ukrainian counter-offensive operations: Exploiting Russian lack of personnel and attacking at junctures between understaffed units using mobile groups—a tactic that was honed as long ago as during the first limited Ukrainian counter-offensive to the north of Kharkov earlier in this conflict. In encounters with layered Russian Army defences, the Ukrainian forces have sustained significant, painful, and, in the long term, unsustainable casualties and equipment losses.
Why would Ukraine attempt a massive 60k offensive operation with an army that is not yet ready for such an adventure (if it ever will be)? Two possible reasons come to mind: (1) because it is pushed to do so by its overseas masters, or (2) because it is a feint intended to conceal a different maneuver altogether. While we cannot dismiss the former, nor can we disregard the urgency of trying a critical move now, before the Russian mobilization is complete, the Ukrainians (and their sponsors) have shown themselves to be finer tacticians than many expected.
Just as the Andreevka bridgehead incursion was paired up with a rapid advance in the Kharkov theatre (exploiting weaknesses, rather than blindly smashing against strengths) and, eventually, the "toad-leap" assault in the Berislav direction (toward Dudchany, in the northeastern Kherson Oblast)—both of which were vastly more successful than anything that Ukraine achieved with the Andreevka-Davydov Brod bridgehead—we can expect that any demonstration of a massive counter-offensive against Kherson (especially one that is being telegraphed so obviously) will be accompanied by a smarter tactical move elsewhere.
That elsewhere is, in my opinion, the Zaporozhye theatre, with an attempt at a deep strike through to the heartland of the Russian territory north of the Azov sea. Frankly, it would not matter even if the assault does not penetrate all that far—the morale and media impact of such a raid in the direction of Melitopol or Berdyansk (no need even to reach them) would be a significant victory for Ukraine. It would also critically threaten the entire Kherson grouping of the Russian Army without any need for a wasteful frontal assault against the layered Russian defences in Kherson—layers that do not exist anywhere to the same extent along the Orekhov-Gulyai Pole line of the front.
For that reason, Russia must watch the Zaporozhye theatre carefully and not fall into the trap of driving all available reserves to Kherson—like it was done, to some extent, before the crisis along the Kharkov front. Mistakes must not be repeated, and, with the nearing completion of the Russian mobilization, it may be Ukraine's turn to make mistakes in a rush to secure a significant victory before the 300k-strong Russian force floods the Ukrainian theatre.