jamajka
mode: Calm
- Член од
- 28 април 2007
- Мислења
- 19.645
- Поени од реакции
- 27.609
Левите не биле екстремисти, десните биле
Progressive International или нова интернационала
- Креатор на темата teneke
- Време на започнување
- Член од
- 13 јули 2006
- Мислења
- 15.722
- Поени од реакции
- 18.775
Левите не биле екстремисти, десните биле
Абе не цепидлачи сега
.Тие 10% од едната и другата страна се екстремисти.
- Член од
- 13 јули 2006
- Мислења
- 15.722
- Поени од реакции
- 18.775
@jamajka @Bafra @Darling @stratUs
Ова е суштината на протестите, кај обичните луѓе. Политичарите само ги злоупотребуваат и канализираат за сопствени потреби. Вие можете да дебатирате до сто и едно и назад за ситници што се случиле, но тоа е само да се разводни дискусијата од главните проблеми.
www.spiegel.de
Ова е суштината на протестите, кај обичните луѓе. Политичарите само ги злоупотребуваат и канализираат за сопствени потреби. Вие можете да дебатирате до сто и едно и назад за ситници што се случиле, но тоа е само да се разводни дискусијата од главните проблеми.
What's Wrong With America?: "The Despair Is Smoldering in Society"
Millions of Americans have seen their wages stagnate for decades, even as the wealthiest have grown fantastically rich. The economists Anne Case and Angus Deaton believe the health-care system is partly to blame, and the coronavirus is highlighting the broader dangers American society is facing.
jamajka
mode: Calm
- Член од
- 28 април 2007
- Мислења
- 19.645
- Поени од реакции
- 27.609
Нема обични луѓе на протестите, никогаш немало... Протестите се организирани од една структура, немаат никаква издржаност и не ги претставуваат огромнот мнозинство од обичните луѓе во САД кои не се за никаква промена, а најмалку земјата да им стане комунистичка. Црнците излагаат што да пљачкаат, што ради црн Исус, што ради оштетата или доживотното загарантирано месечно примање што им го ветуваат... Самиот кажа, тоа се 10% екстремисти кои не го претставуваат народот, пошто таму има све освен нормален народ...@jamajka @Bafra @Darling @stratUs
Ова е суштината на протестите, кај обичните луѓе. Политичарите само ги злоупотребуваат и канализираат за сопствени потреби. Вие можете да дебатирате до сто и едно и назад за ситници што се случиле, но тоа е само да се разводни дискусијата од главните проблеми.
What's Wrong With America?: "The Despair Is Smoldering in Society"
Millions of Americans have seen their wages stagnate for decades, even as the wealthiest have grown fantastically rich. The economists Anne Case and Angus Deaton believe the health-care system is partly to blame, and the coronavirus is highlighting the broader dangers American society is facing.
Без разлика што и да не чини...
Darling
High Value
Ne, sustinata na protestite e rasna. BLM ne e nikako povrzano so toa sho e spomenato vo tekstot.@jamajka @Bafra @Darling @stratUs
Ова е суштината на протестите, кај обичните луѓе. Политичарите само ги злоупотребуваат и канализираат за сопствени потреби. Вие можете да дебатирате до сто и едно и назад за ситници што се случиле, но тоа е само да се разводни дискусијата од главните проблеми.
What's Wrong With America?: "The Despair Is Smoldering in Society"
Millions of Americans have seen their wages stagnate for decades, even as the wealthiest have grown fantastically rich. The economists Anne Case and Angus Deaton believe the health-care system is partly to blame, and the coronavirus is highlighting the broader dangers American society is facing.
Demokratite igraat na tribalizam, podelba i manipuliraat so simpatiite na svoite glasachi.
Tekstot kako tekst, ne spomna nisto novo, so pola od rabotite vo nego se soglasuvam. Sakav samo da go izdvojam ovoj mal del.
Kako koincidencija, istata partija koja go oformi KKK.
@jamajka @Bafra @Darling @stratUs
Ова е суштината на протестите, кај обичните луѓе. Политичарите само ги злоупотребуваат и канализираат за сопствени потреби. Вие можете да дебатирате до сто и едно и назад за ситници што се случиле, но тоа е само да се разводни дискусијата од главните проблеми.
What's Wrong With America?: "The Despair Is Smoldering in Society"
Millions of Americans have seen their wages stagnate for decades, even as the wealthiest have grown fantastically rich. The economists Anne Case and Angus Deaton believe the health-care system is partly to blame, and the coronavirus is highlighting the broader dangers American society is facing.
Не ја отварам темава, ниту знам што сте пишувале во неа, ниту имам претстава што би значел насловот.
Ама како вообичаено за тебе, пак си даваш автоголови. Претходно ми беше смешен, а сега сум збунет, дали ти тоа почнуваш да сфаќаш и прифаќаш кој е директен виновник за кризите и неефикасен систем, или пак си пиел тамифлу, па халуцинираш нешто...
Ова што го кажуваш, јас милион пати сум го докажал, а ти си бил тој што си контрирал, за сега да потврдиш:
И не само што ги злоупотребуваат, туку се директни виновници/ причинители. За народот да почне да се буни, треба да му е лошо, да има проблем, а единствена причина за тоа, се одговорните во системот, нивното корумптивно работење, неисполнети ветувања, ретардирани одлуки за решавање на проблеми, кои стануваат причина за идните поголеми проблеми.
И не туку цитирајте германци, тие се во огромни лајна, нека напишат за нивниот двор, ако смеат. Допрва нив ги чекаат проблеми.
Штом Wirecard сметководствено лажеле за 2 милијарди долари, ни тие веќе не се репер за сигурност.
- Член од
- 13 јули 2006
- Мислења
- 15.722
- Поени од реакции
- 18.775
@jamajka од овие гомна ќе се излези само со инветивни економисти, а тоа нема да бидат конзервативци. Баткава уште нема диплома, ама со неговото размислување го следат од Feds, голем број на новинари за економија, и советници на политичариве.
Кога ти велам дека се фаќаш на јадицата на стереотипи од Fox и Reddit, ти не ми веруваш. Берни е многу повеќе од тоа што пробуваат да му залепат тие, а воедно и ти на Кајгана.
Кога ти велам дека се фаќаш на јадицата на стереотипи од Fox и Reddit, ти не ми веруваш. Берни е многу повеќе од тоа што пробуваат да му залепат тие, а воедно и ти на Кајгана.
- Член од
- 13 јули 2006
- Мислења
- 15.722
- Поени од реакции
- 18.775
Глобализација грешка во чекори
getpocket.com
Оригиналниот текст на кој што се повикува го ископирав од blomberg затоа што е позади paywall.
This column is adapted from a chapter in “Meeting Globalization’s Challenges” (Princeton University Press), a collection of papers by scholars who contributed to a conference at the International Monetary Fund on Oct. 11, 2017. The book will be published on Nov. 4.
Concerns about adverse effects from globalization aren’t new. As U.S. income inequality began rising in the 1980s, many commentators were quick to link this new phenomenon to another new phenomenon: the rise of manufactured exports from newly industrializing economies.
Economists took these concerns seriously. Standard models of international trade say that trade can have large effects on income distribution: A famous 1941 paper showed how trading with a labor-abundant economy can reduce wages, even if national income grows.
And so during the 1990s, a number of economists, myself included, tried to figure out how much the changing trade landscape was contributing to rising inequality. They generally concluded that the effect was relatively modest and not the central factor in the widening income gap. So academic interest in the possible adverse effects of trade, while it never went away, waned.
In the past few years, however, worries about globalization have shot back to the top of the agenda, partly due to new research and partly due to the political shocks of Brexit and U.S. President Donald Trump. And as one of the people who helped shape the 1990s consensus — that the contribution of rising trade to rising inequality was real but modest — it seems appropriate for me to ask now what we missed.
The 1990s Consensus
There was confusion and debate during the mid-1990s over how to use data on trade to assess wage impacts. Most studies focused on the volume of trade and the amount of labor and other resources embedded in imports and exports. Some economists objected to this approach, preferring to focus on prices rather than quantities.
What eventually emerged was a “but for” approach: asking how different wages would have been but for the rise of manufactured exports from developing countries — increases that were minimal in 1970 but higher by the mid-1990s. It turned out that imports of manufactured goods from developing countries, while much larger than in the past, were still small relative to the size of advanced economies — around 2% of their gross domestic products. This wasn’t enough to cause more than a modest change in relative wages. The effect wasn’t trivial, but it wasn’t big enough to be a central economic story, either.
Hyperglobalization
These assessments of the impact of trade made around 1995, inevitably relying on data from a couple of years earlier, were probably correct in finding modest effects. In retrospect, however, trade flows in the early 1990s were just the start of something much bigger, or what a 2013 paper by economists Arvind Subramanian and Martin Kessler called hyperglobalization.
Until the 1980s, it was arguable that the growth of world trade since World War II had mainly reflected a dismantling of the trade barriers erected before the war; world trade as a share of world GDP was only slightly higher than it had been in 1913. Over the next two decades, however, both the volume and nature of trade moved into uncharted territory.
This chart shows one indicator of this change: manufactured exports from developing countries, measured as a share of world GDP. What seemed in the early 1990s like a major disturbance in the trade force was just the beginning.
Something Was Happening
Developing country exports of manufactured goods as a percentage of world GDP
Source: World Bank
What caused this huge surge in what was, in the 1990s, still a fairly novel form of trade? The answer probably includes a combination of technology and policy. Freight containerization was not exactly new, but it took time for businesses to realize how the reduction in transshipping costs made it possible to move labor-intensive parts of the production process overseas. Meanwhile, China made a dramatic shift from central planning to a market economy focused on exports.
Since manufactured exports from developing countries, measured as a share of the world economy, are now triple what they were in the mid-1990s, should we conclude that the effect on income distribution has also tripled? Probably not, for at least two reasons.
First, a significant part of the increase in developing-country exports reflects the rapid growth of trade among the modernizing economies of Asia, Africa and Latin America. That’s an important story, but it’s not relevant to the impact on advanced-country workers. Even more important, though, the nature of this trade growth — involving goods made by both unskilled and highly skilled workers — means that the value of the labor involved in North-South trade hasn’t risen nearly as fast as the volume.
Consider two cases: imports of apparel from Bangladesh and imports of iPhones from China. In the first instance, we are in effect importing the services of less educated workers, putting downward pressure on the demand for such workers in the U.S. In the second case, though, most of the value of the iPhone reflects work done in high-wage, high-education countries like Japan; we are in effect importing skilled as well as unskilled labor, so the impact on income distribution should be much smaller.
Despite these qualifications, it’s clear that the impact of developing-country exports grew much more between 1995 and 2010 than the 1990s consensus imagined possible, which may be one reason concerns about globalization made a comeback.
Trade Imbalances
One contrast between the way scholars measure globalization’s impact and the way the broader public looks at it — the approach taken by Trump, for example — is the focus on trade imbalances. The public tends to see trade surpluses or deficits as determining winners and losers. But the economic trade models that underlay the 1990s consensus gave no role to trade imbalances at all.
The economists’ approach is almost certainly right for the long run, both because countries must pay their way eventually, and because trade imbalances mainly affect the relative shares of traded and nontraded sectors in employment, with no clear effect on the overall demand for labor. Yet rapid changes in trade balances can cause serious problems of adjustment — a broader theme that I’ll return to shortly.
Consider, in particular, the comparison between the U.S. non-oil trade balance (which is overwhelmingly manufactured goods) and U.S. manufacturing employment:
The 2000 Import Shock
A lot of factory-job losses in the 2000s can be blamed on worsening trade deficits
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Until the late 1990s, employment in manufacturing, although steadily falling as a share of total employment, had remained more or less flat in absolute terms. But manufacturing employment fell off a cliff after 2000, and this decline corresponded to a sharp increase in the non-oil deficit.
Does the surge in the trade deficit explain the fall in employment? Yes, a lot of it. A reasonable estimate is that the deficit surge reduced the share of manufacturing in GDP by around 1.5 percentage points, or more than 10%, which means that it explains more than half the roughly 20% decline in manufacturing employment between 1997 and 2005.
This is over a relatively short time period and focuses on absolute employment, not the employment share. Trade deficits explain only a small part of the long-term shift toward a service economy. But soaring imports did impose a shock on some U.S. workers, which may have helped cause the globalization backlash.
Rapid Globalization and Disruption
The pro-globalization consensus of the 1990s, which concluded that trade contributed little to rising inequality, relied on models that asked how the growth of trade had affected the incomes of broad classes of workers, such as those who didn’t go to college. It’s possible, and probably even correct, to think of these models as accurate in the long run. Consensus economists didn’t turn much to analytic methods that focus on workers in particular industries and communities, which would have given a better picture of short-run trends. This was, I now believe, a major mistake — one in which I shared a hand.
It should have been obvious that the politics of globalization were likely to be much more influenced by the experience of individual sectors that gained or lost from shifting trade flows than by big questions of how trade affects the global blue-collar/white-collar wage gap or the broad statistical measure of inequality known as the aggregate Gini coefficient.
This is where the now-famous 2013 analysis of the “China shock” by David Autor, David Dorn and Gordon Hanson comes in. What they mainly did was shift focus from broad questions of global income distribution to the effects of rapid import growth on local labor markets, showing that these effects were large and persistent. This represented a new and important insight.
To make partial excuses for those of us who failed to consider these issues 25 years ago, at the time we had no way to know that either the hyperglobalization that began in the 1990s or the trade-deficit surge a decade later were going to happen. And without the combination of these developments, the China shock would have been much smaller. Still, we missed a crucial part of the story.
A Case for Protectionism?
What else did the 1990s consensus miss? A lot. Developing-country exports of manufactured goods grew far beyond their level at the time that consensus emerged. The combination of this rapid growth and surging trade imbalances meant that globalization produced far more disruption and cost for some workers than the consensus had envisaged.
Does this mean that Trump is right and a trade war would be in the interests of workers hurt by globalization?
No. This answer is based not so much on some rigid commitment to free trade as on the nature of the losses that globalization imposed. The problem with surging globalization wasn’t so much changing demand for labor as the disruption that was caused by some of the most rapid changes in history. Rapid change now appears to be largely behind us: Many indicators suggest that hyperglobalization was a one-time event, and that trade has more or less stabilized relative to world GDP. You can see it leveling off in the first chart above.
As a result, major disruptions now would be more likely to come from an attempt to reverse globalization than from leaving the current trade regime in place. At this point, millions of decisions about where to put plants, and where to move and take jobs, have been made on the assumption that the open world trading system will continue. Making that assumption false, by raising tariffs and forcing a contraction of world trade, would set off a whole new wave of disruption along with a whole new set of winners and losers.
So while the 1990s consensus on the effect of globalization hasn’t stood the test of time, its shortcomings don’t make a case for protectionism now. We might have done things differently if we had known what was coming, but that’s not a good reason to turn back the clock.
Economists on the Run
Paul Krugman and other mainstream trade experts are now admitting that they were wrong about globalization: It hurt American workers far more than they thought it would.
Оригиналниот текст на кој што се повикува го ископирав од blomberg затоа што е позади paywall.
This column is adapted from a chapter in “Meeting Globalization’s Challenges” (Princeton University Press), a collection of papers by scholars who contributed to a conference at the International Monetary Fund on Oct. 11, 2017. The book will be published on Nov. 4.
Concerns about adverse effects from globalization aren’t new. As U.S. income inequality began rising in the 1980s, many commentators were quick to link this new phenomenon to another new phenomenon: the rise of manufactured exports from newly industrializing economies.
Economists took these concerns seriously. Standard models of international trade say that trade can have large effects on income distribution: A famous 1941 paper showed how trading with a labor-abundant economy can reduce wages, even if national income grows.
And so during the 1990s, a number of economists, myself included, tried to figure out how much the changing trade landscape was contributing to rising inequality. They generally concluded that the effect was relatively modest and not the central factor in the widening income gap. So academic interest in the possible adverse effects of trade, while it never went away, waned.
In the past few years, however, worries about globalization have shot back to the top of the agenda, partly due to new research and partly due to the political shocks of Brexit and U.S. President Donald Trump. And as one of the people who helped shape the 1990s consensus — that the contribution of rising trade to rising inequality was real but modest — it seems appropriate for me to ask now what we missed.
The 1990s Consensus
There was confusion and debate during the mid-1990s over how to use data on trade to assess wage impacts. Most studies focused on the volume of trade and the amount of labor and other resources embedded in imports and exports. Some economists objected to this approach, preferring to focus on prices rather than quantities.
What eventually emerged was a “but for” approach: asking how different wages would have been but for the rise of manufactured exports from developing countries — increases that were minimal in 1970 but higher by the mid-1990s. It turned out that imports of manufactured goods from developing countries, while much larger than in the past, were still small relative to the size of advanced economies — around 2% of their gross domestic products. This wasn’t enough to cause more than a modest change in relative wages. The effect wasn’t trivial, but it wasn’t big enough to be a central economic story, either.
Hyperglobalization
These assessments of the impact of trade made around 1995, inevitably relying on data from a couple of years earlier, were probably correct in finding modest effects. In retrospect, however, trade flows in the early 1990s were just the start of something much bigger, or what a 2013 paper by economists Arvind Subramanian and Martin Kessler called hyperglobalization.
Until the 1980s, it was arguable that the growth of world trade since World War II had mainly reflected a dismantling of the trade barriers erected before the war; world trade as a share of world GDP was only slightly higher than it had been in 1913. Over the next two decades, however, both the volume and nature of trade moved into uncharted territory.
This chart shows one indicator of this change: manufactured exports from developing countries, measured as a share of world GDP. What seemed in the early 1990s like a major disturbance in the trade force was just the beginning.
Something Was Happening
Developing country exports of manufactured goods as a percentage of world GDP
Source: World Bank
What caused this huge surge in what was, in the 1990s, still a fairly novel form of trade? The answer probably includes a combination of technology and policy. Freight containerization was not exactly new, but it took time for businesses to realize how the reduction in transshipping costs made it possible to move labor-intensive parts of the production process overseas. Meanwhile, China made a dramatic shift from central planning to a market economy focused on exports.
Since manufactured exports from developing countries, measured as a share of the world economy, are now triple what they were in the mid-1990s, should we conclude that the effect on income distribution has also tripled? Probably not, for at least two reasons.
First, a significant part of the increase in developing-country exports reflects the rapid growth of trade among the modernizing economies of Asia, Africa and Latin America. That’s an important story, but it’s not relevant to the impact on advanced-country workers. Even more important, though, the nature of this trade growth — involving goods made by both unskilled and highly skilled workers — means that the value of the labor involved in North-South trade hasn’t risen nearly as fast as the volume.
Consider two cases: imports of apparel from Bangladesh and imports of iPhones from China. In the first instance, we are in effect importing the services of less educated workers, putting downward pressure on the demand for such workers in the U.S. In the second case, though, most of the value of the iPhone reflects work done in high-wage, high-education countries like Japan; we are in effect importing skilled as well as unskilled labor, so the impact on income distribution should be much smaller.
Despite these qualifications, it’s clear that the impact of developing-country exports grew much more between 1995 and 2010 than the 1990s consensus imagined possible, which may be one reason concerns about globalization made a comeback.
Trade Imbalances
One contrast between the way scholars measure globalization’s impact and the way the broader public looks at it — the approach taken by Trump, for example — is the focus on trade imbalances. The public tends to see trade surpluses or deficits as determining winners and losers. But the economic trade models that underlay the 1990s consensus gave no role to trade imbalances at all.
The economists’ approach is almost certainly right for the long run, both because countries must pay their way eventually, and because trade imbalances mainly affect the relative shares of traded and nontraded sectors in employment, with no clear effect on the overall demand for labor. Yet rapid changes in trade balances can cause serious problems of adjustment — a broader theme that I’ll return to shortly.
Consider, in particular, the comparison between the U.S. non-oil trade balance (which is overwhelmingly manufactured goods) and U.S. manufacturing employment:
The 2000 Import Shock
A lot of factory-job losses in the 2000s can be blamed on worsening trade deficits
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Until the late 1990s, employment in manufacturing, although steadily falling as a share of total employment, had remained more or less flat in absolute terms. But manufacturing employment fell off a cliff after 2000, and this decline corresponded to a sharp increase in the non-oil deficit.
Does the surge in the trade deficit explain the fall in employment? Yes, a lot of it. A reasonable estimate is that the deficit surge reduced the share of manufacturing in GDP by around 1.5 percentage points, or more than 10%, which means that it explains more than half the roughly 20% decline in manufacturing employment between 1997 and 2005.
This is over a relatively short time period and focuses on absolute employment, not the employment share. Trade deficits explain only a small part of the long-term shift toward a service economy. But soaring imports did impose a shock on some U.S. workers, which may have helped cause the globalization backlash.
Rapid Globalization and Disruption
The pro-globalization consensus of the 1990s, which concluded that trade contributed little to rising inequality, relied on models that asked how the growth of trade had affected the incomes of broad classes of workers, such as those who didn’t go to college. It’s possible, and probably even correct, to think of these models as accurate in the long run. Consensus economists didn’t turn much to analytic methods that focus on workers in particular industries and communities, which would have given a better picture of short-run trends. This was, I now believe, a major mistake — one in which I shared a hand.
It should have been obvious that the politics of globalization were likely to be much more influenced by the experience of individual sectors that gained or lost from shifting trade flows than by big questions of how trade affects the global blue-collar/white-collar wage gap or the broad statistical measure of inequality known as the aggregate Gini coefficient.
This is where the now-famous 2013 analysis of the “China shock” by David Autor, David Dorn and Gordon Hanson comes in. What they mainly did was shift focus from broad questions of global income distribution to the effects of rapid import growth on local labor markets, showing that these effects were large and persistent. This represented a new and important insight.
To make partial excuses for those of us who failed to consider these issues 25 years ago, at the time we had no way to know that either the hyperglobalization that began in the 1990s or the trade-deficit surge a decade later were going to happen. And without the combination of these developments, the China shock would have been much smaller. Still, we missed a crucial part of the story.
A Case for Protectionism?
What else did the 1990s consensus miss? A lot. Developing-country exports of manufactured goods grew far beyond their level at the time that consensus emerged. The combination of this rapid growth and surging trade imbalances meant that globalization produced far more disruption and cost for some workers than the consensus had envisaged.
Does this mean that Trump is right and a trade war would be in the interests of workers hurt by globalization?
No. This answer is based not so much on some rigid commitment to free trade as on the nature of the losses that globalization imposed. The problem with surging globalization wasn’t so much changing demand for labor as the disruption that was caused by some of the most rapid changes in history. Rapid change now appears to be largely behind us: Many indicators suggest that hyperglobalization was a one-time event, and that trade has more or less stabilized relative to world GDP. You can see it leveling off in the first chart above.
As a result, major disruptions now would be more likely to come from an attempt to reverse globalization than from leaving the current trade regime in place. At this point, millions of decisions about where to put plants, and where to move and take jobs, have been made on the assumption that the open world trading system will continue. Making that assumption false, by raising tariffs and forcing a contraction of world trade, would set off a whole new wave of disruption along with a whole new set of winners and losers.
So while the 1990s consensus on the effect of globalization hasn’t stood the test of time, its shortcomings don’t make a case for protectionism now. We might have done things differently if we had known what was coming, but that’s not a good reason to turn back the clock.
jamajka
mode: Calm
- Член од
- 28 април 2007
- Мислења
- 19.645
- Поени од реакции
- 27.609
Јас пак ќе ти кажам, а ти како сакаш.... reddit воопшто не следам, ниту ме интересира, FOX пратам ради медиумскиот мрак во САД истовремено пратам и CNN like медиуми и RT... Сега веќе потпрестанав, зошто се потсмири ситуацијата. Премногу работи мејнстрим медиите ги преќутуваат... Работи кои не ги слушам на RT и на Fox, туку ги слушам од луѓе директно од таму... Го пратив тука или во другата тема, серијалот за Сан Франциско, од Такер... Мене тој серијал не ми излезе, па јас да го барам, туку слики и видеа лични ми прати клиент од СФ, па јас барајќи некакви информации, не ги најдов во CNN, туку кај Такер у Фокс.. Јас никогаш не сум бил Фан на Трамп, ама никогаш, сум го гледал како инструмент, кој ми помага во мојот анти-американски став, за да те тролам тебе, батеман не-сум-јас и уште некој кој ќе се најде на патот. Клиентите ми се од СФ и Њујорк, знаеш ти нивната ориентација, IT sector, метропола и нивниот став кон Трамп, нешто слично како тебе... Но сега не е баш таква ситуацијата, тие луѓе се свртеа кон Трамп, не дека Трамп им е мил, туку дека го гледаат како единствен излез од ова што ги снајде.. Сега и јас почнав да го пратам Трамп, што збори, кој е позади него, почнав да ги прегледувам тролањата што му ги прават ЦНН лајк медиумите и да ги барам оригиналните видеа и говори. И уствари сега гледам дека Трамп не е ни 1/5 од тоа што го прават. Тој е шоумен, трча ко прле пред магаре, ама не е таков каков што сакаат да го престават.... Па кога ќе го погледнам Бајден и неговите говори, и кога ќе видам како го претставуваат... Не ме зезај... И така дојдов до некои имиња кои стојат позади Трамп, попут Џеф Сешнс, кому надворешната политика речиси е идентична со моите ставови во врска со интервенцијата во Југославија, војната во Украина, Сирија, Либија...@jamajka од овие гомна ќе се излези само со инветивни економисти, а тоа нема да бидат конзервативци. Баткава уште нема диплома, ама со неговото размислување го следат од Feds, голем број на новинари за економија, и советници на политичариве.
Кога ти велам дека се фаќаш на јадицата на стереотипи од Fox и Reddit, ти не ми веруваш. Берни е многу повеќе од тоа што пробуваат да му залепат тие, а воедно и ти на Кајгана.
Така да можеби е редно во ваква една ситауција да се запрашаш дали можеби ти ги следиш исправните медиуми...
И кога станува збор за левицата, поготово таа левица либтардска во САД, човек треба да е доста претпазлив.. Начините на делување им се во најмала рака морално дискутабилни, cancel culture итн... злоупотребата на црнците евидентна... и директно се против Американската култура таква каква што е... Не дека мене ме боли стапот за Америка, ако сакаат нека пропаднат, туку и без да ги рачунам личните интереси кои ги имам, тоа што се проповеда ќе донесе такви потреси што биди сигурен дека нема да не одмине и нас. Можеби на долгорочен план, ќе испаднеме некаков ќар, но ако треба до тој ќар да се пројде низ крв, тоа не би бил мојот посакуван избор. И башка во една таква ситауција, све ти е ставено на коцка. Знаеш дека јас сум, иако националист (знам дека ти изгледа несвојствено, поради континуираното црнење, меѓутоа национализмот не е сам по себе агресивен) по убедување, заложник за мир и стабилност.
Единствено еве некоја шанса давам за Берни (со крајни резерви), дека ете Жижек на некој начин стои позади него. Да не се разбереме погрешно, мене не ми се допаѓа идеологијата на Жижек (денеска на темава со демократија ме натераа да гледам видео со Петерсон па на крај се изнагледав левичарски видеа со Жижек) , туку едноставно како левица, се одвојува од класичните либтардски левичари.
Последно уредено:
Инветивни економисти .... што ли подразбираш под ова, што ли очекуваш од нив, што побогу може економиста да измисли, што претходно во историјата не е пробано
Баткава уште не испилен, за тебе сигурно е инветивен економиста.
А можеби баш поради "инветивните" економисти кои немаат допир со реалноста, се полошо и полошо е.
Инветивни економисти
Еве ти еден неинвентивен економиста, обичен реален практичар. Изборот е наш, сакаме бесплатен ручек сега, гарантирано после ние и нашите наследници ќе си платиме огромна сума, или ...
Точна констатација, тоа си е човекот, затоа и е поставен, да замајува народ, додека си тече агендата. Од Буш постариот, претседателите имаат овластувања како кралеви, па доколку Трамп имал некоја намера за САД и остатокот од светот да ги врати во колосек, без проблем ќе го направеше тоа, а не театар за народ.
jamajka
mode: Calm
- Член од
- 28 април 2007
- Мислења
- 19.645
- Поени од реакции
- 27.609
Позади секој Амерички претседател стоела и стои војска експерти и паметни личности. Ниеден претседател не бил оставен сам на себе. Досега што истражував кој стои позади Трамп го запазив Џеф Сешнс, кој уствари не се ни експонира многу. А и искрено немам време многу да се замарам околу моменталната Америчката политичка сцена... и ова што го правам е премногу веќе
Иначе ситуацијата, ако веќе неможе да се врати на старо, тогаш статус кво засега мене лично повеќе ми одговара одколку да започне поголем хаос.
- Член од
- 13 јули 2006
- Мислења
- 15.722
- Поени од реакции
- 18.775
Darling
High Value
Taka e, ni treba poekstremno od Berni.
What can go wrong?
Gledaj molim te koj otisol, prince Charles, im propaga krunata od koga brat mu e eden od najgolemite klienti na pedo island. Milioni kralski funti potroseni na zlostavuvanje devojcinja.
Se sobrale bogatashi na kup, da i kazuvaat na srednata i niskata klasa kako da ziveat.
Mrsh.
- Член од
- 15 ноември 2013
- Мислења
- 1.601
- Поени од реакции
- 2.868
А што демек Берни многу екстремен е?
И што може да тргне наопаку од досега што е?