Stage Directions of an Operetta. Or How President Zelenskyy Replaces the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU
On the afternoon of July 15, 2026, an article appeared on the Ukrainska Pravda portal describing a meeting between President Zelenskyy and MPs from his Servant of the People party, organized ahead of a vote to appoint a new government. Zelenskyy reportedly informed them that "Fedorov has a systemic conflict with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyi, and the army that cannot be resolved," which is why he would be dismissed from his post as Minister of Defense. Additionally, Zelenskyy allegedly stated that "both Fedorov and Syrskyi should be dismissed, but currently he cannot do so in Syrskyi's case."
The following day (July 16), the dismissed Fedorov called a press conference where he leveled a series of serious allegations against Syrskyi. At the same time, his advisor, Sternenko, called on people to take to the streets. On the first day in Kyiv, a few hundred people gathered at Ivan Franko Square near the Presidential Office. Over the following days (July 17 and 18), the number of protesters reached 2,000–3,000. Interestingly, the few small-scale protests with cardboard signs taking place at the same time outside TCK (military recruitment) offices were immediately broken up by the police. As we can see, protesting against Syrskyi is allowed, but protesting against mobilization methods is not.
Right after Saturday's largest protest of around 3,000 people—which can still hardly be called "mass" in a city of nearly three million like Kyiv—Zelenskyy posted a video on his social media announcing that he had "heard what the people are saying" and promised that decisions regarding the army would be made. So, it turns out nothing stands in the way of dismissing Syrskyi after all. Why couldn't it have been done two days earlier then?
The next day, Zelenskyy held phone calls (via videoconference) with Gen. Drapatyi and Apostol, and met in person with Gen. Horbatiuk. The latter received an initial offer to become the new Chief of the General Staff, and I believe he agreed. Horbatiuk is one of the last "Zaluzhnyi men" remaining in the General Staff, although he has been clearly sidelined since 2024. Drapatyi, on the other hand, was offered the position of the new Commander-in-Chief and perhaps tentatively agreed as well—or at least did not say a direct "no." He was supposed to appear in person in Kyiv the next day to continue talks at the Presidential Office.
On the morning of July 20, meetings took place at the Presidential Office between Zelenskyy & Horbatiuk, and Zelenskyy & Drapatyi. Horbatiuk confirmed his willingness to take the post of Chief of the General Staff. According to sources connected to the Zelenskyy and Fedorov camps, Drapatyi was expected to do the same—they were certain of it. From early morning, Sternenko was excitedly posting that Syrskyi's dismissal was imminent, as were other Ukrainian accounts tied to the government. Around 2:00 PM, an excited DeepState reported that Syrskyi was out. However, moments later, well-informed journalist Olha Kyrylenko wrote on her Telegram channel that Drapatyi had refused to become Commander-in-Chief. Shortly after, Syrskyi himself denied the news of his dismissal via the official General Staff account. It took another 20 minutes for the Presidential Office to break its silence. Budanov confirmed in a convoluted manner that no change in top command had taken place, but that "work is ongoing."
It seems to me that Kyrylenko's reports regarding Drapatyi's refusal are true. I am inclined to believe this because the Zelenskyy camp was clearly anxious to wrap up the entire operation of replacing the commander-in-chief as quickly as possible—preferably yesterday. Hence the burst of joy from DeepState, Sternenko, and others, testifying to their certainty that the "good news" was about to be announced. They had leaked information that the decision on Zelenskyy's end was made; they just failed to foresee that Drapatyi would ultimately refuse.
What next? Out of all the names floating around yesterday as potential successors to Gen. Syrskyi as Commander-in-Chief of the AFU—feed to journalists as controlled leaks from the Presidential Office—only two are truly serious:
- Gen. Mykhailo Drapatyi,
- Gen. Viktor Nikoluk.
As explained above, rumors say Drapatyi refused—perhaps he can eventually be persuaded, though I frankly doubt it. In this situation, that leaves Gen. Nikoluk, the current head of Operational Command "East." The problem is that Nikoluk has so far been considered "Syrskyi's man," belonging to his circle of closest, loyal associates. Will he agree to take the position, or will he refuse—albeit for different reasons—just as Drapatyi allegedly did?
The remaining names are hogwash (Biletskyi, Prokopenko, Obolenskyi), candidates for chief of staff (Horbatiuk), or people likely to refuse out of loyalty to Syrskyi (Apostol). It is not impossible that Zelenskyy will struggle to find someone among currently active senior officers and will be forced to look among those who have transitioned to the reserve. Most of them are former, close associates of Gen. Zaluzhnyi.
To sum up: the crisis is dragging on, which could ultimately harm the internal cohesion of the AFU, particularly along the junior officer–senior officer line. Yet Zelenskyy is clearly determined to remove Syrskyi, regardless of the disastrous consequences—starting with the fact that along with Syrskyi, around 50 other senior officers from his immediate, loyal circle will have to leave. Most of them currently hold positions as commanders of corps and higher operational formations. And all of this is supposed to be carried out in the middle of a Russian summer-autumn offensive.
I still don't know why the conflict between Syrskyi and Zelenskyy broke out in the first place. The duo had worked closely together since 2022, practically from the beginning of the war. Syrskyi was one of the core pillars supporting Zelenskyy's authority over the past three years, so the president is taking a massive risk trying to remove him. It is already clear that the actual reason is neither Fedorov nor the allegations he raised. What, then, are the real reasons for this conflict erupting right now?
Below: a photo from yesterday's special conference featuring President Zelenskyy, the Head of his Office, the Minister of Defense, members of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, Generals Syrskyi and Hnatov, alongside various AFU commanders at the corps level and above, convened in this format by Zelenskyy for the first time. It is an interesting photo for two reasons:
- It is striking that there are far too many participants for a table of that size; as a result, they are sitting unnaturally squeezed together. Some officers ran out of room at the main table and have to sit off to the side, with only their legs visible. It looks unprofessional and shows that the meeting was put together in a hurry, completely contradicting Budanov's claims that "the situation is being handled professionally."
- Generals Syrskyi, Hnatov, and Drapatyi are sitting right next to each other. Horbatiuk is nowhere to be seen.