Тој експеримент ја промени Русија засекогаш, руското население е градско население (кое носи еден куп негативи) и е со тешки комплекси на пониска вредност према западот, слично и нивните елити, сеуште им се про-западни и сакаат да се партнери и рамни со Западот, кој не ги есапи.
Погледни ја само картата на Европа и Русија
Русија без Украина и Белорусија е буквално географски изолирана, ставена во џак.
Додади на тоа, дека без апсолутна победа на Русија во Украина ќе имаме веројатно востанија кои ќе се случат во муслиманските републики на Северен Кавказ
А тука е и демографскиот аспект
Russia’s Real Resource
Ask a Russian schoolkid what their country’s greatest treasure is, and they’ll probably say oil or gas. But the truth is harsher. The only resource that ever really mattered, and the one Russia can’t afford to lose, is people.
A thousand years ago, the forests and frozen plains east of the Vistula River in Poland remained thinly settled. Poor soil, harsh, endless winters, and the absence of natural trade routes made survival very difficult with medieval technology. West of that line, the picture was entirely different. Medieval Europe clustered around bustling market towns, where craftsmen, merchants, and monks packed into dense communities, and where goods and ideas traveled with equal ease.
That density brought growth, innovation… and death. In the 14th century, the Black Death alone wiped out up to half of Europe’s population, turning thriving cities into graveyards and halting development for over a century.
War finished the job. From the Thirty Years’ War to Napoleon’s campaigns, scarcely a decade passed without some European army ravaging the countryside. Violence was profitable and convenient. In many cases, in Western Europe, you only needed to march several days to plunder your neighbor. In Russia, it took months through the forest and frozen steppe.
Muscovy stood apart from that cycle of bloodshed. Towns like Kostroma or Vologda never saw a single foreign siege in three hundred years. They grew in relative peace while cities like Lützen and Leipzig burned and rebuilt again and again. Even when plague waves reached Russia, they thinned out but rarely shattered its scattered settlements.
The result? A demographic snowball.
By the early 19th century, the Russian Empire had an estimated 36 million people.
By 1850, that number hit 69 million.
By nineteen hundred, it soared to 133 million. A near-quadrupling in a single long lifetime.
The first full census in 1897 confirmed it: Russia was the largest nation in Europe, by a margin of thirty million.
Two 19th-century breakthroughs turned that raw headcount into real power. First, railroads stitched the countryside to the cities, from just sixteen miles of track in 1838 to over 31,000 miles by 1905. Suddenly, a bad harvest in Tambov didn’t mean famine, and an army regiment in Kiev could ride the steel rails all the way to the Pacific — to crush a local rebellion.
Second, modern medicine. When Russian physicians enforced handwashing in maternity wards, maternal deaths dropped nearly tenfold. Babies who once died began to survive. More infants lived. Fewer peasants starved. The empire’s human reservoir deepened. And the state dipped into that reservoir with gusto.
After defeating Napoleon, Russia kept over a million men permanently under arms. During the Crimean War, the number ballooned to 1.7 million, the largest standing force on earth. Losses were staggering.
• Borodino alone cost up to 42,000 Russian casualties.
• The Crimean campaign killed 113,000 more, most by disease.
And yet… the state barely flinched.
Even by 1905, little had changed. At Mukden and Tsushima, Russia lost 50,000 dead and 75,000 captured fighting Japan, and still, General Kuropatkin wrote: “Russia’s strength is inexhaustible.”
That confidence shaped everything:
• Want a city on the Baltic? Draft 40,000 peasants to haul granite. The villages will refill in a generation.
• Want influence in the Balkans? March half a million conscripts south. If 80,000 die of cholera, census records show their younger brothers are already fifteen and growing.
For two centuries, that arithmetic worked. But history has a cruel habit. The moment you believe a resource is infinite, is the moment it starts to run out.
The Century of Shrinking Generations
In the twentieth century, Russia kept playing by old rules, treating manpower like a bottomless stockpile, even as the supply of new people steadily shrank.
The decline began in the cities. A woman born around 1900 had, on average, seven children. Her daughters, born in the 1920s, had just two or three. Those born in the 1950s dipped below two, the first time in Russian history.
The post–World War II baby boom that packed strollers from Cleveland to Copenhagen never arrived east of the Vistula. Russia became one of the few European countries where demographers class the baby boom as “weak or absent.”
Why did Russia’s decline start a generation earlier than in Western Europe?
First, the cost of space. After Stalin’s industrialization drive, urban living space averaged just 5.6 square meters per person, barely the size of a prison cell with a hot plate. In Moscow’s kommunalki, dozens of strangers shared a kitchen, a toilet, and every bitter argument. When Khrushchev launched mass housing in 1957, the average rose to seven square meters, still half the French norm. Couples often delayed a second child simply because there was nowhere to put the crib.
Second, the missing men. World War II alone wiped out 26 million Soviet citizens, including at least 8 million soldiers. Add in the Gulag, collectivization, famines, and postwar purges, and the male population took a crushing hit. By 1950, the USSR had only 76 men for every 100 women of marriageable age. Women pulled double shifts, on factory floors and in ration lines, while Soviet abortion laws filled the gap. In 1965, the USSR recorded 5.5 million abortions, roughly three terminations for every live birth.
Third, the missing grandparents. Urbanization pulled young families into cities, but their parents stayed behind on collective farms. With no babushka to help raise toddlers, having three or four children became logistically impossible for two working parents.
And then people simply left.
• Between 1918 and 1922, two million fled with the White émigré wave. What had happened to them?
• After 1945, countless Soviet displaced persons, mostly POWs and forced laborers, refused repatriation.
• Starting in the 1970s, 1.6 million Jews and their relatives emigrated to Israel, the U.S., and Germany.
• Since 1992, a post-Soviet brain drain has removed two million professionals, hollowing out universities, labs, and research centers.
Between 1990 and 2024, Russia saw 54 million births. Had it simply held the replacement rate of 2.1, that number would have been 70 million.
Factor in the children those missing adults would be having now, and Russia in 2025 could have counted 165 million people instead of the official 146 million, enough to fill two more cities the size of Moscow.
But this isn’t a one-time loss. It’s a rolling echo. Every small generation grows up to have an even smaller one.
Yet Russia never adjusted its strategy. The Kremlin kept planning wars, megaprojects, and pension systems as if peasant families would go on producing an infantry squad per household.
They didn’t. They won’t. Because the key inputs—space, stability, and extended family—are gone.
The Vanishing Empire
When Russian officials talk about building a
“Russian World” stretching from Ukraine to Kamchatka and beyond, they’re still using nineteenth-century math, the kind where every new decade brought millions of extra subjects.
But today, Russia is shrinking, even on paper. The last confirmed fertility rate was 1.41 children per woman, a number that guarantees long-term population decline. And if you’ve seen websites claiming a sudden jump to 1.83 in 2024, don’t buy it. That figure comes from a misread UN projection. The actual UN numbers for Russia forecast just 1.46 for both 2024 and 2025.
Even those modest figures are padded. Until recently, Russian stats counted babies born to recent immigrants as if they were native Russians. And those newcomers aren’t few. Strip them out, and the fertility rate for ethnic Russians drops even further.
Want to see reality up close? Look at regions barely touched by Central Asian migration:
• Novgorod, last recorded fertility rate: 1.26
• Vladimir, 1.15
• Smolensk, 1.03
Barely half the replacement rate.
Novgorod alone has lost 30% of its population over the last 35 years, dropping from 750,000 to 550,000. Demographers expect another 200,000 to vanish by the 2040s, leaving a territory the size of Croatia with less than a tenth of Croatia’s population.
Roads, schools, hospitals, all built for a different century, will either be shutted or left to rot. No budget can sustain full services across empty forests.
The Kremlin knows there’s a huge problem with Russia’s population, but it can’t do anything about it. Because the only solution that could make a real difference is this: stop the war and give ordinary people — not the elites, but the average Mikhail and Masha — a sense that they can raise children without fear, with at least twenty years of economic stability ahead. Everyone remembers what the economic collapse of the 1990s looked like. And people can feel that hard times are coming again. So they do their own calculation: it’s easier to survive a crisis without small children.
The Kremlin has tried nearly everything, short of cloning. In 2007, the “maternity capital” voucher scheme bumped fertility by about 0.15 children per woman, but only by nudging some couples to have their second child sooner during the oil boom of 2008–2012. When that boom faded, lawmakers went after abortion access, floated mandatory gynecologist permission slips, and even banned “child-free propaganda” in 2024.
This year, they started offering lump-sum bonuses to pregnant schoolgirls and even launched a reality show, Mom at 16, urging teens to have babies now and finish their education later.
These measures make headlines. They don’t make babies. Because the deeper forces point the other way. The goverment just stopped publishing monthly birth figures, a silent admission that the future is too grim for public release.
Into this vacuum pour labor migrants, up to 14 million, mostly from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.
These countries are far poorer than Russia, and their fertility rates still hover around three children per woman. That’s why young men come to Russia looking for cash, and often bring their families.
Recently, Russian business groups floated the idea of bringing in up to one million Indian workers to fill labor gaps, a claim quickly denied by the Labor Ministry, which insists quotas for Indian citizens remain capped at around 72,000 for 2025. Still, the push reflects growing pressure from industries desperate for manpower as Russia’s working-age population shrinks. With native birth rates in freefall and war draining the younger male workforce, Moscow is quietly expanding labor migration programs, even as official rhetoric avoids admitting just how dependent the country has become on foreign hands.
Moscow needs them. To keep construction sites running. To prop up tax revenues. To delay pension fund collapse. To keep the military from running out of recruits.
But nationalist TV rails against them, claiming they’ll soon outnumber ethnic Russians. And in some parts of Moscow and nearby satellite towns, dense clusters of Asian families preserve their language and traditions rather than assimilate.
There’s no alternative. Without migrant labor, the system collapses. And if current trends hold, by the time today’s toddlers finish college, Russia will have 25 to 30 million Asian–born residents.
Factor in the high-birth North Caucasus, and Orthodox Slavs could become just one group among many, with Russian just one of many languages spoken on city buses.
That prospect terrifies a government whose legitimacy hinges on restoring a Russian empire. But instead of facing the numbers, officials trot out tired slogans about “traditional families” and promise ever-larger maternity payouts.
The math, however, is merciless. You can’t sustain imperial ambitions on a population base that melts away faster every year. And you certainly can’t revive it by throwing cash at pregnant teenagers, while your most educated citizens line up for one-way flights.
The Hollow Dragon
Will Russia lose the war in Ukraine because of its demographic collapse? The answer is complicated. Ukraine’s numbers are even harsher. In 2023, Statista put Ukraine’s fertility rate at 0.98, a historic low after war, blackouts, and mass flight shattered normal family life.
But holding conquered land? That’s a different challenge. Classic counter-insurgency doctrine says you need twenty security personnel per thousand inhabitants to control a hostile population. To hold all of pre-war Ukraine — now roughly 29 million people after displacement — Russia would need around 580,000 troops on the ground, and they’d have to keep them there for decades. That’s roughly the size of Russia’s entire force at the front today. And the draft pool for a vast country with exposed borders and scattered military bases? Just 1.27 million young men.
This dragon simply doesn’t have the body mass to swallow its prey.
But the men in charge are Cold War fossils, averaging seventy-one years old, convinced their power depends on looking dangerous. TV anchors still talk about victory parades in Warsaw and tell citizens they’re the luckiest people on Earth. One state-TV guest even urged schools to “prepare our children to fight, because this is World War III.”
The gap between their bravado and real life widens every month.
Yes, the dragon can still scorch towns on its borders. But inside? It’s hollowing out.
If this opened your eyes — share it. Not for me, but for those still clinging to the old myths about Russia’s future. Because in this essay, you saw why Russia’s real collapse won’t start with war or sanctions. It’s already happening in maternity wards, in empty classrooms, and in a shrinking, hollowed-out society.
