Војна во Украина (исклучиво воена перспектива)
- Креатор на темата Vanlok
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500 к жртви се бајка, исто како за скоро 1 милион руски загуби.
Ќе требаат многу години додека Украина остане без тие националистички настроени војски, бар со сегашново темпо на војување слаб-среден итензитет. Путин може и да не доживее да им се потроши човечкиот материјал за војување.
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Зошто е бајка, затоа гледам градовите им се како градови на духови и ловат луѓе по улици да ги праќаат на фронт. Ти исто како и оној @Ne_sum_ja експерти за днопертиза.
Vanlok
deus ex machina
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Белогоривка се водат тешки битки веќе пар години, едно од најсилните украински упоришта на тој дел од фронтот (и кое исто паѓа/падна)... Но нафо se жалат дека наеднаш „Русите бескомпромисно го бомбардираат“.
Автоматски споено мислење:
Љубезно продолжи во темата за јадење бурек. Оваа остави ја за ВОЕНИ РАБОТИ.
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Теоретски да но во пракса потешко. Првенствено Украина последен попис има направено во 2001 година, од тогаш државата се има соочено со: поголема смртност отколку новородени, драматичен пад на ТФР, миграција кон РФ/ЕУ, анексија на територии од страна на РФ како и огромен бран на миграција од 2022 до денес; никој не знае колку точно народ живее во Украина моментално, може само да се погодува. Понатаму, колкава е вистинската бројка на загинати и ранети во војната? Има само шпекулации, Зеленски кажа дека имале 31.000 загинати војници на почетокот на годинава во што се надевам дека барем на форумов не верува никој поради самообјаснувачки причини.
Трето, колку повеќе луѓе праќа Украина на фронт толку помалку е ефикасна државата, како на пример: помалку возачи на автобуси/камиони, помалку наставници, помалку работници, помалку доктори, помалку бирократи и чиновници, помалку градежници, помалку пожарникари, помалку хигиеничари, помалку пекари, месари, земјоделци... Од тоа што читам веќе се чувствува недостигот во некои дејности.
Продолжувам; минатата година Зеленски ги отпушти сите главни офицери задолжени за мобилизацијата што предизвика тотален хаос и блокада на регрутирањето а откако почна да се пеглаат овие недостатоци има неретко видеа од како регрутерите се напаѓани па и убиени од страна на потенцијалните војници што значи покрај криење, бегање на државата постои и најекстремната мерка.
Последно и најважно, како што самиот заклучи дека Русија ќе мора да го испотепа цело население на Украина за да прогласи победа (мислам дека е спремна на тоа), мислам дека добро прашање е дали може Украина да си дозволи целото население да и биде потепано со цел... со каква цел точно? Која е целта на Украина, да ги поврати границите од 1991? Дали верува некој во ова освен најголемите поддржувачи на Украина/САД? Украина ја спушти границата на мобилизација на 25 години а се зборува дека може да се намалува уште. Кога ќе создаваат нови поколенија овие луѓе ако се на фронт? Да додадам тука, Украина со новиот закон забрани завршеток на воениот рок, сите кои се мобилизирани ќе бидат на фронт до самиот крај на војната каков и да е тој.
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Situation west of Donetsk city: During the last four days Russian Army managed to capture Fermerska street & Alexandrovskoye farm base on the western part of Krasnogorivka. Combats with Ukrainian Army continue at the center of the town without changes.
Situation east of Chasov Yar: During the last days Russian Army made new advances on the dachas north of Kanal microdistrict. Clashes with Ukrainian Army continue along the railway and the eastern part of Kalinina.
Situation on eastern front: During the last four two days Russian Army made new advances southwest of Spirne and north of Vesele. Currently Russian forces are trying to capture the trench system located at the heights that overlook Rozdolivka from the northeast.
Situation on Velikonovoselkovskaya front: During the last days Russian Army made new advances in Staromaiorske taking control over 40% of the locality. In addition, new advances were made by Russian troops adjacent to the road towards Rivnopil.
Situation on Zaporizhia front: During the last two days Russian Army made new advances northwest of Verbove taking control over a series of trenches from Ukrainian Army.
Situation south of Bakhmut: Russian Army fully secured the village of Andriivka as Ukrainian Army continue towards the water canal.
Situation west of Avdivka: During the last five days Russian Army took control over the last part of Umanske.
Situation east of Chasov Yar: During the last days Russian Army made new advances on the dachas north of Kanal microdistrict. Clashes with Ukrainian Army continue along the railway and the eastern part of Kalinina.
Situation on eastern front: During the last four two days Russian Army made new advances southwest of Spirne and north of Vesele. Currently Russian forces are trying to capture the trench system located at the heights that overlook Rozdolivka from the northeast.
Situation on Velikonovoselkovskaya front: During the last days Russian Army made new advances in Staromaiorske taking control over 40% of the locality. In addition, new advances were made by Russian troops adjacent to the road towards Rivnopil.
Situation on Zaporizhia front: During the last two days Russian Army made new advances northwest of Verbove taking control over a series of trenches from Ukrainian Army.
Situation south of Bakhmut: Russian Army fully secured the village of Andriivka as Ukrainian Army continue towards the water canal.
Situation west of Avdivka: During the last five days Russian Army took control over the last part of Umanske.
Последно уредено:
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Situation southwest of Donetsk: Russian Army made small advances southwest of Novomykhailivka and inside Paraskoviivka.
Situation on Seversk front: During the last six days Ukrainian Army managed to recapture some positions north of Bilohorivka.
Situation on northeastern front: During the last four days Ukrainian army was able to regroup and re-enter the Vovchansk area north of the Vovcha River. This area was not actually secured by the Russian Army, although it was declared under their control after the Ukrainian withdrawal. The front lies between Horkoho, Hoholia and Olesia Dosvitnoho streets.
Situation on Seversk front: During the last six days Ukrainian Army managed to recapture some positions north of Bilohorivka.
Situation on northeastern front: During the last four days Ukrainian army was able to regroup and re-enter the Vovchansk area north of the Vovcha River. This area was not actually secured by the Russian Army, although it was declared under their control after the Ukrainian withdrawal. The front lies between Horkoho, Hoholia and Olesia Dosvitnoho streets.
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Волчанск ќе биде новиот Бахмут и Авдивка за украинциве
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Situation on northeastern front: Russian Army made new advances north of Kyslivka & entered in the first houses of Ivanivka.
Situation on Luhansk front: During the last week Russian Army managed to capture most of the locality of Berestove.
Situation north of Donetsk: During the last days Ukrainian Army retook new positions southeast of Yampolivka.
Situation south of Bakhmut: Russian Army began advancing south of Ivanivske. On the other hand, the situation around Klishchiivka was clarified. The southern height is contested or under Ukrainian control, the same happen with the further southern "houses".
Situation west of Avdivka: After the capturing of Umanske, Russian Army captured the southern forest belt.
Situation on Luhansk front: During the last week Russian Army managed to capture most of the locality of Berestove.
Situation north of Donetsk: During the last days Ukrainian Army retook new positions southeast of Yampolivka.
Situation south of Bakhmut: Russian Army began advancing south of Ivanivske. On the other hand, the situation around Klishchiivka was clarified. The southern height is contested or under Ukrainian control, the same happen with the further southern "houses".
Situation west of Avdivka: After the capturing of Umanske, Russian Army captured the southern forest belt.
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Situation in Kherson front: Over the past three weeks, Ukrainian Army has gradually moved from the village of Krynky to the neighbouring village of Kozachi Laheri. With the start of a new operation, Ukrainian forces completely abandoned Krinky and moved north and south-west. However, it cannot be said that the locality has been recaptured by Russian Army. The village is destroyed, and it is impossible to consolidate there.
The easy entry of Ukrainian troops into Kozachi Laheri is due to the lack of presence of Russian personnel there, in fact it is a reality that along the bank of the Dnieper there is no real Russian presence, which is to be found in the defences located a few kilometres inland.
It is hard to understand the Ukrainian insistence on holding the southern bridgehead, barely managing to take what might be considered vital or strategic objectives while losing troops to Russian artillery and drones operating quietly from the rear (despite some "experts" claiming that there are still hordes of soldiers assaulting Stalingrad-style positions). Nor does a goal of forcing the diversion of Russian reinforcements to this front make sense, as it is precisely Ukraine that is now forced to reinforce Kharkov and the Donbass because of dwindling troop reserves.
The easy entry of Ukrainian troops into Kozachi Laheri is due to the lack of presence of Russian personnel there, in fact it is a reality that along the bank of the Dnieper there is no real Russian presence, which is to be found in the defences located a few kilometres inland.
It is hard to understand the Ukrainian insistence on holding the southern bridgehead, barely managing to take what might be considered vital or strategic objectives while losing troops to Russian artillery and drones operating quietly from the rear (despite some "experts" claiming that there are still hordes of soldiers assaulting Stalingrad-style positions). Nor does a goal of forcing the diversion of Russian reinforcements to this front make sense, as it is precisely Ukraine that is now forced to reinforce Kharkov and the Donbass because of dwindling troop reserves.
Vanlok
deus ex machina
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Air Defence. Considerations.
Recent months have seen a significant increase in Ukraine's use of long-range flying bombs. They are the analogue of the famous Geran. In the Ukrainian case they have appeared in a wide variety of forms, including commercial propeller planes converted into unmanned attack devices. The target of...
Air Defence. Considerations.
The Right People ( TL Channel)May 22, 2024
Recent months have seen a significant increase in Ukraine's use of long-range flying bombs. They are the analogue of the famous Geran.
In the Ukrainian case they have appeared in a wide variety of forms, including commercial propeller planes converted into unmanned attack devices.
The target of the attacks have overwhelmingly been civilian infrastructure targets, especially of an economic nature in the energy resource extraction and processing sector.
Here it is quite interesting to see the Ukrainian response to the Russian Geran. A recent article published by the Wall Street Journal gives the following information about the recent effectiveness of the Ukrainian Air Defence, which now consists mainly of advanced Western systems and mobile point air defence groups. While the effectiveness of the air defence in the second half of 2023 reached 73%, the current effectiveness of the defence is only 46%.
However, this has not affected the effectiveness of the fight against drones (mainly Geran).
The reason is simple and shows that if the right solutions are taken, Russia can get rid of the problem of Ukrainian attacks inside Russia with relative ease.
The defences dealing with the threats are different.
As I mentioned the Ukrainian air defence consists of two components, the traditional SAM batteries, be they S-300, Patriot etc and the mobile anti-drone groups. On the missile side we see a greater sophistication of the Russian devices used (we can speak for example of X-101 missiles with different warheads or improvements such as built-in decoy systems) as well as a greater variety, for example in this 2024 the X-69 has started to be used which was responsible for destroying a power plant near Kiev and therefore under surveillance by Patriot and other systems.
On the other hand, the reduction of the Soviet defence stockpile is likely to have meant a loss of anti-aircraft coverage density that could not be countered by a greater sophistication of the available Western systems. Moreover, if we look at 2023, Ukraine would have both modern Western and Soviet-origin systems, and now only Western ones.
This explains the change in missiles.
The NO change in drones is explained in a similar way.
On the one hand, although the Gerans have been changing and becoming more sophisticated (better guidance, more noise-immune Kometa systems, some cases of optoelectronic guidance, better warheads).
But, despite these changes, most Geran remain the same or very similar. Relatively slow aircraft travelling at low altitude and without countermeasures. The improved Kometa system used has probably made them more resistant to Ukrainian electronic warfare systems, we also saw the use of the Ukrainian telephone network for drone guidance.
However the nature of the defence against them has not changed, once their route has been discovered or in the vicinity of the final target, Ukrainian mobile groups armed with a variety of short-range weapons (mainly machine guns and auto-cannons) interpose themselves between the drone and the target and manage to shoot them down.
For Geraniums this is a really difficult obstacle to overcome, there are models equipped with jet engines, but this makes them more expensive and it is likely that it is simply simpler to create a normal missile than one or two Geraniums of this type, or at least their number is much smaller than the simple variants. The advantage of the Geranium is how cheap it is, but if, in order to increase its survivability, its complexity has to be increased, its main advantage over other offensive systems simply disappears.
Russian case
At the same time we have to consider the damage capacity of these means, which is limited. In the case of attacks on energy infrastructure we can count on secondary explosions due to the highly flammable characteristics of the substances involved, but even so we have seen that most attacks have resulted in only minor damage, being repaired within days or weeks.
This contrasts, for example, with the recent Russian missile attack on the Ukrainian gas station at Bilche-Volitsa, which resulted in the total destruction of the infrastructure, judging by satellite images.
Several missiles with warheads weighing several hundred kilos were launched at the same time.
Achieving this level of destruction with individual drones with payloads rarely exceeding 100kg is virtually impossible. Launching huge waves of drones will attract a lot of attention and due to the weaknesses discussed about the Geran (applicable here) they will be easily tracked and destroyed.
I don't think it will be long before we see similar countermeasures on the Russian side. Moreover, these will probably be carried out with a greater degree of sophistication than the Ukrainian countermeasures, not only in terms of detection means, such as adjusting radar units on the ground and in the air (a capability that Ukraine lacks, except for NATO aircraft outside its direct territory).
But also in the nature of the means of shoot-down. Moreover, we have already seen this about a year ago, when Ukraine repeatedly hit buildings in Moscow.
Once the problem became too big to ignore, the Russian Ministry of Defence took measures that proved to be 100% effective, as no drone has ever again attacked Moscow or attempted to do so.
More sophisticated than the use of pick-up based mobile groups is the use of helicopters to shoot down drones, which we saw:
The Right People Z
First-person view of the destruction of the Ukrainian UJ-22 Airborne UAV from the 30-mm autocannon of the Mi-28 helicopter.
t.me
The Right People Z
"Pantsir-S" was installed on the main building of the Ministry of Defense of Russia.
t.me
The Right People Z
Additional sites for deployment of Pantsir-S1 air defence systems that will protect the capital from Ukrainian UAV attacks have been deployed in the Moscow region. #info
t.me
Given Ukraine's ability to defend itself against the Geran and the greater technical capabilities available to Russia, it is likely that the ‘window of opportunity’ for the effectiveness of these means of attacking deep into the territory of the Russian Federation has begun to close, and Russia will soon adopt the measures Ukraine has adopted as well as improve upon them.
The xx
Russia state-affiliated bot. ☑️
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Мал обрт на ситуацијата во Харков и Донбас. И како се поврзани. Украина е приморана да пренесува трупи од другите региони, за да го стабилизира новиот фронт. Веќе е почнат домино ефектот со тоа што почнаа да губат населени места кои ги имаа под контрола уште од 2014.
Околу 60 населени места им се под ризик дека ќе бидат загубени.
Е сега ќе си праат бајрам со мозокот дека неуспешна офанзива имале Русите кон Харков.
Vanlok
deus ex machina
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US Weapons Accuracy Drops to 10 Percent in Ukraine Due to Jamming
Many high-tech US weapons systems in Ukraine are now useless due to jamming signals by Russia.
mishtalk.com