Најавуваната пролетна офанзива, небаре е холивудски блокбастер, почна дури во летото и заврши катастрофално. Во моментов Русите ги ораат украинските позиции со фабови. Падна Авдеевка, паднаа и сите околни села. Абрамсите одлично се покажаа, додуша како мети за Ланцетите. Почнаа да им ги лупаат и семоќните Химарси и Патриотите во кои се крстеа. А и пари нешто занема. Ти најверојатно чекаш руски тенкови да влезат во Лвов за да речеш дека на Украина лошо и оди.
Руските тенкови требаше да се возат низ Лвов веќе на 28 февруари 2022, а денес да бидат стигнати барем до Париз, ако не и до шпанските и португалските крајбрежја на Атлантскиот Океан.
Тоа е отприлика начинот на размислување на тие кои веруваат дека со сила се` може да се постигне, бидејќи сила Бога не моли и каде што има сила нема правдина.
Делумно се оправдани бидејќи од 1991 година па наваму единствено што знаат од сила е американска сила, никој друг нема демонстрирано сила изминативе 30 (ТРИЕСЕТ) и повеќе години.
Не се специфицираше точно кој Октомври... Трпение, спасение.
Инаку Абрамсите испаднаа и полесна цел од Леопардите. Но без грижи, сега со свемирски ласери и со Ф16 ќе ја оправаат работата. А тек Ф22 кога ќе донесат...
Во меѓувреме карванот...
Автоматски споено мислење:
Какви снабдени музеи ќе се отвараат после војнава...
Situation on Zaporizhia front: During the last two days the Russian Army continued to advance southeast of Chervone reaching the bank of the Yanchur River. In addition, today it was announced the capture of the locality of Myrne. The Russian presence in the locality was previously confirmed. However, today they consolidated new positions to the north and west of it to ensure their control.
Situation west of Avdivka: Russian Army made new advances during the last three days in Tonenke and Berdychi. Meanhwile Ukrainian Army retreated from Orlivka to Durna river.
Situation north of Avdivka: During the last 48 hours Ukrainian Army increased the attacks along the railway and south of Novokalynove and managed to recapture some positions in this axis.
There is still a part of Orlivka in a gray zone, the proximity to the Durna river prevents the Russian Army from completely securing the locality. Meanwhile, fighting in Tonenke continues in the northern part of the village, where Ukrainian troops are holding their positions.
Situation on northeastern front: Russian Army made minimal advances northeast of Tabaivka towards the main Ukrainian trench in this direction. The situation around that village is complicated for Russian forces as Ukrainian Army still in control over the western hills.
Putin's been reelected, Ukraine is desperately short on men, ammunition and equipment, and Western resolve is cracking. It seems to me the time is ripe to end this war.
What do the Russians have to attack with? Let's take a look.
I'm going to preface this analysis by saying that I'm simply ignoring official Russian statements on the size of their military at this point - Shoigu stated earlier this year that there were a little over 1.1 million people in the Russian services, which is impossibly small given the amount of recruitment and mobilization they've done and known casualty figures. I suspect the Russians have administratively bifurcated their military into a "regular" force that will continue in service postwar and a "wartime" force to be demobilized and are only reporting numbers for the regulars. This was standard practice in the US from the Civil War to Vietnam, with a distinction between the "regular" United States Army and the "wartime" Army of the United States.
The prewar Russian Army (including the Ground Forces, VDV and Spetznaz) fielded some 360,000 personnel, with about 100,000 of them conscripts barred from combat in Ukraine but deployable in prewar Russia. LDPR forces added some 34,000 troops to that, and I estimate there were approximately 100,000 Rosgvardiya internal troops who could also be deployed in combat roles (Chechen troops are Rosgvardiya, for instance). I'll round this to a 500,000-man total force. Obviously not all of these available troops went into Ukraine.
Russian force strength seems to have remained largely static until September 2022, when the Russians made what is in retrospect an obvious decision to dig in for a long war against an enemy that was by that point turning into little more than a boxing glove for NATO. Mobilization followed as well as formalization of recruitment for wartime volunteers (who had previously served under very loose rules). Some 300,000 reservists were mobilized immediately and volunteer recruitment increased to around 30,000 new soldiers inducted monthly.
This is, however, a war. Although modest in comparison to Ukrainian losses, Russian casualties have been quite heavy - taking Mediazona as a yardstick we can expect approximately 50,000 Russian KIA by this point and another 50,000 Russian soldiers invalidated by serious wounds.
So let's do some math.
We're looking at a 500,000-man prewar force, plus 300,000 reservists, plus 540,000 volunteers (18 months at 30,000/month), minus 100,000 casualties, for a total army of 1.24 million men.
* I'm rolling "wartime" Wagner contractors into the volunteer bucket as they now work for the MoD. Their prewar cadre has been excluded entirely as it's now in exile in Belarus following Prigozhin's failed putsch. I'm also not attempting to differentiate between volunteerism for the Ground Forces versus Rosgvardiya etc.
Now let's allocate forces. 100,000 conscripts will need to be pulled off the line immediately, and it's reasonable to think that another 140,000 regulars will need to supervise them. This is some 240,000 troops - almost equal in size to Russia's prewar army - who can be deployed for to fill the prewar army's security missions as well as train new volunteers, etc. This leaves a million men to deal with Ukraine - considerably more, by the way, than even the most aggressive estimates of Russian force strength actually in theater, suggesting most of these troops are on standby in the deep rear. This is also much higher than any serious estimate of Ukrainian force strength at this point, most of which range from 400-600,000.
This large figure is supported by secondary evidence such as Western outlets reporting that the Russians are maintaining rotations for their (large) force in theater and the obviously formidable forces now available for deployment on the prewar Russian border, which easily defeated a brigade-size Ukrainian attack last week.
The Russians overprepared to defeat the Ukrainian 2023 offensive. I very strongly suspect they've overprepared for their own attack this year - and that they intend that blow to be so heavy as to foreclose intervention by NATO forces. But more on that later.
Situation west of Donetsk front: Recent video footage shows Russian attack towards Ukrainian position and tank close to the trench system south of Krasnogórivka. During the last week Russian Army retreated from the southern streets following the failure to consolidate positions there. So far, Russian forces still located in the first houses of Shevchenka street.
Situation west of Donetsk: Ukrainian Army retreated towards Durna river and began withdrawal from the northern part of Tonenke. In addition, Russian Army began the attacks to Ukrainian positions north of Orlivka.
Оваа страница користи колачиња за персонализирање на содржината. Со продолжување на користењето, се согласувате со нашата политика за користење колачиња.
