1. Because Europe, as a result of a complete misjudgment of the real strategic situation, is sticking to a course that is diametrically opposed to US strategy and US interests. Trump and his entourage have realized that the war in Ukraine is lost and that there is no real option left to turn this around. Ultimately, Ukraine is not important enough to Trump. He wants to get rid of the problem and foist it on the Europeans. This is partly because of the midterms and partly because he still wants the Nobel Peace Prize.
2. The working and expert levels in the administration have long wanted to shift away from the UA and Eastern Europe and toward China, and see at least the beginning of a normalization of relations with RU as a vital strategic interest. Europe plays a subordinate or rather disruptive role here, if any (see point 1).
3. I dispute that the US has squandered its influence over Russia. On the contrary, this influence is fed by common interests: Russia also has an extremely strong interest in normalizing relations (not least because of the nuclear component of these relations). Both also have an interest in first dividing the world into hemispheres and then resolving conflicts over this with deals.
4. Europe does not have the means – except for verbal sabre-rattling, as was heard at the MSC – to fundamentally change the strategic situation. Certainly not militarily, and the remaining common sense in the capitals dictates that no risks should be taken that could provoke a direct military confrontation between NATO and Russia. The arsenals are empty, the economies are suffering massively from their own sanctions, the budgets are being massively burdened by excessive military spending, and the populations are increasingly unwilling to accept unconditional support for the UA and the aggressive course toward RU.
What Europe should and could do (though not with its current leadership) would be to shift its policy toward Ukraine and Russia toward the development of a new, sustainable security architecture that includes Ukraine AND Russia. There is no other way to solve the problems that Europe has brought upon itself. They certainly cannot be solved militarily or with increased deterrence. Apart from the fact that a massive expansion of deterrence capabilities will not go unanswered by Moscow, which will ultimately lead to less security, less stability, and greater vulnerability to unintentionally triggered escalations, Europe would have to strive for nuclear parity with Russia, CHN, and the US - a project that Michael Rühle once described in a reply to Münckler as “mission impossible.”
No—Europe has squandered its influence with a fundamentally flawed strategy, and it will take truly major changes in Europe's political leadership before the ship can be steered off the sandbank.
